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ABSTRACT 
 
MARK SLAGLE: Mightier Than The Sword? The Black Press  
and the End of Racial Segregation in the U.S. Military, 1948-1954 
(Under the Direction of Dr. Barbara Friedman) 
 
 
Although President Harry S. Truman ordered the integration of the U.S. military in 1948, the 
armed forces made limited progress in desegregating before the summer of 1950. The outbreak 
of war on the Korean peninsula that year forced the military to re-evaluate its policy of 
segregation and ultimately led the complete integration of all the armed forces.  
 
This study analyzes how the largest and most influential black newspapers fought for military 
integration and how these publications reacted when it arrived. By examining how the black 
press sought to achieve its goals, this study illustrates the ways in which black newspapers did 
and did not operate as a dissident media source. 
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“The Army is made up of individual citizens of the United States who have pronounced views 
with respect to the Negro just as they have individual ideas with respect to other matters in their 
daily walk of life. Military orders, fiat, or dicta will not change their viewpoints. The Army then 
cannot be made the means of engendering conflict among the mass of people because of a stand 
with respect to Negroes which is not compatible with the position attained by the Negro in civil 
life. . . .The Army is not a sociological laboratory; to be effective it must be organized and 
trained according to the principles which will ensure success. Experiments to meet the wishes 
and demands of the champions of every race and creed for the solution of their problems are a 
danger to efficiency, discipline, and morale and would result in ultimate defeat.” 
—Col. Eugene R. Householder, U.S. Army, 1941 
 
 
“Salvation for a race, nation, or class must come from within. Freedom is never granted; it is 
won. Justice is never given; it is exacted.” 
—A. Philip Randolph, 1972. 
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Chapter One: Introduction and Background 
A single headline dominated the front page of the July 8, 1950 edition of the 
Chicago Defender, one of America’s largest and most influential black newspapers: 
“TAN GIs GO INTO ACTION!” 1Two weeks earlier the North Korean People’s Army 
had invaded South Korea, prompting President Harry S. Truman to authorize military 
action against the North Koreans. Among the first foot soldiers to engage the North 
Koreans in battle were members of the U.S. Army’s all-black 24th Infantry Regiment. 
These troops, according to the Defender, were “playing leading roles in American 
participation in the clash.”2 
 For the Defender and other black newspapers, the performance of black units such 
as the 24th Infantry Regiment was not only a source of pride, but also an opportunity. 
Black Americans had participated in every major military conflict since the 
Revolutionary War. Yet they were never treated as the equals of their white counterparts. 
The military kept its troops segregated, and black troops were often relegated to support 
roles. For decades the black press had urged the government to integrate its armed forces. 
Its efforts seemed to bear fruit in 1948 when President Truman issued Executive Order 
9981, which mandated the desegregation of all branches of the military. The Army, 
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however, resisted this effort to integrate its ranks. By the time the Korean War began, it 
had made little substantive progress toward desegregation.3 
 The North Koreans’ surprise attack, however, had caught the U.S. military flat-
footed. The rapid demobilization following World War II had left the entire defense 
establishment, and the Army in particular, short of men and resources.4 Eighth Army, 
which was the first American unit to engage the North Koreans in ground combat, was in 
particularly dismal shape. Budget-cutting measures had forced the deactivation of one 
battalion in each of its twelve regiments, except for one: the all-black 24th Infantry 
Regiment of the 25th Division.  
The Army’s policy of racial segregation meant it had few places to put its black 
soldiers after World War II. Most of its black combat troops were therefore assigned to 
occupation duty in Japan with the 24th Regiment.5 Now the Army was forced to send 
these soldiers to the front lines in Korea. No longer relegated to the rear echelons, black 
troops were now in the thick of the fighting.6 For the black press, this turn of events 
meant that black service members would be given a chance to prove their worth as 
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fighting men. Black newspapers had pursued this goal for years.7 At last it was within 
sight. As one editorial in the Defender put it, “these Negro boys who have suffered all the 
indignities and limitations of arrogant racism at home have become heroes of whom 
every American regardless of color must be proud. Their prowess and manhood are the 
equal of any of America’s sons. Yet these are the boys whom Dixiecrat Congressmen 
would relegate to inferior positions.”8  
 The idea that black troops could earn equal treatment by demonstrating their 
abilities on the battlefield was not a new one. Its most immediate precedent was the 
“Double V” campaign launched by the Pittsburgh Courier during World War II. That 
war also saw the government asking black Americans to fight and sacrifice for a nation 
that still treated them as second-class citizens. Inspired by a letter written by a black 
factory worker, the Courier began to promote the idea of a double victory: victory abroad 
over fascism and victory at home over racism. Other black newspapers adopted the 
slogan, urging both black troops and black civilians to do their part for the war effort 
while fighting for civil rights at home. As one Courier columnist wrote, “when the war 
ends the colored American will be better off financially, spiritually and economically. 
War may be hell for some, but it bids fair to open up the portals of heaven for us.”9 
 The exigencies of the war did create opportunities for black servicemen. Black 
soldiers proved their worth as tankers and infantrymen, while the Tuskegee Airmen 
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earned fame as one of the most accomplished fighter escort groups in the Army Air 
Forces.10 Despite these achievements, however, the armed forces sought to return to the 
status quo ante immediately after the war. The black serviceman had fewer opportunities 
for training and advancement in 1946 than he did in 1945.11 The black press, meanwhile, 
could do little but bitterly lament that the sacrifices made by black troops had not yet 
earned them equal treatment. 
 Nonetheless, when the Korean War began black newspapers once again embarked 
upon a similar strategy. They emphasized the accomplishments and sacrifices of black 
troops and voiced support for the war effort even as they demanded change within the 
military. In the early stages of the conflict especially, the pages of black newspapers were 
filled with news stories detailing the exploits of black soldiers and editorials bemoaning 
the Army’s unwillingness to fully comply with Truman’s executive order. The Courier 
went so far as to propose a second Double V campaign.12 Just as in World War II, the 
black press was determined to make Korea the last war the United States would fight 
with a segregated military. 
 In the end, the black press got its wish. Changes in leadership and persistent 
problems in Korea eventually persuaded the Army to finally abandon its policy of racial 
segregation. On July 26, 1951 the Army announced that its all-black units, including the 
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24th Infantry Regiment, would be dissolved and that complete integration of all forces in 
Japan and Korea would be completed in six months. Integration of units stationed 
elsewhere would follow shortly thereafter.13 After decades of mistreatment and 
discrimination, black Americans had finally won the right to fight as equals. 
 The purpose of this study is to analyze how the black press covered the Korean 
War and the end of racial segregation in the U.S. military. For many black editors and 
publishers, the conflict provided them with an opportunity to again demonstrate that 
black Americans were worthy of equal rights. This study seeks to chart, describe, and 
analyze how three of the nation’s largest black newspapers—the Chicago Defender, the 
Pittsburgh Courier, and the Baltimore Afro-American— used the war as a vehicle to 
advance the goal of complete racial integration within the military, what strategies these 
newspapers used, how their coverage did or did not fit conform to the typical roles of the 
alternative press, and how they reacted to their success.  
 This study also places the black newspapers’ campaign for military integration 
within the larger context of an ongoing debate within the black press about how to best 
achieve its goals. In some respects, this campaign was the last major victory for the 
generation of black publishers and editors who had come of age before World War II. 
That experience had defined their goals and strategies as they used their papers to 
advocate for equal rights. The next generation of civil rights advocates, however, had a 
different plan. By examining how the largest and most influential black newspapers 
addressed the topic of military integration at this crucial moment, this study provides an 
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important discussion of how the black press provided a forum for discussion among its 
readership. 
Historical Context 
 To understand how the most influential black newspapers perceived and reacted 
to the end of military segregation during the Korean War, it is necessary to first 
understand the history of both black military service and the black press. Black 
Americans have long served in the nation’s armed forces, yet for most of that time they 
were not allowed to serve alongside white troops. Often used in labor battalions, blacks 
were allowed to take up arms only out of military necessity or intense political pressure. 
When the crisis passed, the military usually returned black troops to their non-combat 
roles or removed them from the armed forces altogether. 
 The struggle for an integrated military had long been a goal of many black 
newspapers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Yet these newspapers did 
not always agree on how to best achieve this goal. The issue was inexorably intertwined 
with a larger debate within the black community about how to best win equal rights for 
black Americans. Some newspapers advocated a policy of accommodation with the white 
power structure, while others took a more militant stance. Yet all of them agreed that 
black Americans could contribute much to the armed forces if given a chance to 
participate as full citizens.  
Black Americans in the U.S. Military 
 The history of black military service in the United States predates the creation of 
the nation itself. During the American Revolution black men served alongside whites at 
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the battles of Lexington and Bunker Hill, among others.14 Despite the efforts of these 
men on behalf of the rebellious colonies, Southern slaveholders were unsettled by the 
prospect of arming slaves and free blacks. At the Continental Congress in September 
1775, Edward Rutledge of South Carolina attempted to bar all blacks, both free and slave, 
from serving. That effort failed, but one month later General George Washington and his 
officers acquiesced to the concerns of the slaveholders and banned all blacks from the 
Continental Army. Washington later relented and allowed black veterans of the fighting 
in New England to reenlist. The ban on new black recruits, however, remained in force.15 
 In the years after the Revolution, the fledgling armed forces of the new nation 
continued to exclude blacks from their ranks, at least officially. It was not until the Civil 
War that the United States military formally institutionalized black service. The process 
began in a piecemeal fashion, as Union Army commanders such as Ben Butler began 
freeing Southern slaves and incorporating them into their forces. The use of such 
“contrabands of war,” in Butler’s words, eventually became official policy within parts of 
the Union Army. The Union Navy soon followed suit.16 Following President Abraham 
Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation in early 1863, Congress authorized black 
enrollment in all of the armed forces.17 By the end of the war, 186,000 blacks had served 
in the Union Army, most as enlisted men although a few managed to earn officers’ 
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commissions.18 The performance of these men persuaded Congress to finally formalize 
the presence of black troops by mandating that the Army maintain six all-black units. 
After a re-organization of the Army in 1869, this number was reduced to four: the 24th 
Infantry (Colored), the 25th Infantry (Colored), the 9th Cavalry, and the 10th Cavalry.19  
 Although black troops had a poor reputation among their white counterparts and 
the public at large, the Army needed them. With the end of the Civil War, the nation’s 
attention had turned westward, as white settlers pushed the frontier further toward the 
other side of the continent. This process inevitably brought them into conflict with local 
Native Americans, some of whom responded violently. In 1867, the Army dispatched the 
all-black 9th and 10th Cavalry to the frontier to protect the settlers.20 Life on the frontier 
was little better for the cavalrymen than it had been back east. Living conditions were 
deplorable. Black troops received far less pay and rations than their white counterparts. 
The Army failed to provide suitable equipment or uniforms, forcing the men to scrounge 
for their supplies and giving them a rather motley appearance. Moreover, the local whites 
were rarely grateful for the protection the soldiers provided.21 Despite all these setbacks, 
the men of the 9th and 10th Cavalry performed ably during their service on the frontier. 
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They proved their worth as combatants in battles with various Native American tribes, 
and by around 1870 had earned the nickname “Buffalo Soldiers.”22  
 When America went to war with Spain over Cuba in 1898, black troops faced a 
new challenge. Because all four of the black Army units included experienced veterans, 
and because many whites thought blacks were constitutionally suited to tropical warfare, 
the Army decided to put all of its black units into action.23 The performance of the black 
troops made an impression on many of the white officers who witnessed their courage 
under fire. By the end of the war, five black soldiers and one black sailor had earned 
Medals of Honor.24 
 Blacks also served in the Spanish-controlled Philippine Islands during and after 
the war, but under very different conditions. Although the U.S. military had hoped to 
make common cause with the local insurgents there much as it had in Cuba, the Filipinos 
quickly determined that America was more interested in gaining control of the islands 
than liberating them. The 1899 peace treaty with Spain placed the Philippines under 
American control; by that time Filipino insurgents were already attacking U.S. troops. To 
respond to the threat, President William McKinley authorized the creation of two new 
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black regiments, the 48th and 49th Volunteer Infantry. In 1900 these units joined the 
regular black units already on the islands.25 
 Despite concerns from black civilian leaders and a Filipino propaganda campaign 
that chastised black troops for participating in a war of racial conquest, black soldiers 
continued to serve. Their actions earned them little gratitude, however, as demonstrated 
in 1906 when President Teddy Roosevelt ordered the dishonorable discharge of 167 black 
soldiers for their alleged participation in the so-called “Brownsville Raid.”26 Although the 
Brownsville affair was damaging to the reputation of black soldiers in general, it was 
later eclipsed by another incident of racial unrest in Texas. In 1917 the 24th Infantry 
Regiment was sent to Camp Logan, on the outskirts of Houston. There the members of 
the unit encountered an openly hostile civilian populace and a local police force that 
treated them no differently than any other black man: that is, with contempt and 
sometimes violence. On the morning of August 23, 1917, one of the members of the 
regiment attempted to intervene when he witnessed a white police officer beating a black 
woman on the street. The officer responded by clubbing him over the head and arresting 
him. When a black military police officer inquired about the arrested man, the white 
officer clubbed him and shot at him. That incident touched off a two-hour rampage in 
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which about a hundred black soldiers marched through the streets of Houston shooting at 
police officers and other whites.27  
To the Army leadership, which was increasingly dominated by Southerners, 
events such as the Houston riot proved that black troops were largely unfit for military 
service. Although the Army continued to accept blacks into its ranks, it did so only in 
relatively small numbers. Moreover, the Army insisted that only Southern white officers 
should command black units, on the grounds that Southern whites had more experience 
interacting with blacks. This resulted in an increasing number of black units relegated to 
support units such as labor battalions. The trend of moving black soldiers away from 
combat duty might have persisted had it not been for the manpower shortage created by 
America’s entry into World War I.28 
 A new draft law passed in 1917 had brought tens of thousands of blacks into the 
Army.  In August of that year, the Army approved a plan to organize sixteen new infantry 
regiments and a number of support units to absorb these new recruits. Because of the 
violence in Houston, however, the War Department approved only four regiments. These 
four regiments comprised the 92nd Division. A second black division, the 93rd Division 
(Provisional), was created to absorb mobilized black National Guard units from various 
                                                 
27
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states.29 The Army, however, was now forced to confront two conflicting forces: the 
logistics of organizing and supplying the newly created black divisions as well as the 
existing infantry and cavalry regiments, and the need to adhere to the mores of racial 
segregation. Black officers were therefore limited to the infantry, and certain commands 
permitted no black officers above the rank of second lieutenant. The Houston incident 
had also made the Army sensitive to Southern fears of large numbers of blacks in their 
communities. Most black troops were therefore stationed in the North and Midwest 
before being sent overseas.30 
 The Army’s efforts to maintain segregation, however, broke down when the black 
units arrived in France. In marked contrast to their own countrymen’s treatment of them, 
black soldiers found French citizens to be welcoming. Despite the efforts of the military 
police to maintain a separation of the races, black soldiers mingled freely with French 
civilians.  
Relationships between black soldiers and French women were a subject of particular ire 
for the Army leadership.31 The refusal of the French military to participate in the U.S. 
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Army’s program of segregation created a situation of de facto integration in certain parts 
of France.32 
 Emboldened by their performance abroad and their good relations with the 
French, many black soldiers returned home after the war with the hope that they had 
earned a modicum of respect from the country they had served. Instead, they found a 
populace gripped by a paralyzing fear of Communism and a resurgent Ku Klux Klan. 
White mobs throughout the South and Midwest lynched blacks by the hundreds. Black 
soldiers, whose uniforms offended Southern sensibilities, were a frequent target.33 Within 
the military, the numbers of blacks in the Army dwindled as black soldiers demobilized 
and the War Department again limited the numbers of blacks eligible to enlist. Despite 
the inhospitable racial climate of the interwar years, there were some victories for black 
soldiers. The most notable of these was the approval of flight training for blacks in the 
Army Air Forces at the Tuskegee Institute in Alabama.34 
 When America went to war again in 1941, however, the armed forces remained 
strictly segregated. Although President Franklin D. Roosevelt had promised to improve 
the status of blacks in the military, the military of 1941 looked very much like the 
military of 1918. The Marines still had no black members, and the Navy continued to 
relegate its black sailors to the stewards’ branch. The Army, meanwhile, again sacrificed 
efficiency for the sake of maintaining separate facilities for its black troops.35 Even as the 
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Army was gripped by a severe manpower shortage, it wasted considerable amounts of 
time and money providing duplicate command structures.36 
 For the first few years of the war, it seemed as though no black serviceman would 
ever see combat. The only exceptions were the fighter escort pilots of the 99th Fighter 
Squadron of the Army Air Forces, better known the Tuskegee Airmen.37 The 
disenchantment of the black community, and its political implications, eventually 
compelled the War Department to reconsider its ban on blacks serving in ground combat 
roles. In early 1944 the Army dispatched the 93rd Infantry Division to the Pacific, while 
the 92nd Division was sent to Europe a few months later. The performance of both units 
was somewhat marred by mistrust between white officers and black soldiers, as well as 
the generally poor level of training and morale among the black troops. Nonetheless, 
elements of both divisions earned accolades as antiaircraft gunners, artillerymen, tank 
destroyers, and riflemen.38 
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 Throughout the war in Europe, commanders had unofficially mingled black and 
white artillery battalions, tanker, and tank destroyer elements. By late 1944, the 
manpower shortage within the Army had become so severe that black replacements were 
sent to white rifle companies.39 Faced with a lack of staffing options after the Battle of 
the Bulge, General Dwight Eisenhower’s deputy for logistics, Lieutenant General John 
C.H. Lee, proposed that black soldiers who had received infantry training be integrated 
into white units fighting at the front.40 Lee’s proposal instantly ran into opposition from a 
number of commanders, including Lieutenant General George S. Patton Jr., commander 
of Third Army. In the end, Eisenhower did not insist that Patton accept black troops, and 
the volunteers went to other units instead. There they proved overwhelmingly successful, 
particularly in First Army.41 
 For all the accomplishments of black soldiers during World War II, many Army 
leaders refused to recognize that blacks could perform as well as whites on the 
battlefield.42 When black units performed poorly, many officials concluded that their race 
made them ill-suited for combat. Few thought to blame the poor training and leadership 
the Army provided these units.  
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These attitudes meant that although the exigencies of the battlefield had allowed blacks to 
make limited gains, the Army remained committed to an official policy of segregation. 
After the war, the Army disbanded the 92nd and 93rd Divisions, leaving only a few 
smaller units, such as 24th Infantry Regiment. As the service sought to return to a policy 
of strict segregation, there were few options for blacks who remained in the Army. 
Unsure what to do with its black troops, the Army assigned many of them to occupation 
duty in Japan.43  
The glacial pace of progress was a source of great frustration to the black press. 
Now the war outside America’s borders was won, but the one within it had scarcely been 
joined. Black troops returning home from Europe and the Pacific, including those who 
had been cited for their service, were still subjected to discrimination and physical 
violence. In one particularly notorious case, a black sergeant wearing his Army uniform 
was blinded by a South Carolina sheriff, an incident that received widespread coverage in 
the black press.44 But despite the best efforts of black newspapers, there was little 
substantive progress toward military integration. 
 That changed on July 26, 1948, when Roosevelt’s successor, Harry S. Truman, 
signed Executive Order 9981. The order, which was designed to ensure equal treatment 
in the military, read in part: “It is hereby declared to be the policy of the President that 
there shall be equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services 
without regard to race, color, religion or national origin. This policy shall be put into 
effect as rapidly as possible, having due regard to the time required to effectuate any 
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necessary changes without impairing efficiency or morale.”45 The black press greeted the 
news with triumphant headlines. Yet the jubilation of the black press would soon give 
way to more frustration as it became apparent that the military was dragging its feet in 
ending segregation. It would take another war, this one fought in Korea, to finally 
integrate the American forces. 
The Black Press: Strategies of Protest 
 Throughout its history, the black press has been an ardent advocate for the civil 
rights and improved conditions of black Americans. According to the Swedish economist 
Gunnar Myrdal, by the mid-20th century no other institution within the black community 
was as powerful.46 But black newspapers did not march in lockstep toward these goals. 
On the contrary, black newspapers frequently disagreed with one another, sometimes 
bitterly, as to whether to seek accommodation with the white power structure in hopes of 
earning equal rights or to confront it directly. Bernell Tripp’s Origins of the Black Press: 
New York, 1827-1847 made clear that the first black newspapers were created in order to 
provide an outlet for black citizens who were either ignored or denigrated in the 
mainstream press.47 Papers such as Samuel Cornish and John Russwurm’s Freedom’s 
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Journal and Willis Hodges’ The Ram’s Horn protested the qualification tests and 
financial restrictions that barred free blacks in the North from participating in politics.48 
 Despite these early voices of protest, however, many antebellum black 
newspapers preferred to emphasize the accomplishments of free blacks. Frankie Hutton’s 
The Early Black Press in America, 1827 to 1860 noted that “while avoiding a continuum 
of confrontation with white leaders on important issues and problems, the black press 
showcased the best of the race and kept hope alive.”49 These papers were targeted largely 
at middle class blacks in the North, as well as blacks who aspired to the middle class. 
Their publishers and editors stressed the importance of education and self-improvement, 
and “reasoned that coverage in their newspapers of the good times, good deeds, and 
successes of free blacks was sure to make an impression on those of influence in 
America.”50 During the Civil War the black press became somewhat more outspoken in 
its demands for more rights. It also encouraged and lauded the black troops who served in 
the segregated Union Army. 
 After the war, black newspapers pushed west toward the frontier and south into 
the states of the former Confederacy. In their sweeping A History of the Black Press, 
Armistead Pride and Clint Wilson noted that these new papers were similarly divided as 
to how best serve their readers. The New Orleans Tribune, a bilingual newspaper founded 
a year before the end of the war, published a list of demands in one of its early issues: 
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equal treatment for black and white soldiers in position and pay, the same for black and 
white ministers, the enrollment of black children in white schools, and voting rights for 
black men.51 The Colored American of Augusta, Georgia, by contrast, espoused a 
philosophy of interracial accord: “[the newspaper] is designed to be a vehicle for the 
diffusion of Religious, Political and General Intelligence. It will be devoted to the 
promotion of harmony and goodwill between the whites and colored people of the South, 
and untiring in its advocacy of Industry and Education among all classes; but particularly 
the class most in need of our agency.”52 
 Pride and Wilson also noted that the end of the nineteenth century, which saw the 
U.S. Supreme Court affirm the constitutionality of the “separate but equal” doctrine in 
Plessy v. Ferguson, brought about an era in which the gulf between the advocates of 
accommodation and the advocates of confrontation widened: “Following the Plessy 
decision and into the twentieth century, the Black press largely divided into two—
decidedly unequal—ideological camps: one supporting Booker T. Washington, the other 
supporting W.E.B. Du Bois.”53 Washington and Du Bois became the symbols of black 
cooperation and black militancy, respectively. Their lives and writings would inspire 
decades of fractious infighting within the black press. 
 Washington, who was born into slavery in 1856, was the first president of the 
Tuskegee Institute. Created to provide both vocational training and a traditional education 
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to black Americans, the Institute became a vehicle for Washington’s philosophy of self-
reliance. Washington captured the essence of this idea in a speech at the 1895 Cotton 
States and Industrial Exposition in Atlanta. Known as “the Atlanta Compromise,” 
Washington’s speech addressed the nature of race relations in the United States and urged 
blacks to steer clear of “extremist folly.” Instead, they should prove their worth as 
citizens through hard work. Proposing a tripartite alliance among Northern capitalists, 
Southern business leaders and blacks, Washington suggested blacks temporarily put aside 
their struggle for equality in exchange for an opportunity to share in the economic growth 
that would result from Northern investment. Washington neatly summed up this idea with 
a vivid metaphor: “In all things that are purely social we can be as separate as the fingers, 
yet one as the hand in all things essential to mutual progress.”54 
 In addition to his skills as an educator and orator, Washington also possessed a 
canny sense of power and how to cultivate it. Under his leadership, the Tuskegee Institute 
became one of the wealthiest institutions of learning in the South. Supported by donations 
from wealthy philanthropists and boasting a large network of loyal graduates, 
Washington’s school became the center of what became known as the Tuskegee 
Machine. The Tuskegee Machine also included a number of black newspapers that spread 
Washington’s message of racial accommodation. Edgar A. Toppin described how the 
process worked: “Washington’s ‘Tuskegee Machine’ influenced black newspapers and 
magazines. The Tuskegee news bureau, directed by Emmett J. Scott, sent out a flood of 
news releases and canned editorials. By placing or withholding ads, the well-endowed 
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Tuskegee clique persuaded many black editors, most of whose publications were in 
financial straits, to carry these materials favorable to Washington’s views. Moreover, the 
Tuskegee cabal secretly purchased several black periodicals, controlling them 
unbeknownst to the public.”55 
The newspaper most closely linked to Washington was T. Thomas Fortune’s New 
York Age.56 Fortune’s Age had begun life as the Rumor, a 12-page tabloid that billed itself 
as “A Representative Colored American Newspaper.”57 Fortune joined the staff of the 
newspaper in 1879, and by 1891 was editor of what was now called the Age. Not long 
afterwards, he became friends with Washington. Although Fortune personally believed in 
the necessity of more direct forms of social protest, his close friendship with Washington 
led him to use his newspaper to defend Washington’s philosophy of interracial 
cooperation.58  
Washington’s most passionate opponent, W.E.B. Du Bois, also used the black 
press to publicize his own solution to segregation and political disenfranchisement. Du 
Bois, a Harvard-educated sociologist and criminologist, learned the power of the press 
early in life. Born in 1868, by the age of sixteen he had become a correspondent, 
ironically, for the forerunner of Fortune’s Age, the New York Globe.59 By early 
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adulthood, however, Du Bois had become convinced that real change could only come 
about through agitation and protest. In his 1903 book The Souls of Black Folk, Du Bois 
argued that Washington’s strategy of cooperation would consign the black race to eternal 
servitude. Two years later, Du Bois helped found the Niagara Movement, an organization 
that existed primarily to refute Washington’s message of accommodation. Another 
member of the Niagara Movement was William Monroe Trotter, who had become one of 
the most forceful voices for Du Bois’ ideas in the black press. Trotter’s Boston Guardian, 
which he founded in 1901 with George Forbes, repeatedly attacked Washington’s 
policies on its editorial page.60 Richard Digby-Junger observed that “Washington’s other 
detractors, even W. E. B. DuBois, moderated their public criticisms before Trotter.”61 Du 
Bois also cultivated relationships with other journalists and influential individuals outside 
of the Niagara Movement, most notably the anti-lynching activist Ida B. Wells. Wells, 
like Du Bois, was an ardent opponent of Washington’s policies, and the two leaders were 
among the most vocal advocates of radical change.62  
Du Bois did not rely on others to communicate his message of social protest, 
however. Historian Roland Wolseley noted that Du Bois “founded five magazines. . . was 
a correspondent for four newspapers, columnist for numerous both black and white 
papers, and contributor of articles to many general as well as scholarly periodicals, black 
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and white.”63 The most significant of these publications was the Crisis, founded by Du 
Bois in 1910 as the house organ for the newly created National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People. Du Bois stayed at the Crisis for more than 20 years; 
during that time, according to Wolseley, he “made the magazine a vigorous critic of any 
national policy or event which resulted in harm to the black people—whether it was 
discrimination in the military services or the wartime lynchings of the 1914-1919 
conflict.”64 
However, it was during this same period that Du Bois published his most 
infamous and atypically accommodationist editorial. Entitled “Close Ranks,” it ran in the 
July 1918 issue of the Crisis and was the result of an unusual investigation by the federal 
government. The criticism of the more militant black newspapers had attracted the 
attention of federal investigators, who feared such rhetoric might damage the war effort. 
In June, Du Bois and number of other black journalists and activists were invited to a 
conference in Washington, D.C. hosted by the War Department and the Committee on 
Public Information. As Patrick Washburn wrote in The African American Newspaper, 
“the meeting was suggested by two blacks in the government who felt that the black press 
was in danger of being suppressed and needed to meet face to face with government 
officials, who perhaps could abolish some of the injustices facing blacks. At the same 
time, they hoped that the editors would become boosters of the war effort; thus the 
conference would stress ‘the fact that we are at war that that Negro public opinion should 
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be led along helpful lines rather than along lines that make for discontentment and 
unrest.’”65  
Although Du Bois had been highly critical of the American government following 
its declaration of war in 1917, after the Washington conference he reversed his policy 
toward the war effort. In “Close Ranks,” he wrote: “We of the colored race have no 
ordinary interest in the outcome. That which the German power represents today spells 
death to the aspirations of Negroes and all darker races for equality, freedom and 
democracy. Let us not hesitate. Let us, while the war lasts, forget our special grievances 
and close our ranks shoulder to shoulder with our white fellow citizens and the allied 
nations that are fighting for democracy. We make no ordinary sacrifice, but we make it 
gladly and willingly, with our eyes lifted to the hills.”66  
This was an extraordinary reversal for Du Bois, and one that he later came to 
regret. As historian Manning Marable wrote, “Du Bois’s 1917-1918 strategy was based 
upon two assumptions: that loyal participation by American Negroes in the conflict 
would lead to expanded democratic rights and a lessening of social injustices and 
lynchings in the postwar era, and that the war would promote the independence of the 
former German African colonies. Both assumptions proved tragically incorrect.”67 
 When the end of the war brought no real change for black Americans, a chastened 
Du Bois rejoined his allies in pressing for real change. Despite the embarrassment 
surrounding his “Close Ranks” editorial, Du Bois’s philosophy of social protest was 
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becoming more popular within the black press and the black community at large. The 
war, which had brought black people from different classes and backgrounds together for 
a single cause, had created the foundation for “a large-scale social movement to carry out 
the black cause.”68 Perhaps just as importantly, Washington had died in 1915. With his 
passing, the Tuskegee Machine lost its grip on the black press, and more newspapers 
began to identify openly with Du Bois’s Niagara Movement.69 
 Yet even as Washington and Du Bois and their partisans fought to control the 
direction of the struggle for equal rights, there were many black Americans who sought 
to reconcile the differences between the two, or transcend them completely. Despite the 
outsize influence of Washington and Du Bois, the black community writ large was never 
a monolithic institution dominated by a single individual or idea. Differences in class, 
gender, and socioeconomic status meant that numerous factions among black Americans 
embodied philosophies of social change that could not be classified easily as either 
accomodationist or confrontational. The middle-class Women’s Convention of the black 
National Baptist Convention, for example, espoused a “politics of respectability” that 
contained an implicit message of assimilation with the white community.70 This 
fundamentally Washingtonian message of self-improvement, however, “also provided the 
platform from which black church women came to demand full equality with white 
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America.”71 Similarly, many of the black intelligentsia of the early twentieth century 
espoused a philosophy of “racial uplift” that sought to undermine culturally dominant 
depictions of black Americans even as they embraced white-dominated notions of 
middle-class life.72 
 The intellectual tumult engendered by these coexisting and sometimes conflicting 
notions of how to achieve true equality was a boon to black newspapers, which became 
the primary forum for these debates. The black press was also benefiting from the mass 
exodus of Southern blacks to the North. Known as “The Great Migration,” this 
movement was fueled by the harsh living conditions of the Jim Crow South and the 
promise of work in the factories of the North. These migrants flooded into the industrial 
centers of the North. New York City’s black population grew from 91,709 in 1910 to 
152,465 in 1920; Detroit’s black community of 5,741 in 1910 swelled to 44,838 in ten 
years; and Chicago’s black population grew from 44,103 in 1910 to 109,458 in 1920.73 
This influx of blacks into the cities expanded the readership of black newspapers and thus 
made them more profitable. It also made these papers much more important to the 
communities they served, as recent arrivals depended on the black press to familiarize 
them with their new surroundings. 
 Emboldened by their growing economic power, many black newspapers 
demonstrated a growing willingness to participate or even lead forms of social protest. 
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One such example was a 1929 campaign by the New York Amsterdam News called 
“Don’t Buy Where You Can’t Work.” Designed to exert pressure on merchants who 
refused to hire blacks, the campaign succeeded in changing the hiring practices of a 
number of local business. It was also hugely popular with the News’ readers.74 The News’ 
campaign was emblematic of a trend toward more strident calls for racial justice within 
the black press. One notable target of black newspapers’ ire in the early twentieth century 
was segregation within the military. Foremost among the black newspapers leading the 
charge for equal rights within and without the armed forces were three of the nation’s 
largest and most influential: the Chicago Defender, the Pittsburgh Courier, and the 
Baltimore Afro-American.  
The Chicago Defender 
Founded by Robert Sengstacke Abbott in 1905, the Defender appeared in a 
crowded market for black newspapers. Chicago already had three black papers when 
Abbott started his weekly. His original aim, as he later wrote, was to “create an organ that 
mirror the needs, opinions, and aspirations of my race.”75 The Defender quickly became 
popular among blacks for its blend of sensational reporting and scathing indictments of 
Jim Crow and Southern racism.76 During and after World War I, Abbott used his paper to 
encourage the migration of Southern blacks to Northern cities such as Chicago.77 Abbott 
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and his newspaper benefited greatly from the large numbers of blacks moving to 
Chicago. In 1915, the newspaper reached its peak circulation of about 230,000, although 
because Pullman porters circulated the newspaper on railroads, its actual readership may 
have surpassed one million.78 By 1916 it was the largest selling black newspaper in the 
nation.79 Many of the Defender’s readers lived below the Mason-Dixon line; the 
newspaper was distributed throughout the South in both large cities and small towns.80 
After World War I, however, the newspaper began a long slow decline in 
readership. By the early 1930s it had shrunk to around 73,000. By the late 1930s, Abbott 
was nearing the end of his life and increasingly focused on ensuring an orderly transition 
after his death. He had already chosen John H. Sengstacke, his brother’s son, as his 
successor. Abbott had paid close attention to Sengstacke’s rearing and education for 
years, and upon the younger man’s graduation from the Hampton Institute (now Hampton 
University) in Virginia, steered him toward the Chicago School of Printing. Sengstacke 
studied his uncle’s trade there while taking business classes at Northwestern University. 
In 1934, Abbott hired Sengstacke as vice president and treasurer of the Robert S. Abbott 
Publishing Company. One year later he promoted him to general manager. Almost every 
stage of Sengstacke’s early career was carefully guided by Abbott.81 In 1938, Abbott 
turned control of day-to-day operations of the Defender over to Sengstacke. Abbott’s 
death two years later placed Sengstacke in total control of the newspaper. The younger 
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man was almost immediately presented with a series of problems, including sagging 
circulation figures, a federal investigation of the Defender’s coverage of the American 
government’s activities during World War II, and stiff competition from the Defender’s 
primary rival, the Pittsburgh Courier. 
The Pittsburgh Courier 
The Courier began life in 1910 as a weekly founded by Nathanial Harleston, a 
security guard who dabbled in poetry.82 It was another man, however, who would 
transform the two-page publication into one of the most influential black newspapers of 
the twentieth century. Robert Vann was a lawyer who had contributed articles and poetry 
to the Courier; he later became the newspaper’s legal counsel.83 When the Courier’s 
editor quit, Vann quickly took his place. Over the next thirty years, Vann transformed the 
struggling paper into a financially successful publication with a strong reputation among 
both blacks and whites. By the mid-1930s, the Courier had become the largest black 
newspaper in the nation, with a circulation of about 250,000.84 Following Vann’s death in 
October 1940, his wife Jessie assumed control of the Courier. Ira Lewis, who had worked 
at the paper since 1914 as a sports writer and eventually managing editor, and whom 
Vann had hand-picked as his successor, became editor. Under his leadership the Courier 
reached its highest circulation, and gained even greater popularity. By 1947, the Courier 
was bringing in two million dollars annually and its circulation had grown to about 
330,000. The paper operated twelve branch offices, published fourteen editions around 
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the country, and employed 165 workers.85 When Lewis died in 1948, P.L. Prattis and 
William Nunn Sr. took over daily operations.86 
Taking its cues from the Defender, the Courier offered its readers an equal 
mixture of sensationalism and advocacy. The Courier was a vocal opponent of Jim Crow, 
leading public campaigns against segregation in public facilities. The paper was also 
known for its efforts to integrate professional sports; the Courier gave considerable 
coverage to Jackie Robinson and Joe Louis early in their careers. The newspaper’s 
editorial tone earned it the affection and loyalty of readers far beyond Pittsburgh. Like the 
Defender, it had a national audience.87 The only other paper with so large a reach was the 
Baltimore Afro-American. 
The Baltimore Afro-American 
 The Afro-American began life as three different church newspapers: the Afro-
American, the Sunday School Helper, and the Ledger. In 1892 the Helper’s publisher, 
John H. Murphy Sr., bought the other two papers and named his new publication the 
Afro-American Ledger and later just the Afro-American. Murphy, an ex-Union Army 
sergeant, was also the Sunday School superintendent at the St. John A.M.E. Church. His 
new paper soon earned a reputation for probity and moderation that matched that of its 
owner: Murphy refused to accept advertising from alcoholic beverage companies or 
political organizations. The Afro-American was a stalwart advocate of equal rights for 
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black citizens. It editorialized for years against unequal pay for black and white teachers 
and the absence of black officers on the Baltimore police force. Murphy also used his 
own money to fund a lawsuit seeking to end segregation aboard Southbound trains.88 
 After Murphy’s death in 1922, control of the Afro-American fell to his son, Carl 
Murphy. By that point the newspaper had already become a national publication. The 
younger Murphy continued the tradition of his father, avoiding alliances with political 
factions while remaining committed to the equal treatment of black Americans. That 
philosophy is embodied in a creed written by John Murphy Sr.: “A newspaper succeeds 
because its management believes in itself, in God and in the present generation. It must 
always ask itself—Whether it has kept the faith with the common people; Whether it has 
no other goal except to see that their liberties are preserved and their future assured; 
Whether it is fighting to get rid of slums, to provide jobs for everybody; Whether it stays 
out of politics except to expose corruption and condemn injustice, race prejudice and the 
cowardice of compromise.”89 The paper’s contempt for the “cowardice of compromise” 
would be put to the test during the Korean War as black soldiers continued to struggle for 
equal treatment. 
Research on the Black Press and the Military  
Given the relative paucity of scholarship devoted to either the black press or the 
Korean War, it is unsurprising that there are no studies of how the black press covered 
that conflict. As David Halberstam wrote in his final book, “the true brutality of the war 
never really penetrated the American cultural consciousness. . . . When servicemen 
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returned from their tours, they found their neighbors generally not very interested in what 
they had seen and done. The subject of the war was quickly dispensed with in 
conversation.”90 Similarly, the Korean War is absent from most general histories of the 
black press, which often skip from its heyday during and immediately after World War II 
to its sudden decline in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Armistead Pride and Clint 
Wilson’s A History of the Black Press claimed that “the numerous peaks reached in the 
1940s became an orchestrated crescendo just before the 1954 U.S. Supreme Court 
decision in Brown v. Board of Education” but makes no mention of black newspapers’ 
role in fighting for military integration during the Korean War.91 In The Black Press 
U.S.A., another widely cited history of black newspapers and magazines, Roland 
Wolseley concluded that “in the late 1940s storms were clearly ahead for the American 
black press,” but failed to mention how its struggle for desegregation in the military 
might have affected the difficulties it faced later in the century.92 Perspectives of the 
Black Press: 1974, a collection of essays by scholars and journalists, included several 
entries on how black newspapers covered World War II and the issues confronting the 
black press of the 1970s. It did not contain any discussion about the Korean War, or even 
more curiously, the then still-ongoing Vietnam conflict.93 Even the most recent works on 
the history of the black press continue to omit the Korean conflict from their pages. 
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Patrick Washburn’s The African American Newspaper made reference to the economic 
and political difficulties facing black newspapers in the early 1950s but not to the war.94 
There are, however, several studies that analyzed how black newspapers have 
covered other wars. William Jordan’s Black Newspapers and America’s War for 
Democracy, 1914-1920 chronicled the struggles of the black press during the First World 
War. In it, Jordan noted that despite the threat of investigation, newspapers such as 
Abbott’s Defender continued to assail the government’s racist policies. Although 
pressure from the government may have led some newspapers to moderate their 
coverage, they did not abandon their goal of racial equality.95 Given the obstacles 
confronting them, black newspapers were at least somewhat successful in achieving their 
goals. They avoided the kind of suppression that drove the socialist press and German-
language press to the brink of extinction during the same period. Moreover, their 
editorializing helped the growth of a national anti-lynching movement at a time when 
racialized violence permeated the South and Midwest. Above all, Jordan concluded, the 
publishers and editors of the leading black newspapers of that time were pragmatists who 
communicated their message as effectively as they could in the face of intense 
government scrutiny and societal pressure.96 
The black press would confront many of the same issues during World War II. 
Once again, the black press came under scrutiny from the federal government, a process 
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detailed at length in Patrick Washburn’s A Question of Sedition.97 Washburn noted that 
the war effort required the participation of large numbers of black Americans in both the 
military and civilian industry. But even after the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 
1941 thrust America into the war and unified much of the nation against the Axis threat, 
the black press criticized the Roosevelt administration for not doing more to guarantee 
equal treatment for black Americans.98 Why should black soldiers fight for freedom 
abroad, black writers and editors reasoned, if they were denied it at home? Roosevelt, 
concerned about maintaining public support, eventually directed Attorney General 
Francis Biddle to investigate the black press and other critics for violations of the World 
War I-era Espionage and Sedition Acts. Biddle met with John Sengstacke in June 1942 to 
discuss Roosevelt’s concerns.99 Sengstacke persuaded Biddle that he and other African-
American newspaper publishers would gladly support the war effort in exchange for 
better access to government officials. According to Washburn, Biddle agreed to this 
arrangement. Shortly thereafter, many black newspapers began reporting more favorably 
on the war effort, and the Justice Department turned its attention to other matters.100  
Despite Roosevelt’s concerns, the black press in general never offered more than 
muted criticism of the American government during the war, Washburn argued. Even as 
the newspaper took issue with the military’s treatment of black military personnel, it 
strove to convince the government that it remained loyal to the country. Just weeks after 
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Pearl Harbor, the Defender published an editorial insisting that the newspaper would 
continue its crusade for civil rights even as it pledged its loyalty to a nation that had done 
little to protect those rights. In trying to reconcile these notions, the editorialists argued 
that equal rights for black Americans would help the country “save democracy.” This was 
an appeal based not on the notion of the equality of all races, but on the practical 
advantages of desegregation.101  
 The fight for racial justice in the Second World War was not limited to the 
reporters and editors who remained on the homefront. Jinx Broussard and John Maxwell 
Hamilton’s “Covering a Two-Front War: Three African-American Foreign 
Correspondents During World War II” described how black journalists who reported on 
the war from Italy, France, and Great Britain used their coverage to highlight the 
achievements of black soldiers, which were generally ignored by the mainstream press. 
Broussard and Hamilton wrote: “Many of the articles [the correspondents] filed used 
glowing terms such as “daring” and “brilliant” to describe feats by African Americans on 
the battlefield. Glorification of military personnel and patriotism generally was common 
among all correspondents. The difference for the black media was that black patriotism 
could not be assumed. To recount black heroism was to make a powerful political 
statement that ran counter to racial attitudes at home.”102 Echoing Washburn’s work, 
Broussard and Hamilton noted that for these correspondents, the achievements of black 
soldiers provided an opportunity to advance the argument of racial equality. 
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 Lee Finkle, however, took a dim view of the black press’ activities during this 
time period. In his book Forum for Protest, Finkle concluded that the Double V 
campaign was merely a “pseudo-militant stance” taken to appease black audiences.103 
Black newspapers, he argued, had abrogated their tradition of protest by appeasing the 
government with a pro-war message. This was a step backward toward the philosophy of 
Washington and his Tuskegee Machine. As Finkle put it: 
With the outbreak of war the black press adopted a position that black 
people should insist upon the right to fight because their wartime 
performance would determine the postwar status of blacks in the country. 
The press, therefore, had reverted to an old idea that black leaders had 
embraced in the Civil War and World War I. Since the position of the 
press reflected the views of most of the black leadership during the war, 
one can conclude that black leaders took a conservative course rooted in 
the past. Despite the stirring of the black masses and the militant rhetoric 
of the black leaders, the war years cannot be considered the beginning of 
the “black revolution.” It would be more accurate to describe these years 
as the last effort of the old order.104 
 
In place of innovative direction, he argued, black editors and other leaders offered only 
stale rhetoric. True change would not come until a new generation of black leaders 
eclipsed the men who ran the black press. To date, however, no mass media scholar has 
produced a comprehensive account of how the “new order” reacted to black newspapers’ 
coverage of the Korean conflict and the last throes of segregation in the armed forces. 
 Researchers seeking any information about the role of the black press during this 
period are better advised to consult the histories of black troops in the United States 
military. Many of these studies make some reference to the reaction of black newspapers 
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to military integration, although rarely in any depth. Bernard Nalty’s Strength for the 
Fight provided one of the most extensive accounts of Chicago Defender publisher John 
Sengstacke’s participation in the Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in 
the Armed Forces, which was created by President Truman to help implement his 
executive order desegregating the military.105 It makes little reference, however, to how 
Sengstacke’s paper or other black publications reacted to the aftermath of this decision, 
or to the end of segregation during the war. Gerald Astor’s The Right to Fight relied 
primarily on interviews with black and white Korean War veterans in constructing its 
account of black troops during that conflict, but it also drew on contemporaneous 
accounts taken from black newspapers such as the Courier.106 Morris MacGregor’s 
Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940-1965 noted that “the black press was spokesman 
for the widespread demand for equality in the armed forces” but provided few examples 
of these claims.107 
 Black Soldier, White Army, a history of the all-black 24th Infantry Regiment in 
Korea written by William Bowers, William Hammond, and George MacGarrigle, made 
passing reference to the foreign correspondents of the Courier, the Defender, and the 
Afro-American.108 Its discussion of these men and their exploits in Korea, however, was 
limited to these newspapers’ coverage of the 24th Infantry Regiment. Moreover, many of 
these references were taken from Richard Dalfiume’s Desegregation of the U.S. Armed 
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Forces. Dalfiume’s book, although it quoted papers such as the Courier, did so 
infrequently and provided little insight as to how these publications covered the war and 
desegregation over time, or whether the nature of that coverage changed over time.109 In 
short, there is no comprehensive analysis of how the black press covered the Korean War 
and the end of segregation in the U.S. military. This study is intended in part to fill that 
void. 
Theoretical Framework: The Role and Function of Alternative Media 
 For an analysis of the response of the black press to the Korean War and the end 
of military segregation, this study refers to the alternative (or dissident) media model. 
Comprising ethnic, immigrant, and other minority publications, alternative media 
represent a varied assortment of groups and philosophies but are united by a number of 
shared traits. According to Lauren Kessler, these media  
[W]ere the underdogs of their time. All held views or believed in ideas 
that diverged from the mainstream political, economic, social, and cultural 
climate of their times. All wanted, to some degree, to effect social change. 
All wanted access to the popular media marketplace for their ideas, or 
sometimes merely for their existence as a group. All were excluded from 
the conventional marketplace, although the extent and type of exclusion 
(denial of access) varied from group to group and over time. In response to 
this exclusion—and because the groups wanted to disseminate their ideas 
to a larger public—they started media marketplaces of their own.110 
 
As Kessler noted, black Americans were among the first minority group to create their 
own media system, independent of the mainstream media market.111 As black literacy 
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increased and more black newspapers came into existence, they served an increasingly 
important purpose to the black community. Jane Rhodes wrote that the nineteenth-
century black press “played a crucial role in community building, and was an influential 
forum for the assertion and dissemination of African Americans’ ideas.”112 The black 
press continued to play this role well into the next century. In his study of the immigrant 
and ethnic presses in the early twentieth century, Robert Park concluded that such media 
were essential to constructing a sense of community within an increasingly urbanized and 
heterogeneous America.113 The community-building role of the alternative press was also 
emphasized by Stephen Harold Riggins, who stated that “if minority media did not 
contribute to ethnic cohesion and cultural maintenance. . . there would be little reason for 
their existence.”114 
 However, the alternative media have additional functions beyond the community-
building one. One of them is the promotion of change within the larger society in which 
alternative media exist. In Rodger Streitmatter’s formulation, the alternative media are 
“proactive agents of change” who are passionate about their chosen cause.115 Indeed, the 
earliest historians of the black press characterized it as a “fighting press” that existed to 
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effect positive change for its community.116 In this role, black newspapers demanded 
equal rights, protested racial injustice, challenged ideas of black inferiority, presented 
positive images of black Americans, and insisted that white America fulfill the nation’s 
promise of liberty and equality for all.  
 Minority publications also provide a forum for debate and discussion within 
marginalized communities. Todd Vogel noted that “the articles of the [black] press 
amount to verbal exchanges between community members over crucial questions, such as 
the Missouri Compromise, but also over less plangent but important questions such as 
economic oppression of blacks in the 1970s.”117 Because the concerns of minorities are 
routinely ignored or downplayed in the mainstream press, alternative press systems are a 
crucial vehicle for these discussions. Without them, the ability of these communities to 
address and resolve issues of importance to their members is impaired. 
 Alternative media also allow minorities to craft their image for the larger society. 
Although these publications are created primarily for the benefit of a particular minority, 
they also provide a window into these communities. Frankie Hutton noted that many 
nineteenth century black newspapers espoused a fervent belief in the supremacy of 
democratic governance, thus demonstrating their patriotism and loyalty to the larger 
white society.118 Because many minority groups were excluded almost completely from 
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the mainstream press, alternative media might be the only source of information about 
these minorities to non-community members. 
 Finally, alternative media define a group’s identity to the group members 
themselves. Several scholars have explored this function of the black press in particular 
depth. E. Franklin Frazier argued that the major function of the black press was to 
provide psychological compensation for the black bourgeoisie’s inferiority complex by 
publishing white praise of blacks and exaggerated accounts of black achievement.119 In a 
more positive vein, Martin Dann argued that by defining the controversies and concerns 
of black Americans, the early black press helped define the nature of black identity for a 
people transitioning from slavery to freedom.120  
 By analyzing how black newspapers responded to the Korean War and the end of 
segregation in the military, this study aims to see which roles these newspapers 
emphasized and which ones were downplayed. The different roles that the Defender, the 
Courier, and the Afro-American chose to embrace can suggest whether these newspapers 
opted to pursue a policy of confrontation or accommodation in pursuing their goal of 
equal treatment for black troops. This in turn can provide additional insight into how 
many of the most influential voices in the black community sought to achieve a 
longstanding goal during a time when that community was still divided over questions of 
strategy. Depending on the path each newspaper chose, these publications could have 
been harbingers of the kind of change that would produce genuine change in the coming 
decade, or the last spokesmen of the old order.  
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The Significance of This Study 
 The black press of the early twentieth century was both the driving force and the 
vehicle for a vigorous discussion among black leaders about the most appropriate way to 
advance the cause of equal rights and racial justice for black Americans. Some papers 
supported a policy of accommodation, believing that blacks could “earn” equal treatment 
from the white power structure through hard work. Other papers took a more militant 
stance, suggesting a more forceful approach to the problem. Some of these newspapers 
changed their positions over time, or sought to chart a middle course between these two 
paths. All of them remained committed to the same goals: an end to segregation and the 
acceptance of blacks as full citizens, complete with all the rights and privileges accorded 
to whites. 
 The status of black Americans in the armed forces was a frequent topic in the 
black press at this time. For many black newspapers, military service was an avenue to 
higher status in a segregated society. Although blacks could not serve alongside whites, 
they could nonetheless prove their ability to fight and their devotion to their country. 
Other papers questioned why blacks should fight and die in the name of freedom when 
they lived a second-class existence in their own nation. In recent years a number of 
scholars have analyzed how this debate affected the black press’ coverage of the First and 
Second World Wars. However, no study has examined how the black press covered the 
last battlefield of military segregation, the Korean War.  
This study attempts to provide a deeper understanding of how the nation’s major 
black newspapers covered the period of 1948-1954, when the last barriers to the 
integration of the armed forces began to crumble before collapsing entirely. More 
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specifically, this study examines what kind of editorial strategies these newspapers used 
in their campaign to finally make the integration of the American military a reality. The 
strategies embraced by these newspapers at this critical juncture in the history of race 
relations in America can perhaps shed light on how one of the most influential 
institutions in the black community participated in the fight for civil rights. 
In the previous two wars, the black press’ ability to criticize the government or 
the military was constrained by the interference of various federal agencies. No federal 
investigation of the black press occurred during the Korean War, nor were black 
newspapers ever threatened with one. Yet that conflict took place during a time of fervent 
anti-Communism and intense suspicion of government critics. This study examines how 
this atmosphere of paranoia affected black newspapers’ coverage. It also examines how 
the black press confronted the sacrifice required in its quest for racial integration and 
equal treatment. For centuries the segregation that had kept black troops from serving 
with whites had bred resentment, but also pride. The exploits of the Buffalo Soldiers, the 
black doughboys of World War I, and the Tuskegee Airmen had provided a source of 
intense racial pride to a community that had been given few opportunities to excel in 
American society. The coming of integration also brought about the disappearance of 
these all-black units. 
Research Questions 
 This study attempts to answer the following questions: 
• What kinds of strategies did the black press employ in pressing for full equality in 
the armed forces? How do these strategies relate to the traditional roles of the 
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alternative and minority press? Did the black press’ coverage conform to, or 
depart from, the traditional model of the alternative press as outlined above? 
• How did the black press portray black military personnel?  
• How did the black press portray America’s entry into the Korean War, and its 
prosecution of it? Did that coverage change over time? If so, how? 
• How did the black press react to the end of military segregation and the demise of 
all-black units?  
• What, if anything, does the black press’ coverage of the end of military 
segregation reveal about its role in the larger struggle for civil rights for all black 
Americans? 
Method of Inquiry 
 This study employs the traditional method of historical inquiry, which Louis 
Gottschalk defined as “the process of critically examining and analyzing the records and 
survivals of the past.”121 James Startt and David Sloan divided this process into three 
distinct elements: evidence, interpretation, and narrative.122 The first element, evidence, 
provides the basis for all historical studies. It comprises the record of what past peoples 
and societies did and did not do. The beginning of every historical study includes a 
careful examination of all available evidence, to ensure as much accuracy as is possible. 
This task is complicated by the fact that the record is almost always incomplete, to a 
greater or lesser degree. Even when an abundance of evidence is available to the 
                                                 
121
 Louis Gottschalk, Understanding History: A Primer of Historical Research (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1980), 48. 
 
122
 James D. Startt and David Sloan, Historical Methods in Mass Communication, rev. ed. (Northport, AL: 
Vision Press, 2003), 3.  
 
45 
 
historical researcher, it is still insufficient to answer every question that can be posed 
about a particular subject. Information can be lost or destroyed, or never recorded in the 
first place. Thus the researcher must rely upon the second element of the historical 
process, interpretation.123 
 Interpretation is a critical tool for historical analysis. Evidence alone cannot 
illuminate the past, or explain its relationship to the present. The researcher must make 
judgments based upon the evidence available to him or her. Such judgments are 
necessarily somewhat subjective in nature. As Startt and Sloan noted, “history is a study 
in which fact and opinion are bound together in more ways than one might suppose. 
Historians select the evidence as they assemble it into their accounts and finally offer a 
general interpretation by way of shaping an overall understanding of the subject.”124  
 The final element of the historical study is narration. Unlike the social sciences, 
history depends upon a narrative component. This component is a mixture of 
“explanation based on evidence and intuitive reasoning,” as Startt and Sloan described 
it.125 Like fiction, it contains stories about people and events, usually arranged in a 
chronological fashion. However, historical narration is not merely an anodyne recitation 
of facts. It includes an analytic component as well. Together, the narrative and analytical 
components produce a unified account of a particular time and place that deepens 
readers’ understanding of that era and their connection to it. In this study, these elements 
can not only recreate an important period in black press history, but provide a deeper 
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understanding of how these newspapers chose to react to a milestone in the civil rights 
struggle.  
This study comprises a historical examination of secondary literature, black 
newspaper articles, and other primary source documents. More specifically, this study 
analyzes coverage of three major black newspapers: the Chicago Defender, the 
Pittsburgh Courier, and the Baltimore Afro-American. These newspapers were selected 
because they were the most widely circulated black papers during period under 
investigation (1948-1954). All three newspapers published national editions, which are 
the editions examined in this study. 
 The time period studied begins in 1948 with President Truman’s executive order 
announcing the desegregation of the military and ends in 1954 with the Army’s 
deactivation of its last all-black unit. The process of integration was a slow and halting 
one, with many notable events along the way. These include the participation of Defender 
publisher John Sengstacke on President Truman’s Committee on Equality of Treatment 
and Opportunity in the Armed Forces (also known as the Fahy Committee); the 24th 
Infantry’s victory over the North Korean People’s Army in the tiny hamlet of Yechon; 
Truman’s firing of Gen. Douglas MacArthur and the ascension of his replacement, Gen. 
Matthew Ridgway; and the Army’s announcement that it would finally deactivate its all-
black units and fully integrate. All of these events, and the newspapers’ coverage of 
them, are discussed within this study. 
 For this study, I examined every issue of the Defender, the Courier, and the Afro-
American published between January 1, 1948, and December 31, 1954. This study 
includes all news stories, columns, house editorials, and editorial cartoons appearing in 
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these issues. For the purposes of this study, news stories were defined as all non-
advertising product appearing in the publication being examined. Advertising content 
was not included in this study. Neither were non-editorial cartoons, which black 
newspapers such as the Courier often published. This study also included an examination 
of select government documents, most notably the complete records of the Fahy 
Committee. 
Limitations of This Study 
 Beyond the limits of time and money, the most significant limitation this study 
faces is a lack of primary sources beyond the newspapers themselves. All of the principal 
figures in this study, including John Sengstacke, Jessie Vann, Ira Lewis, P.L. Prattis, 
William Nunn Sr., and Carl Murphy, are deceased. Jessie Vann’s personal 
correspondence was destroyed after her death. Most of the personal records of the 
Murphy family have similarly been lost to time. In part because of these limitations, this 
study focuses primarily on coverage within the newspapers themselves and changes in 
that coverage over time.  
Chapter Breakdown 
 This study is organized chronologically, as it is an examination of black 
newspapers’ coverage of the Korean War and military integration over time. 
• Chapter One: Introduction and Background. Introduction, background, and 
overview of the history of black Americans in the armed forces, a history of the 
black press from its inception through the defining controversies of the early 
twentieth century and up to the Korean War, a discussion of the theoretical 
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models of alternative American media, a summary of the methods used, and 
mention of the limitations of this study. 
• Chapter Two: Ready to Fight. An analysis of the black press’ efforts on behalf of 
military integration in the months leading up to and immediately after President’s 
Truman’s July 1948 executive order desegregating the armed forces.  
• Chapter Three: Principles and Pragmatism. A discussion of black newspapers’ 
coverage of the Fahy Committee, from its first meeting with President Truman in 
January 1949 to the completion of its final report in May 1950. This chapter will 
focus closely on the work of John Sengstacke, Chicago Defender publisher and 
member of the committee.  
• Chapter Four: Now to War. An examination of how black newspapers covered the 
outbreak of the Korean War and the participation of black troops in the early 
months of the conflict. This chapter covers the beginning of the war in June 1950, 
the Chinese counterattack in October 1950, and the stalemate between UN and 
Communist forces that began in the spring of 1951. 
• Chapter Five: A Pyrrhic Victory? A discussion of how the black press reacted to 
the U.S. Army’s announcement that it would integrate all of its units in the Far 
East. This chapter will also analyze closely how black newspapers reacted to Gen. 
MacArthur’s dismissal in April 1951. It will also study how the war and issue of 
military integration faded from the pages of these newspapers as the war dragged 
on and the 1952 presidential election began to dominate the news cycle. This 
chapter covers the period from June 1951 to the deactivation of the last all-black 
unit in October 1954. 
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• Chapter Six: Winning the Battle, Losing the War. Conclusion and final thoughts.  
  
 
 
Chapter Two: Ready to Fight 
The end of racial segregation in the U.S. military did not occur all at once. Its demise was 
the result of many factors and many people working over a period of time. The year 1948, 
however, was an important one for the black press in its campaign to rid the armed forces of Jim 
Crow. This was an election year, and President Harry S. Truman found himself deeply unpopular 
with the public and facing serious splits within his own Democratic Party. This fracturing was 
fueled in part by the president’s record on civil rights for black Americans. On the left Truman 
was confronted by former vice president Henry Wallace, whose newly formed Progressive Party 
decried what Wallace described as the president’s go-slow approach on racial issues. On the 
right Truman faced South Carolina Governor Strom Thurmond and his Democratic States’ 
Rights Party, better known as the Dixiecrats. Thurmond’s group opposed any change to the 
decades-old system of racial segregation that still prevailed within the South. Although neither 
Wallace nor Thurmond stood a serious chance of winning the election, their candidacies 
threatened to drain crucial votes away from Truman. To win, Truman would have to focus on 
winning the votes of the Democratic Party’s core constituencies, including black Americans.126 
But black voters, and black newspapers in particular, would want something in exchange for 
their support. They wanted, among other things, the desegregation of the armed forces. And they 
wanted it sooner rather than later.  
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Truman and the Black Press 
 Truman had already made significant inroads with many of the most important voices in 
the black press. On June 29, 1947 he became the first president to address the annual conference 
of the NAACP. In his speech, delivered on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial, Truman had 
vowed to “make the federal government a friendly, vigilant defender of the rights and equalities 
of all Americans. And again I mean all Americans.”127 The leading black newspapers greeted 
Truman’s speech with enthusiasm, noting that it was the first time a U.S. president had 
committed himself firmly and publicly to equal rights for black Americans. An Afro-American 
editorial praised Truman for acknowledging the gap between the nation’s democratic ideals and 
its discriminatory practices.128 The Defender described his speech as “a fitting climax” to the 
NAACP conference.129 
Truman also endeared himself to many black editors and publishers when he established 
the President’s Committee on Civil Rights to examine the condition of civil rights in the nation 
and make recommendations to improve them. Truman carefully picked the fifteen members of 
the committee, which included two blacks, Sadie T.M. Alexander, an attorney, and Channing H. 
Tobias, a philanthropist.130 In late 1947, the committee released its 178-page report, To Secure 
These Rights: The Report of the President’s Committee on Civil Rights. In it, the committee’s 
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members called for the establishment of a civil rights commission, the creation of a civil rights 
division within the Department of Justice, the passage of federal anti-lynching laws, and the 
abolishment of poll taxes. The document also addressed the issue of segregation within the 
armed forces. “When an individual enters the service of the country, he necessarily surrenders 
some of the rights and privileges which inhere in American citizenship,” the report noted, but 
added that “the government in return undertakes to protect his integrity as an individual and the 
dignity of his profession.”131 To that end, the report recommended the immediate and complete 
integration of every branch of the armed forces. Once again, the Afro-American and the Defender 
voiced their support of the report and its conclusions.132  
 Truman’s efforts on behalf of black Americans stemmed from a mixture of genuine 
concern and political savvy. Raised in rural Missouri in the early 1900s, Truman inherited the 
prejudices that were endemic among people of his time and place. He used racial slurs in 
everyday conversation and once admitted in a letter that “I am strongly of the opinion that 
negroes ought to be in Africa, yellow men in Asia and white men in Europe and America.”133 
Despite these attitudes, he had declared his belief in 1940 that, “I believe in the brotherhood of 
man; not merely white men, but the brotherhood of all men before the law. . . If any class or race 
can be permanently set apart from or pushed down below the rest in political and civil rights, so 
many any other class or race when it shall incur the displeasure of its more powerful 
associations, and we may say farewell to the principles on which we count our safety.”134 
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Truman also opposed the internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II, and he was 
particularly horrified by a 1946 incident in which a black Army sergeant in uniform had been 
taken off a bus in South Carolina and beaten by a local sheriff until he was blind. “My God,” 
Truman told NAACP Executive Secretary Walter White, “I had no idea it was as terrible as that. 
We’ve got to do something.”135 
 Truman’s moral discomfort with the ugly realities of segregation existed alongside his 
pragmatic view of politics. After the Republicans took control of both houses of Congress in the 
1946 midterm elections, Truman and his advisors began planning in earnest for the 1948 
election. As part of that planning, Truman aide Clark Clifford produced a 43-page memorandum 
outlining the administration’s election strategy. The document predicted that Congressional 
Republicans would introduce a series of civil rights bills in an effort to return the black vote to 
the GOP. If Truman did not preempt this effort, the Republicans could siphon off black votes in 
key states such as New York, California, and Illinois.136 Truman’s efforts to win the allegiance of 
black voters took on added urgency as it became evident early in the year that Henry Wallace 
would form a new party. Wallace, who had been fired from his position as Secretary of 
Commerce when he denounced Truman’s foreign policy toward the Soviet Union, promised to 
end segregation and ensure equal voting rights for all black Americans. Wallace’s campaign 
included many blacks, and he refused to appear before segregated audiences, eat in segregated 
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restaurants, or stay in segregated hotels. Hostile crowds in the South pelted Wallace with eggs 
and rotten tomatoes, yet he refused to moderate his message of racial harmony.137  
Despite Wallace’s brave stance on civil rights, the black press tended to treat his 
candidacy as a quixotic scheme at best. The Defender, one of Truman’s most vocal supporters 
among either the black or mainstream press, commended Wallace’s commitment to civil rights 
but declared he had no chance of winning the election. The paper expressed its hopes that “the 
Negro leadership, despite its admiration for Mr. Wallace’s stand on racism, will refuse to follow 
left-wingers up a blind alley.”138 The Afro-American denounced the violence that met the 
Wallace campaign even as it acknowledged his Progressive Party stood no chance in 
November.139 The real value of the Progressive Party, the newspaper’s editors concluded, lay in 
the party’s ability to propagate ideas rather than elect candidates.140 The Courier barely 
mentioned Wallace’s candidacy, and when it did so it usually emphasized the odds against 
him.141 
With the major black papers treating Wallace as more of a curiosity than a viable 
candidate, the question then became which of the two major party candidates for president would 
do the most to advance the cause of civil rights. The Defender continued to voice its support for 
Truman on its editorial pages, applauding his February message to Congress. That message, a 
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ten-point proposal that echoed many of the recommendations made by the President’s 
Committee on Civil Rights, succeeded in preventing the Republicans from advancing their own 
civil rights agenda in Congress. However, it also enraged the Southern wing of the Democratic 
Party and all but guaranteed their defection at the party’s national convention that summer.142 
For his efforts, the Defender’s editorial cartoonist depicted the president grasping his civil rights 
plan in his hand while the ghosts of George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, and Frederick 
Douglass looked down approvingly. In an accompanying editorial, the newspaper described 
Truman’s speech to Congress as “a courageous attack upon racism in America and a noble re-
declaration of principles which distinguish our democracy from all other political systems.”143  
The Afro-American, if less effusive in its praise of Truman, applauded his civil rights 
program and kept up a steady barrage of criticism directed toward the president’s opponents in 
Congress. Afro publisher Carl Murphy went so far as to berate the president’s usual allies on the 
left, such as the Urban League and American Federation of Labor, for not throwing the full 
weight of their organizations behind the civil rights agenda.144 The Afro was also willing to 
criticize the president, as it did when Truman failed to include civil rights when outlining his 
legislative priorities to Congress.145 For much of 1948, however, its coverage of the president 
was generally positive.  
 The Courier, however, was altogether less enamored of the president, despite his efforts 
on behalf of black Americans. The paper’s enmity toward Truman had less to do with his actions 
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in office than an ongoing ideological opposition to the Democratic Party. Robert Vann, the 
paper’s longtime publisher, had been a stalwart Republican with connections to Pittsburgh’s 
Republican political machine. Under his leadership, the Courier had been a reliable voice for 
Republicans in both local and national races. Vann’s efforts to ingratiate himself to Republican 
leaders, however, never brought about the recognition he desired. These personal setbacks, 
coupled with the onset of the Great Depression, drove Vann and his newspaper into the arms of 
Roosevelt and the Democratic Party.146 Unlike many black Americans however, who were from 
hereafter a major constituency of the Democrats, Vann did not stay with his new party. Once 
again he was passed over for political positions he believed he had earned. Moreover, Vann had 
become increasingly disenchanted with Roosevelt’s failure to deliver on his promises of civil 
rights for black Americans. The inability or unwillingness of the Roosevelt administration to 
make any substantive progress toward military integration was a particular sticking point for 
Vann, whose newspaper had taken up the cause in the late 1930s. In the 1940 presidential 
election, Vann once again switched horses, backing the Republican candidate Wendell 
Willkie.147  
 Vann died that year before the election was held, but the Courier continued to espouse a 
politically conservative viewpoint in the years after his death. Roland Wolseley attributed the 
Courier’s conservatism in the 1940s and 1950s to the growing influence of the novelist and 
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journalist George Schuyler, who had written for the newspaper since 1924.148 An ardent critic of 
Roosevelt, Schuyler became increasingly conservative in the postwar years, using his weekly 
column to denounce Truman and the Democrats for their timidity on civil rights issues. One such 
column took the president to task for failing to follow through on his promises to integrate the 
military: “Consider, for instance, the various Federal bureaus and departments, including the 
Army, Navy, and Air Force, which the president bosses. Are they free of color discrimination 
and segregation which Mr. Truman allegedly abhors? If they are not, why does he not do 
something to make them truly egalitarian?”149 Throughout 1948 the Courier’s editorials and 
news articles continued to hammer the president for not using the full power of his office to ban 
military segregation immediately.150  
Butting Heads With the “Brass Hats” 
 If not all of the major black newspapers shared a single opinion about the president’s 
commitment to civil rights, they were united in their contempt for the military officials who were 
attempting to thwart all efforts to integrate the services. In February, both the Defender and the 
Afro-American pilloried Army Secretary Kenneth Royall for refusing to press for the integration 
of all National Guard units even after the governor of New Jersey ordered his own state’s units to 
desegregate. “This is the type of discrimination which Mr. Royall orders continued in every State 
except New Jersey, despite the instructions of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy to 
the Secretary of Defense to eliminate discrimination in the armed services,” one Afro-American 
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article read. 151 Royall was a Southerner, and reputed to be considering a run for governor in his 
native North Carolina. The rumors surrounding his political ambitions did not escape the black 
press, which frequently portrayed him as the major obstacle to complete integration within the 
armed forces.  
 The Afro-American in particular sought to combat military segregation on every possible 
front. In addition to its calls for the integration of both regular military and National Guard units, 
the paper also launched a campaign in early 1948 to establish Army Reserve Officer Training 
Corps (ROTC) units at black land-grant universities. In a series of articles running over several 
months, the Afro-American revealed that twelve out of seventeen black land-grant schools in the 
South had no ROTC units, even though federal law required all such institutions to provide 
them.152 Although the presidents of these schools had petitioned the Army for years to establish 
ROTC units on their campuses, their requests were routinely denied. The Army, together with 
the connivance of state education officials, was giving black colleges “the run-around,” 
according to the paper.153 Such a policy made no sense, according to the Afro, because the Army 
had acknowledged publicly that it was suffering from a paucity of junior officers. In blasting the 
Army’s policy, the newspaper struck a familiar theme: “The AFRO believes that the U.S. Army, 
which is chronically complaining about its inability to enlist a sufficient number of qualified 
men, is overlooking one of its best bets when it turns a consistent deaf ear to college presidents 
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who want an ROTC unit at their institutions.”154 In other words, the Army’s continued support 
for Jim Crow was not merely morally indefensible, it was impractical and damaging to the 
service’s military readiness. 
 Meanwhile, the Afro was also monitoring closely an effort by the NAACP to eliminate 
racial discrimination in the WAVES and WACS. This particular campaign centered on an 
amendment to a bill establishing female military auxiliaries as permanent units of their 
respective services. The amendment, which would have expressly forbid racial segregation in 
any female military unit, was voted down by the Senate Armed Services subcommittee.155 When 
the subcommittee’s counterpart in the House appeared to be heading in a similar direction, Rev. 
Adam Clayton Powell Jr., at the time one of only two black Congressmen, delivered a harshly 
critical speech on the House floor. The Afro quoted the Congressman’s speech at length, 
including Powell’s observation that “‘the President has clearly laid down a policy advocating 
abolition of segregation.’”156 Here again the black press emphasized that the push for racial 
integration in the services had come from the president himself. The efforts of the armed services 
(and their allies in Congress) to thwart these efforts were evidence of disloyalty in the eyes of 
black editors.  
No issue highlighted the stark differences of opinion between the president and the 
military more than the universal military training bill that Congress had taken up in late 1947. 
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The World War II-era draft had expired that year and the president, concerned about future 
military conflicts with the Soviet Union, was attempting to revive it. The original bill had 
included a provision explicitly forbidding racial segregation in the armed services, but the vocal 
opposition of the Army compelled its allies in Congress to remove the offending clause before 
the bill was introduced formally.157 To the Courier, this was a clear sign that military officials 
intended to keep the ranks racially segregated despite the president’s directives. The paper took 
military leaders to task on its editorial pages, concluding that “the brass hats are determined that 
colored youth will be segregated in the armed forces as they were before and during World War 
II, and as they are today.”158  
A. Philip Randolph Throws Down the Gauntlet 
 While the Courier’s editors bemoaned the probable passage of a bill that seemed likely to 
keep Jim Crow alive in the military, other black leaders chose to adopt a more provocative 
stance. Foremost among these leaders was civil rights advocate A. Philip Randolph. Although 
Randolph was now a veteran of the fight for equal rights, he retained the pugnacity of a brash 
upstart. In 1917 he had founded a monthly magazine called The Messenger, which styled itself as 
a radical alternative to the NAACP’s Crisis.159 Randolph used his new publication to disseminate 
his socialist beliefs, campaign for anti-lynching laws, and oppose America’s entry into World 
War I.160 In 1925 he organized the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters to lobby the powerful 
Pullman Company on behalf of the company’s mostly black employees. The BSCP’s tireless 
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efforts to gain better working conditions for its members, and its eventual recognition by the 
American Federation of Labor, made Randolph one of the most effective and well-known civil 
rights advocates by the end of the 1930s.161 By 1941 Randolph wielded enough power to compel 
President Roosevelt to issue an executive order prohibiting racial discrimination in the defense 
industry. Randolph accomplished this by threatening to lead a massive march of union members 
on Washington.162  
Roosevelt issued the order and the planned march never materialized, but Randolph 
remained a thorn in the side of the federal government for years to come. Even as groups like the 
NAACP and the Urban League continued to press for equal rights through legal challenges, 
legislation, and moral suasion, Randolph embraced a much more aggressive philosophy. In the 
words of historian Morris MacGregor: 
[T]here was another facet to the American reform tradition, one that stressed mass 
action and civil disobedience. . . . The articulate leaders of the prewar struggle 
were still active, and in fact would make their greatest contribution in the fight 
that led to the Supreme Court’s pronouncement on school segregation in 1954. 
But their quiet methods were already being challenged by A. Philip Randolph and 
others who launched a sustained demand for equal treatment and opportunity in 
the armed forces during the early postwar period. Randolph and leaders of his 
persuasion relied not so much on legal eloquence in their representations to the 
federal government as on an understanding of bloc voting in key districts and the 
implicit threat of civil disobedience. The civil rights campaign, at least in the 
effort to end segregation in the armed forces, had the appearance of a mass 
movement a full decade before a weary Rosa Parks boarded a Montgomery bus 
and set off the all-embracing crusade of Martin Luther King, Jr.163  
 
Concerned that the bill for universal military training under consideration by Congress would 
make it more difficult to integrate the armed forces, Randolph and clergyman Grant Reynolds 
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founded the Committee Against Jim Crow in Military Service and Training in 1947.164 Backed 
by a number of powerful black leaders and activists, the Committee immediately directed its 
efforts at derailing the universal military training bill. In March, committee members met 
privately with the president and suggested that blacks might not be willing to fight again for a 
segregated society.165 Within a few days, Randolph made a much more public and explicit threat. 
Appearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Randolph vowed that he would  
[O]penly counsel, aid, and abet youth, both white and Negro, to quarantine any Jim 
Crow conscription system, whether it bear the label of universal military training 
or selective service. . . . From coast to coast in my travels I shall call upon all 
Negro veterans to join this civil disobedience movement and to recruit their 
younger brothers in an organized refusal to register and be drafted. . . . I shall 
appeal to the Negro parents to lend their moral support to their sons, to stand 
behind them as they march with heads held high to Federal prisons as a telling 
demonstration to the world that Negroes have reached the limit of human 
endurance, that, in the words of the spiritual, we will be buried in our graves 
before we will be slaves.166 
 
Truman K. Gibson, the only black member of the president’s civilian commission on universal 
military training, also appeared before the committee. Although his commission had 
recommended the immediate end of racial segregation in the armed services, he expressed 
“shock and dismay” at Randolph’s suggestion.167 
The leading black newspapers tried to walk a fine line in their responses to Randolph’s 
suggestion. For the most part they refused to endorse his plan of civil disobedience, but neither 
did they repudiate it. The Defender ran two separate stories about Randolph’s proposal, one 
focused primarily on Randolph’s arguments for such a campaign, the other on Gibson’s 
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opposition to it.168 It published no editorials either in favor of or opposed to the Randolph plan. 
The Defender’s coverage reflected the divided opinion among other black leaders. According to 
another story, “no one here in a position of leadership would either wholly condemn or praise 
Randolph’s stand.”169 The Afro-American quoted a statement from the national office of the 
NAACP which read, “We are not urging colored people to refuse to defend their country in time 
of danger but—there is sympathy in many hearts for the point of view expressed by Mr. 
Randolph.”170 The Afro-American’s front-page editorial concluded only that no one “should 
condemn Mr. Randolph too harshly.”171 Only the staunchly conservative Courier, whose editors 
had little taste for Randolph’s socialism and pacifism, came out definitively against his proposal. 
In its own editorial about the controversy, the paper noted that “the Pittsburgh Courier was one 
of the earliest advocates of erasure of the color line in the armed forces and will continue to 
maintain that position, but it is unalterably opposed to the advocacy of any extremist policy 
which would certainly boomerang against all of our people with unfortunate promptitude.”172 
Yet the same editorial also acknowledged the frustration that fueled Randolph’s crusade, 
describing blacks as “unquestionably bitter about the useless and unnecessary jim-crow [sic] 
policy which the armed forces persist in perpetuating even in the face of a global war of 
unprecedented intensity and extent.”173 
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The editorial noted that such bitterness was not sufficient to induce black Americans to 
turn against their country: “Alone among the various elements constituting the American nation, 
the Negro has never produced any traitors and we do not believe he ever will.”174 What the 
editorial did not say—what it did not need to say—was that America’s shoddy treatment of its 
racial minorities had long been a cudgel that the Soviet Union and other Communist nations used 
to beat their geopolitical adversary. That the United States would champion the values of 
freedom and democracy abroad while trampling on them at home was to the Soviets evidence of 
America’s rank hypocrisy. The Soviet Union’s ideological allies in the West, meanwhile, had 
long sought to make common cause with blacks who were searching for true equality. It was this 
longstanding and often complicated relationship between black civil rights activists and 
Communists that led many white Americans to look upon black citizens as a potential fifth 
column in their midst. Randolph’s vow of civil disobedience had now brought the question of 
black Americans’ loyalties to the fore. In such a charged atmosphere, the black press would have 
to tread carefully as it reported and commented on these matters. 
The Black Press and Communism 
  Randolph’s claim that blacks would be unwilling to “shoulder a gun to fight for 
democracy abroad until they have democracy at home” was an old refrain, one that harked back 
to the Courier’s Double V campaign of World War II and Du Bois’ “Close Ranks” editorial 
during World War I.175 What had changed was the political context of his claim. America was 
entering a period of intense anti-Communist fervor. Although waves of anti-Communist hysteria 
had swept the nation before, in the period during and immediately after the First World War, the 
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dawn of the nuclear age and the new postwar international order made Communism seem far 
more menacing than it had in the past. As historian Ellen Schrecker wrote, “with the advent of 
the Cold War, Communists, once viewed as a political problem, now became a threat to the 
United States. A new, more demonized image of Communism took hold along with a heightened 
sense of the danger that it posed.”176 When Randolph warned the president that “any failure to 
prescribe broad, unequivocal anti-segregation and civil rights safeguards would ‘form a beach-
head’ for Communism in America,” or stated that “discrimination and segregation in the armed 
services are the most powerful weapons in the hands of the Communists,” he was wielding the 
most powerful rhetorical weapon in American political discourse.177 That weapon, however, was 
a double-edged sword, as many black leaders and black newspapers were vulnerable to charges 
of Communist sympathies. 
 During World War II, many black newspapers had expressed admiration for the Soviet 
Union, where racial discrimination ostensibly did not exist. Although the United States was 
allied with Soviet Union at the time, concerns over a deepening of the alliance between blacks 
and white leftists contributed to the FBI’s investigation of the black press. In the course of its 
investigation, the bureau compiled a list of many black journalists and editors believed to harbor 
Communist sympathies. That list was never made public, but some groups and individuals were 
willing to voice their suspicions that black journalists were secret Communist sympathizers. 
Foremost among them was archconservative newspaper columnist Westbrook Pegler, who 
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accused black newspapers of glorifying “Negro Communists and fellow-travelers.”178 For the 
most part, black newspapers simply shrugged off such claims. In some cases the accusations 
were wildly wrong-headed (as in the case of the solidly conservative, staunchly anti-Communist 
Courier), in others they were exaggerated (as in the case of the Defender, which never identified 
itself as a Communist organ but welcomed the contributions of the CPUSA and other leftist 
groups to the fight for equal rights.)179 
 By 1948, however, it was no longer possible to simply dismiss these accusations as false 
or politically motivated. The merest suggestion of Communist influence could be devastating to 
a black newspaper. The dangers of such rumors were illustrated most starkly by the fate of 
Charlotta Bass, editor and owner of the California Eagle, one of the oldest black newspapers 
west of the Mississippi. Bass had been an staunch Republican prior to the 1930s, but the rise of 
Hitler convinced her that the Soviet Union represented the best bulwark against encroaching 
fascism. Although she never joined the CPUSA, her impassioned editorials on behalf of 
oppressed people throughout the world, coupled with her association with trade union leaders, 
resulted in an FBI investigation in the mid-1940s. Bass was never charged with any crime, but in 
the mid-1940s she had become a target of political persecution by local politicians and rivals in 
the black press. By 1951, Bass was forced to sell the Eagle and leave the publishing world.180 
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 Reading the prevailing political winds, black newspapers adjusted their editorial stances 
accordingly. In the case of the Courier, that simply meant emphasizing the anti-Communist 
message it had trumpeted for decades. For the Defender and the Afro-American, the change was 
more significant. Both papers renounced their previous words of support for the CPUSA, which 
by now was under intense scrutiny from the federal government and mired in internecine 
squabbles. Global Communism gradually replaced European colonialism as the newspapers’ 
primary foe outside of the Jim Crow South.181 Communism, which had once provided succor for 
many civil rights advocates in the 1930s and early 1940s, was now something to guard against. 
 The Defender’s shift to anti-Communism was so complete by 1948 that the executive 
secretary of the Illinois Communist Party wrote a lengthy letter to the editor complaining about 
the paper’s coverage.182 Meanwhile, the Defender was using the specter of Communist 
infiltration to argue against the continued segregation of the military. The perpetuation of racial 
discrimination within the armed forces, the paper contended, would further alienate black 
Americans and drive them into the arms of the Communists. It would do the same to foreign 
nations repelled by the gulf between the nation’s rhetoric of freedom and its anti-democratic 
practices at home. Typical of such arguments was the Defender’s April 24 editorial decrying the 
segregation of American troops stationed overseas: 
The rigid separation of troops according to skin color in lands where such 
separation is unthinkable serves to discredit our country and the democratic ideals 
for which it stands. This is fertile [sic] ground for Communist [sic], who never 
miss an opportunity to embarrass our government, only have to point [sic] to the 
two U.S. armies, one black and the other white, to convince many Europeans that 
our professed love for democracy is sheer hypocrisy. . . .The millions of Latin 
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America, Asia, Africa and in Europe who want to believe in the promises of our 
democratic system are being driven into the arms of Communism by the blind 
bigotry so manifest in the leadership of our Army.183 
 
The United States could not credibly present itself as the defender of democracy in the postwar 
era, the Defender argued, so long as its military remained segregated.  
Like the Defender, the Afro-American had flirted with Communism in the 1930s but by 
1948 the newspaper had embraced free enterprise as a better vehicle for the advancement of 
black Americans. Despite this, the newspaper never embraced anti-Communism as fervently as 
some of its competitors and often railed against the government’s crackdown on the Communist 
Party.184 Yet its editors also thought a war with the Soviet Union was likely and noted that a 
segregated military would handicap the United States in any future conflict with the Soviet 
Union.185 The Courier’s editors, although they took an even harder line against Communism 
than either the Defender or the Afro-American, did not believe that military segregation would 
lead to the widespread embrace of Communism by black Americans. If the Cold War should 
suddenly turn hot, Courier columnist Joseph Bibb wrote, black Americans would fight against 
Communism. But they would demand equal treatment in the military as the price of their 
service.186  
 In addition to the threat of federal investigation, there was another reason for black 
newspapers to be cautious about discussing Communism on their pages. National advertising in 
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black newspapers increased markedly during World War II. An Internal Revenue Service ruling 
on allowable advertising deductions on the wartime excess profits tax left companies with the 
choice of buying more advertisements or letting their surplus income be taxed by the federal 
government. As a result, many white-owned businesses chose to advertise in black newspapers 
for the first time. Although black publishers feared that these businesses would cease advertising 
in the black community once the tax incentives disappeared after the war, companies found that 
they were able to reach a previously untapped market by running ads in black newspapers. Flush 
with cash from these new advertisers, black publishers now had to worry about keeping them. 
Local black businesses might not have been concerned with positive statements about 
Communism, but national corporations were unlikely to continue advertising with a publication 
that voiced any support for Communism.187 
A. Philip Randolph and Grant Reynolds were not Communists. In fact, their proposed 
civil disobedience campaign was denounced by New York City Councilman Ben Davis, one of 
the nation’s most prominent black Communists.188 Nonetheless, the suggestion that large 
numbers of blacks would refuse to serve in the armed forces once again created doubts about the 
true allegiances of black Americans. These concerns were exaggerated by white supremacists 
who were beginning to find anti-Communism a more respectable platform to advance their racist 
agenda.189 The black press and its allies would have to proceed carefully as they tried to 
dismantle Jim Crow in the military.  
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The National Conference on Negro Affairs 
 Randolph delivered his ultimatum just as Secretary of Defense James Forrestal was 
wrestling with the issue of how to reconcile the president’s desire for integration with the 
individual services’ reluctance to change. As the first man to lead the newly created National 
Military Establishment (soon to be renamed the Department of Defense), Forrestal was 
concerned about his ability to impose his will on military services that often resembled 
independent fiefdoms rather than sub-units of a single, unified bureaucracy. As such, he adopted 
a cautious approach toward integrating the military, preferring to suggest or nudge even as others 
wished he would order or shove. “I have gone somewhat slowly,” he wrote in 1947, “because I 
believe in the theory of having things to talk about as having been done rather than having to 
predict them, and. . . morale and confidence are easy to destroy but not easy to rebuild. In other 
words, I want to be sure that any changes we make are changes that accomplish something and 
not merely for the sake of change.”190 
 Shortly before Randolph issued his ultimatum, Forrestal met with members of the 
National Negro Publishers Association, a trade association of the nation’s leading black 
newspapers.191 A group of publishers and editors was preparing to embark on a tour of European 
Army bases. The tour had been designed as a public relations exercise by the military. Before 
their departure, Forrestal met with group to explain why desegregation was proceeding so slowly 
in the services. Morris MacGregor described the scene: 
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[Forrestal] found himself listening to an impassioned demand for immediate 
change. Ira F. Lewis, president of the Pittsburgh Courier and spokesman for the 
group, told the secretary that the black community did not expect the services to 
be a laboratory or clearinghouse for processing the social ills of the nation, but it 
wanted to warn the man responsible for military preparedness that the United 
States could not afford another war with one-tenth of its population lacking the 
spirit to fight. The problem of segregation could best be solved by the 
policymakers. “The colored people of the country have a high regard for you, Mr. 
Secretary, as a square shooter,” Lewis concluded. And from Forrestal they 
expected action.192 
 
Forrestal now found himself pressured from all sides: the president, the black press, and the 
armed forces.   
In an effort to both accommodate black leaders and assist the armed forces in their 
halting efforts to desegregate, Forrestal and Lester Granger of the Urban League had organized 
what they called a “National Conference on Negro Affairs.” Sixteen black leaders would meet 
with Forrestal and leaders of the Army, Navy, and Air Force to discuss how to proceed with 
further plans for integration.193 The men had planned the conference before Randolph’s 
testimony before the Armed Services Committee, but now the uproar over his appearance 
overshadowed the news of the conference. When the conference took place on April 26, 
Randolph was not among the leaders invited, but his threatened campaign of civil disobedience 
shaped the entire discussion.194  
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  Even before the meeting took place, the Afro-American declared that “any colored person 
who accepts appointment on [Forrestal’s] proposed jim-crow [sic] committee, will not only 
stultify himself but will render a disservice to the strengthening of civil rights in this country.”195 
The Defender’s editorialists were only slightly more moderate in tone, writing that “while we do 
not question the sincerity of Mr. Forrestal and company in their efforts to arrive at a ‘solution’ to 
the so-called ‘problem,’ the time has come to build an American army and not a Confederate 
army. The time has come to stop appeasing the forces of evil.”196 The Courier published no 
editorial on the conference, probably because Ira Lewis was one of the participants. However, a 
front-page story about the conference in the May 1 issue of the paper contained a warning from 
Randolph that “any ‘sell out’ on racial discrimination in the armed forces would result in an 
immediate intensification of his proposed civil disobedience movement.”197 
 In the end, the newspapers’ fears that the conference participants would “sell out” to the 
military proved to be unfounded. Just as the black press had refrained from endorsing 
Randolph’s civil disobedience plan while acknowledging the anger behind it, the conferees told 
Forrestal that although they could not support Randolph’s position, they sympathized with his 
motives. Any chance of the conference participants signing on to Forrestal’s approach to 
desegregation was dashed after they heard from Secretary of the Army Royall. Royall told the 
black delegation that the Army believed that segregation could exist without discrimination, and 
that the General Staff had recommended that the service maintain its policy of racial segregation. 
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“But,” Royall added, “even if my general staff had not recommended segregation, I would have 
continued it as a policy.”198 Angered, the black members of the conference informed Forrestal 
that they would refuse to advise the Defense Department so long as the services remained 
segregated.199 They also made their displeasure known to the black press, which voiced its 
approval of their refusal. “Defense Advisors Angered Over Attitude of Officials” read one 
headline in the Afro-American.200 Venice Spraggs of the Defender wrote that “It will be a 
mistake for the Army to assume that any group of Negro leaders will work with it on a program 
within a segregated military setup.”201 Marjorie McKenzie, an editorial columnist for the 
Courier, voiced her approval of the delegation’s refusal to participate further: “When 
pragmatism fails, one is justified in taking a moral stand, no matter what the practical losses.”202 
 Despite the controversy Randolph’s proposal had stirred up among black leaders and 
within the black press, his threatened campaign of civil disobedience had little or no effect on its 
intended targets: Congress and the president. Most members of Congress simply ignored 
Randolph’s threat. Truman, who was preparing for what promised to be a bruising election, had 
already stated his desire for integration but was wary of picking a fight with the armed services. 
Moreover, he was convinced of the necessity of a new draft law and did not want to jeopardize 
its chances in Congress by antagonizing the already restive Southern wing of his own political 
party. In the end, the president made no concerted effort to include a civil rights provision in the 
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proposed bill. In June 1948, the bill passed Congress without any racial provisions.203 Shortly 
thereafter, Congress adjourned for its summer recess.  
Truman had gotten his draft law, but otherwise the president had little success in pushing 
his legislative agenda through the Republican-controlled Congress. His displeasure with the 
legislative branch led him to dub the 80th Congress the “Do-Nothing” Congress.204 The black 
press, whose own agenda had been ignored by Congress, quickly took up the name as well. 
Although Southern Democrats had long been the bête noir of all the major black newspapers, the 
Defender, the Afro-American, and even the conservative Courier soon turned their sights on 
Republican leaders as the party gathered in Philadelphia for its national convention.205 Walter 
White, writing in the Defender, described the civil rights record of the 80th Congress as “one of 
worst in recent American history.”206 The Courier noted that, “the Republican-dominated 
eightieth Congress closed shop early Sunday morning without passing a single piece of civil 
rights legislation—despite the party’s platform pledges of 1940 and 1944, and which at this 
moment are piously being rewritten into the 1948 GOP platform.”207 Undeterred, Courier 
president Ira Lewis sent a letter to Sen. Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., head of the Platform Committee 
of the Republican party. The letter, which the paper reproduced on its front page, contained a list 
of civil rights measures that Lewis urged to party to adopt. The very first item on Lewis’ list was 
a request to “abolish all forms of segregation or racial discrimination in the armed forces of the 
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United States.”208 It was an election year, and the black press was determined to make military 
integration an issue in the race. 
The Black Press and the 1948 Presidential Campaign 
 Black newspapers had cause for cautious optimism in the summer of 1948. At their 
convention in Philadelphia, the Republicans had nominated New York Governor Thomas 
Dewey. The governor, who made a strong showing against Roosevelt in the 1944 election, led 
his party’s liberal eastern wing.209 As such, Dewey was generally opposed to the conservative 
elements of his party that controlled Congress and had so disappointed the editorialists of the 
black press. Even the Democratic-leaning Afro-American was convinced that his nomination 
represented a victory for civil rights. “In selecting Dewey as their standard bearer,” read an 
editorial in the Afro-American, “the GOP chose not only the ablest man available, but the man 
with soundest views on civil rights.”210 The anonymous writer was also pleased that Dewey had 
selected the relatively liberal Governor Earl Warren of California to be his running mate.211 The 
Defender’s reaction was more subdued, although it noted that once again the GOP’s platform 
had committed the party and its candidates to ending racial segregation within the armed 
forces.212 The Courier proclaimed coolly that it “reserves an expression of its position in the 
1948 campaign” even as it acknowledged that “the Republicans could scarcely have done better 
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at Philadelphia.”213 Columnist Marjorie McKenzie was more direct when she predicted that 
under a Dewey administration, blacks could expect the beginning of the elimination of Jim Crow 
in the military.214 
 At the time, a Dewey administration appeared far more likely than a second term of the 
Truman administration. By mid-1948, Truman was besieged by low poll numbers and insurgent 
Democrats who wanted to replace him on the ticket. Henry Wallace had already lured a number 
of liberal Democrats to his Progressive Party, and now a number of party officials sought to get 
rid of Truman before his unpopularity cost them more voters and perhaps the election. At the 
time, most of the speculation surrounding a Truman surrogate swirled around the wildly popular 
General Dwight D. Eisenhower. Eisenhower’s political allegiances remained a mystery, which is 
perhaps why rumors of his candidacy excited both Hubert Humphrey, the liberal mayor of 
Minneapolis, and Strom Thurmond, the segregationist governor of South Carolina. In 
Eisenhower, the Democrats would have a candidate who could keep the badly fractured 
Democratic coalition together for at least a while longer.215 
 The black press was far less enamored of the general, largely because of his attitude 
toward blacks in the military. Eisenhower had appeared before the Armed Services Committee of 
the Senate as it debated Truman’s universal military training bill. Discussing the possibility of 
adding a racial integration provision to the proposed bill, he told the senators, “I do believe that 
if we attempt merely by passing a lot of laws to force someone to like someone else, we are just 
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going to get into trouble.”216 The general’s comments produced a wave of criticism from the 
black press. “We reject General Eisenhower’s opinion on the Negro as negative, undemocratic, 
basically wrong in fact and intent, and against the president’s civil rights program,” the New 
York Amsterdam News opined bluntly.217 Eisenhower was also excoriated by the Defender, 
which derided him as “just another brass hat with a glib tongue and a ready smile.”218 At the 
height of the “draft Eisenhower” movement, the Afro-American scorned the hopes of its backers 
as a “Dixie-inspired boomlet” fueled by “wishful thinking” while the Courier called it “an insult 
to Negroes. . . a repudiation of the progressive principles of the Democratic party.”219 In the end, 
however, the black press would not have to worry about an Eisenhower candidacy for another 
four years. Despite the entreaties of some of the Democrats’ most influential leaders, Eisenhower 
refused to run on their ticket.220  
 Although Eisenhower’s demurral cleared one major obstacle in the president’s quest for 
his party’s nomination, Truman’s success was still far from guaranteed. As the Democrats 
converged on Philadelphia in July for their party’s convention, Truman and his allies were 
nervous. The president had already alienated most of the states of the old Confederacy with his 
civil rights message to Congress in February 1948. Yet he still hoped to avoid a full-scale revolt 
among the Southern states by inserting a vaguely worded civil rights plank in the party’s 
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platform. Even the modest language in Truman’s plank, however, made it clear that Congress 
should take the lead in guaranteeing civil rights for all of the nation’s citizens.221 
 This was too much for the states’ rights advocates of the South, who immediately 
proposed an alternate plank that unequivocally stated that civil rights was an issue that should be 
left to the states. That proposal, known as the Moody plank, sparked a reaction from the liberal 
wing of the party, which had already been unhappy with the milquetoast language of Truman’s 
original plank. Under the guidance of Hubert Humphrey, the liberals proposed a third civil rights 
plank. This proposal, called the Biemiller plank, was far more explicit than Truman’s. It called 
for Congress to enact legislation guaranteeing blacks equal participation in the political process, 
equal employment opportunities, and protection from violence. It also demanded the immediate 
and complete integration of the United States military.222 
 The battle over these dueling civil rights proposals threw the Democratic Party into a 
state of civil war, which reached a head on July 14 when the Democratic delegates voted to reject 
the Moody plank and accept the liberal Biemiller plank. As expected, a large number of Southern 
delegates walked out of the convention in response.223 Despite the revolt of the Southerners, 
Truman easily won the nomination by a margin of more than 900 delegates. He had hoped to 
keep the Southern states in the fold, but once they left, he was no longer compelled to distance 
himself from his own civil rights record. He enthusiastically embraced the newly adopted 
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Biemiller plank. Once again, Truman had committed himself to improved civil rights for black 
Americans, and more specifically, to the end of segregation in the armed forces.224 
The black press was uniformly pleased with the developments in Philadelphia. Not only 
had the Democrats firmly and specifically outlined their commitment to a civil rights program 
even bolder than the Republicans’, they had also rid themselves of many of the most reactionary 
and racist elements within their party. The front page of the July 21 Defender featured an 
editorial entitled “We March Forward—with Truman.” On the same page was a cartoon 
depicting the stern-faced president steering the ship of state through crashing waves labeled 
“Bigotry,” “Race Hatred,” and “Man’s Inhumanity to Man.” Another cartoon on the editorial 
page showed an anthropomorphized version the president’s civil rights agenda in a boxing ring, 
standing victorious over a defeated fighter labeled “The South.”225 The Afro-American mocked 
the “Dixiecrats” who had left the party and nominated Strom Thurmond to be their standard 
bearer in the November election: “No one outside of their own ranks seems to be taking the rebel 
Democrats seriously,” its editorial concluded.226 The Courier refrained from praising Truman but 
welcomed the departure of the Dixiecrats, claiming that “in Philadelphia, the Nation as a whole 
won a victory over its worse self.”227 
If Democratic-leaning papers such as the Defender and the Afro-American were pleased 
by Truman’s victory, they were even more enthused by the announcement he made during his 
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acceptance speech. At two o’clock in the morning on July 15, inside a sweltering hot arena, 
Truman took the stage. As he described the speech in his memoirs, 
I listed in detail the failures of the Republican-controlled Congress and I did no 
pull any punches. Then, toward the end of the speech, I played my trump card. I 
announced: “On the twenty-sixth day of July, which out in Missouri we call 
‘Turnip Day,’ I am going to call Congress back and ask them to pass laws to halt 
rising prices, to meet the housing crisis—which they are saying they are for in 
their platform. At the same time, I shall ask them to act upon other vitally needed 
measures, such as…civil rights legislation, which they say they are for….Now my 
friends, if there is any reality behind that Republican platform, we ought to get 
some action from a short session of the Eightieth Congress. They can do this job 
in fifteen days, if they want to do it.”. . . . Of course I knew that the special 
session would produce no results in the way of legislation. But I felt justified in 
calling the Congress back to Washington to prove to the people whether the 
Republican platform really meant anything or not.228 
 
The president’s ultimatum had put the ball back in the Republicans’ court. “It is clear that the 
president intends to put the Republicans on the spot,” the Defender noted approvingly in its 
editorial.229 
While the president was trying to score political points at the expense of his Republican 
opponents in Congress, the leading black newspapers were trying to keep military integration at 
the top of the national agenda. Even as black newspapers devoted much of their coverage in the 
spring and summer of 1948 to the upcoming presidential election, they had continued to press 
forward their campaign for the end of segregation in the armed forces. A. Philip Randolph had 
failed to win an integration provision in the new draft law, but he still vowed that he would 
encourage black youth to avoid military service until Jim Crow was eliminated in the services. 
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The black press again declined to endorse his plan, but they kept it on the front pages for several 
months.230 
 Meanwhile, black newspapers continued to publicize their own efforts to rid the military 
of Jim Crow. The Afro-American’s Ollie Stewart filed a series of articles from West Germany, 
where he reported on conditions at segregated Army bases. There he found a shortage of black 
officers and disgruntled soldiers who chafed under the treatment of their white superiors.231 The 
paper also kept up its campaign to win more ROTC units for black land grant colleges, an effort 
that paid off in early July when Truman ordered Secretary of the Army Royall to establish three 
such units.232 Courier columnist George Schuyler made his own case for immediate integration 
by making a tour of several Latin American nations and investigating the state of their militaries. 
Integration in these armies, he concluded, had allowed soldiers of all colors to serve together 
without any appreciable tension or degradation in military readiness.233 
 Almost every issue of the Defender, Courier, and Afro-American in the early summer of 
1948 contained an article or editorial arguing for military integration. The front page of the June 
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12 issue of the Afro-American featured four different stories about the subject.234 Even as black 
publishers and editors had been heartened by Truman’s embrace of a strong civil rights program 
at the Democratic convention and his decision to call Congress back into session, they 
recognized that they faced an uphill battle. Truman’s antagonistic relationship with Congress and 
Secretary Forrestal’s hesitancy to seize the reins meant that Jim Crow supporters had been able 
to resist any significant change. The opponents of segregation needed a more powerful tool. 
Soon they would get it. 
Executive Order 9981 
 The Truman team had always planned to make black voters a cornerstone of their 
campaign strategy, as Clark Clifford advised in his 1947 memo to the president. However, it had 
not anticipated how incendiary the issue of civil rights would become at the national convention. 
Truman himself admitted to Forrestal that “he had himself not wanted to go as far as the 
Democratic platform went on the civil rights issue.”235 Nevertheless, he took the platform 
seriously, and was determined to run on it. Moreover, the defection of the Dixiecrats meant it 
was no longer necessary to placate the most reactionary and racist elements of the Democratic 
base. Capturing the black vote was now even more important to the Truman campaign. Having 
cast himself as a forceful advocate for civil rights, however, meant that he was now expected to 
do something about the issue. Truman had made it abundantly clear that he expected no progress 
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from Congress. The pressure would now be on the president to deliver on the promises he had 
made in Philadelphia. 236 
 Truman’s advisers had discussed the idea of an executive order mandating racial 
integration in the federal government and the armed services as early as October 1947.237 That 
idea had also been advanced by a number of black leaders, most notably A. Philip Randolph. In a 
letter to the president, Randolph and Grant Reynolds wrote: “Because the 1948 Republican 
platform expressed its disapproval of army segregation and because the recently adopted 
platform of your own party in essence called for the abolition of racial distinctions within the 
military establishment, we feel that you now have a bi-partisan mandate to end military 
segregation forthwith by the issuance of an Executive Order.”238 Sensing an opportunity to marry 
politics to principle, Truman ordered his advisers to draft such an order. Before releasing it, the 
Truman camp showed a draft to Randolph and Walter White, who both voiced their approval. 
Forrestal also signed off on the document but suggested that Army Secretary Royall might 
disapprove. Despite Forrestal’s concerns and his own stated preferences, however, Royall 
pledged that he would execute the order.239  
 On July 26, 1948—the “Turnip Day” when the 80th Congress was scheduled to 
reconvene—Truman signed Executive Order 9981. In addition to ending racial segregation 
within all of the U.S. armed forces, the order also called for the creation of a committee that 
would examine the state of integration within each of the services and advise them as they 
                                                 
236
 Ibid. 
 
237
 Ibid. 
238
 Letter, Grant Reynolds and A. Philip Randolph to Truman, 15 July 1948; in Blacks in the United States Armed 
Forces: Basic Documents Volume VIII: Segregation Under Siege, 684.  
 
239
 Nalty, 242. 
 
84 
 
moved toward the complete eradication of Jim Crow. Tellingly, the order did not mention 
segregation or integration. Instead, it spoke of equal treatment and opportunity, language that 
mirrored that of the Democratic platform. The vagueness of the order was a deliberate effort by 
Truman’s advisers to minimize conflict with the armed forces. They hoped that each service 
would conclude that equal treatment and opportunity were not possible in a bureaucracy 
segregated by race.240 Truman himself, however, was adamant that the order put an end to the 
military’s policy of professing equality while maintaining racial segregation. When the president 
was asked during a press conference if the order meant the eventual end of discrimination in the 
armed forces, Truman replied with a simple, unequivocal, “Yes.”241 
 The response of the black press was mixed. The Defender, Truman’s staunchest ally 
among the leading black papers, viewed the order as the decisive blow to military segregation 
that the black community had long been waiting for. It stamped its July 31 front page with the 
words, “Save This Paper It Marks History.”242 An editorial published the following week read: 
No week in modern history has been more significant for Negroes than last week 
when the President of the United States struck several mighty blows for  
freedom. . . . In the two executive orders Mr. Truman attacked racism within the 
framework of the military establishment, and discrimination in federal 
employment. In both instances he set up machinery which can and will eventually 
eliminate Jim Crowism and the vicious anti-Negro practices which serve to deny 
equal opportunity to one-tenth of America. . . . There is no question about the 
course which Mr. Truman has chosen to steer the ship of state. He is determined 
to move forward toward a fuller realization of the high ideals of our democratic 
system. Mr. Truman is, without question, ready and willing to use the full power 
of his office to eliminate the evils that confront us. No president in modern history 
                                                 
240
 MacGregor, 310-311. 
 
241
 Foner, 184; Nalty, 242.  
 
242
 Chicago Defender, 31 July 1948, p. 1.  
 
85 
 
has shown more courage and more determination in the face of great 
controversy.243 
 
Real change, the newspaper concluded, had finally arrived. 
The Courier, by contrast, described the order as a half-measure that was insufficient to 
produce real change within the military. While admitting that the executive orders demonstrated 
significant political courage on the part of the president, the paper’s editorial noted that as 
commander-in-chief Truman was empowered to desegregate instantly all units within the armed 
forces. Using language similar to the Defender’s editorial, the Courier’s response concluded that 
“the time has long passed for half-way measures. . . . It is up to those who hold the helm of the 
Ship of State to steer its course courageously and constructively to the safe haven of true 
democracy and not waste time cruising the dangerous waters of expediency.”244 Courier 
columnist Marjorie McKenzie was even more critical of Truman’s order; she described it as 
“pure political chicanery.”245 The Afro-American’s editorial was less vehement but also 
concluded that the executive order would probably not be enough to produce real change within 
the armed forces.246 An editorial cartoon in the same issue showed the president blasting away at 
Jim Crow with a double-barreled shotgun named after his executive orders. Underneath it the 
caption read, “Scorched Him, But the Old Bird’s Still There.”247 This wary tone did not change 
in September, when the president announced the formation of his Committee on Equality of 
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Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Forces. Two of the committee’s seven members — 
Defender publisher John Sengstacke and Urban League president Lester Granger—were black, 
but even the appointment of Sengstacke did not produce any words of optimism from the 
Courier or the Afro-American.248 The Defender itself reported on Sengstacke’s appointment and 
noted that not only were Sengstacke and Granger “intimately familiar with the delicate problems 
which result from racial discrimination” but that the paper was “very much encouraged by the 
calibre of the white members of the committee.”249 
As election day crept closer, the Defender was alone among the major black newspapers 
to throw its support to Truman.250Among the reasons the paper cited for its endorsement of the 
unpopular president was a report that Dewey was not yet prepared to support unconditionally the 
immediate desegregation of the armed forces.251 The Courier, by contrast, endorsed Dewey and 
again scorned Truman for not acting more decisively in ending Jim Crow in the military.252 The 
Afro-American, although it admitted Truman’s record on civil rights had improved markedly 
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since his days as a Congressman, concluded that Dewey was the better candidate for black 
Americans.253 
 Truman had gambled that his civil rights record would win over the black voters he 
needed to triumph in on election day. But if papers such as the Courier and the Afro-American 
appreciated his efforts, they also considered them insufficient. Moreover, the president seemed 
destined to lose on election day. In late September the Afro-American published the results of a 
Roper Poll that showed Truman losing to Dewey by a landslide.254 The black press accordingly 
placed its trust in Dewey. When Truman pulled off one of the most incredible upsets in 
American political history, the Defender alone was able to crow “We Told You So!” on its front 
page.255 “These are the Chicago Defender’s principles; these are President Truman’s principles,” 
John Sengstacke wrote in his post-election day editorial. Among the principles he listed was “the 
right of equal treatment in the service of our nation.”256 Sengstacke and the Defender remained 
committed to the president and his civil rights program. 
 The other leading black papers treated Truman’s surprise victory with a mixture of self-
effacement and grudging respect. The Afro-American acknowledged that it had expected the 
president to lose but also noted that black voters had been instrumental in securing Truman’s 
win.257 The Courier stuck by its belief that Dewey would have made a better president, but it 
also pointed out the debt that Truman owed the blacks who had helped him keep his office. It 
                                                 
253
 “Is Truman the Equal of Dewey On the Civil Rights Question?” Baltimore Afro-American, 9 October 1948, p. 1.  
 
254
 “The Polls Say Dewey Will Win,” Baltimore Afro-American, 25 September 1948, p. 4.  
 
255
 Chicago Defender, 13 November 1948, p. 1.  
 
256
 John Sengstacke, “The People Were Right,” Chicago Defender, 13 November 1948, p. 1.  
 
257
 “The Real Significance of the Truman Victory,” Baltimore Afro-American, 13 November 1948, p. 1.  
 
88 
 
again noted that “as for racial segregation in the armed forces (which he vowed to eliminate) he 
has every opportunity to end it immediately, because he enjoys absolute control and cannot 
blame a Republican-controlled Congress for hampering him.”258 Regardless of which candidate 
they had supported during the campaign, all of the major black newspapers expected substantive 
progress on the issue of military integration.  
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Chapter Three: Principles and Pragmatism 
 As 1948 gave way to 1949, the black press continued to pay careful attention to the issue 
of segregation within the military. Despite President Truman’s executive order and the 
appointment of Defender publisher John Sengstacke to the Committee on Equality of Treatment 
and Opportunity in the Armed Forces, black newspapers were not convinced that victory was yet 
in sight. The black press kept up its pressure on the military establishment in general and the 
Army in particular. Black editors and journalists were convinced that the service would resist 
Truman’s directive in any way it could. The Army’s continued segregation was decried by 
Courier columnist Joseph Bibb, who issued a call for black Americans to “work and fight to 
make this democratic principle a living, breathing reality.”259 “Forty-nine will favor fighters,” he 
wrote, “not appeasers, compromisers, nor opportunists.”260 While his colleagues continued to 
hurl brickbats at the military establishment, however, Sengstacke was attempting to effect 
change from within the target of their abuse.  
John Sengstacke Goes to Work 
The President’s Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed 
Forces (also known as the Fahy Committee for its chairman, former Solicitor General Charles 
Fahy) met for the first time on January 12, 1949, six months after Truman issued Executive 
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Order 9981.261 Truman’s brief discussion with the committee at its first meeting was heralded in 
a page one Defender story that noted that the president expected the group to “ultimately bring 
about the end of racial segregation in the military.”262 Bold proclamations notwithstanding, much 
of the committee’s first meeting was taken up with logistical matters, such as the appointment of 
Sengstacke as the committee’s temporary executive secretary.263 The real work of the committee 
would begin the next day, when representatives from the Army, Navy, and the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense briefed the group on their efforts to comply with Truman’s order. The tone 
of the meeting was one of strained civility, as the committee members pressed the military 
officials on the armed forces’ lack of progress and the officials in turn attempted to explain away 
the slow pace of desegregation or shift the blame elsewhere. An exchange between Sengstacke 
and Major General John E. Dahlquist of the Army about the integration of National Guard units 
illustrated the officers’ resistance to change: 
MR. SENGSTACKE: . . . . I have four Negroes in a little town in Iowa, Illinois 
who are anxious to enlist at the present time and they were told that they could not 
enlist, that they would have to go to some other spot to enlist in the Army, and, of 
course, they are anxious to do it and would like to know what the procedure is 
they should follow to get in…. 
MAJOR GENERAL DAHLQUIST: So far as the Guard is concerned, that is a 
matter for the State of Illinois. So far as Federal recognition is concerned, they 
will not be Federally recognized in that unit. 
MR. SENGSTACKE: They’ll not be? 
                                                 
261
 Sherie Mershon and Steven Schlossman, Foxholes and Color Lines: Desegregating the U.S. Armed Forces 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 190. 
 
262
 “Truman To Meet Committee On Bias In Armed Forces,” Chicago Defender, 8 Jan. 1949, p. 1.  
 
263
 Fahy Committee, The President’s Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services, 
afternoon session, January 12, 1949; in MacGregor and Nalty, Blacks in the United States Armed Forces: Basic 
Documents, Vol. IX: The Fahy Committee, 13-32. The committee’s first meeting also included a discussion about 
where the committee should meet. Granger pointed out that if it continued to meet in the White House, he and 
Sengstacke would be unable to eat at any of the segregated downtown Washington, D.C. restaurants during lunch 
breaks. 
 
91 
 
MAJOR GENERAL DAHLQUIST: No, not at the present time.264 
 
The remainder of the committee’s conversation with the other services’ representatives were 
similarly frustrating.265  
 The military’s attempts to adhere to the letter of Truman’s order while ignoring the spirit 
of it seem to have motivated Sengstacke, at the committee’s next meeting, to formulate a 
statement that would affirm the committee’s interpretation of Truman’s order as an unambiguous 
directive to end all racial segregation in the armed forces. It read in part: 
MR. SENGSTACKE: . . . . Those persons who interpret Executive Order 9981 as 
not outlawing segregation in the armed forces are the same persons who warn that 
the only solution rests in educating the people over a period of time. They explain 
that hatreds cannot be ordered or legislated out of existence. It will be wrong for 
the Committee established by the President’s order to approach its task with a pre-
disposition toward this idea.266 
 
Sengstacke then explained his reason for wanting such a statement: 
MR. SENGSTACKE:. . . . I think we ought to understand this among ourselves so 
that in the future we may not be raising questions from time to time as to the 
interpretation of the order in view of the fact, as I said before, that I have heard it 
discussed in a number of ways and a lot of people interpreted it differently. I think 
we ought to have an official interpretation.267 
 
Although Fahy and other members of the committee indicated they were inclined to agree with 
Sengstacke’s reasoning, they decided to put off any decision until their next meeting. 
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 While Sengstacke and his colleagues were dealing with uncooperative military officers 
and wrestling with the vagaries of Truman’s executive order, coverage of the Fahy Committee in 
the black press was relatively sparse throughout the winter and spring of 1949. Although all of 
the major black newspapers reported on the Committee’s first meeting, by the end of the month 
they had turned their attention elsewhere.268 There was no mention of the group in the Defender 
until February 19. On that day, the Defender ran a short article about the resignation of Second 
Lieutenant John Earl Rudder, the first and only black commissioned officer in the Marine 
Corps.269 Most of the subsequent articles about the committee in the Defender focused on the 
individuals associated with it, rather than the direction of the discussions. The next mention of 
the group was a short article in March announcing the appointments of journalist E.W. 
Kentworthy as executive secretary and former Farm Security Administration official Joseph H.B. 
Evans as associate secretary to the Committee. The article made no reference to the substance of 
the committee’s ongoing discussions with the military.270 In May, the Defender reported that 
Captain Fred Stickney of the Navy, who had often served as an unofficial spokesman on matters 
of integration, had been removed from the Navy’s Planning and Control section. Again, there 
was no mention of the committee’s deliberations.271 
The Courier and Afro had even less coverage of the Fahy Committee, perhaps because 
they had less access than Sengstacke and the Defender. A February 5 Courier article reported 
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that the committee had received a confidential plan for Air Force integration but provided no 
details about the committee’s work.272 The Afro offered few substantive reports or editorials 
about the committee for several months. The dearth of information about the president’s 
committee and its work, however, did not mean that the black press had abandoned the cause of 
military integration. On the contrary, it would continue to focus on the issue with unwavering 
intensity.  
Singing Their Praises 
 While the Fahy Committee’s work was taking place mostly out of view of the black 
press, the Defender, the Courier, and the Afro-American focused on the ongoing injustices and 
problems of military segregation while simultaneously highlighting the achievements of black 
troops. All of the major black newspapers kept close tabs on the progress of black soldiers, 
sailors, marines, and airmen. Although white-dominated dailies often reported on the 
accomplishments of local military personnel, black newspapers filled their pages with briefs 
about black troops from all over the country—especially commissioned officers. Short articles 
such as “Army Promotes Four Officers” and “Army, Navy Commission Five More Doctors” 
served two purposes.273 First, they kept their national audiences appraised of the achievements of 
their friends and relatives in the military. Second, and more importantly, they provided an 
ongoing rebuttal to the arguments of Jim Crow proponents who contended that blacks were 
inherently less qualified than whites to serve in the armed forces. 
 Although the accomplishments of black troops during World War II had convinced many 
former skeptics that a black soldier was every bit the equal of his white counterpart, others 
                                                 
272
 Lem Graves. Jr., “Integrated Air Force Stymied,” Pittsburgh Courier, 5 February 1949, p. 1. 
 
273
 “Army Promotes Four Officers,” Baltimore Afro-American, 1 January 1949, sec. 2, p. 1; “Army, Navy 
Commission Five More Doctors,” Pittsburgh Courier, 12 February 1949, p. 5.  
94 
 
within and without the military establishment remained fixed in their old prejudices. Integration, 
they believed, would inexorably damage the effectiveness of the U.S. military as a fighting force. 
Their views were exemplified in the person of Major General Edward “Ned” Almond, who had 
commanded the ill-starred 92nd Infantry Division during World War II. Once a favorite of 
George Marshall, Almond proved to be a poor division commander and found his heretofore 
rapid ascent up the ranks arrested. He blamed his misfortunes on the troops under his command, 
convinced that their poor performance had damaged his career. After the war Almond said that 
the “initiative and determination [of black soldiers] are low by white standards, so was 
responsibility. Negro troops are easily led and with enough supervision can accomplish anything. 
Without supervision they will disappear. Negroes are afraid at night. They lack confidence in 
each other and they lack leadership.”274 Almond was hardly alone in his beliefs. Secretary of the 
Army Royall remained convinced that black troops were better qualified for manual labor than 
combat duty, a belief shared by many of the officers under his command.275 
 This was the attitude that black newspapers had been combating since World War I, 
when the prevailing pseudoscientific attitudes of the era led the military to conclude that blacks 
lacked the intelligence and initiative to truly succeed as leaders.276 For this reason, black 
newspapers paid close attention to the small number of blacks who had earned commissions as 
officers in the armed services. In 1949, two men were singled out for their accomplishments: 
Wesley Brown, who was about to become the first black graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, 
and Jesse Brown (no relation), who had become the Navy’s first black aviator the previous 
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year.277 Defender columnist Alfred E. Smith, who wrote under the pen name Charley Cherokee, 
described the intense media scrutiny surrounding Wesley Brown’s graduation months before the 
event: “Presently, the Commandant at the Academy is aghast at the number and pressure of 
requests from Negro Press, white and Negro published magazines, etc., who want to follow 
Brown about the campus and get exclusive pictures and story.”278 Brown’s actual graduation 
produced an abundance of coverage in the form of articles, pictures, and congratulatory 
columns.279 Jesse Brown’s commission as an ensign that spring also attracted the attention of the 
Defender, while earlier in the year the Afro published a front-page picture of Jesse Brown in the 
cockpit of his airplane with the headline, “Something New in the Air Force of the U.S. Navy.”280 
The prospect of a black pilot in the formerly all-white world of naval aviation was clearly a 
source of delight for black newspapers; black Americans now had another example of military 
prowess to hold up for the world to see. 
 The coverage of Jesse Brown, Wesley Brown, and other black officers also demonstrated 
how the black press was still deeply affected by the experience of World War II. During that 
conflict black newspapers had embraced the Double V campaign in the belief that black troops 
would be able to earn equal treatment by proving their worth on the battlefield.281 Just a few 
years later, other voices in the black community, such as A. Philip Randolph, were beginning to 
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openly challenge that assertion. Rights were not something to be earned, they were inherent, 
Randolph and his allies averred. In any case, black Americans had won no concessions from the 
military or political establishment for their service in the war. Yet the laurels for Wesley Brown 
and Jesse Brown in the pages of the black press, while serving as a rebuttal to foes like Royall 
and Almond, also allowed the segregationists to establish the terms of the debate. Why should it 
be incumbent on black Americans to prove their worth? Why did the burden of proof not rest on 
the men who continued to keep black troops from being treated as the equal of whites? Although 
Randolph’s now-defunct civil disobedience campaign suggested new avenues of protest, such 
ideas were not yet in the mainstream of the black press.  
Mixed Blessings 
 As spring wore on, Sengstacke and the rest of the Fahy Committee continued to spar with 
the Army over its attempts at integration. Again, the committee’s frustration with the Army was 
downplayed in the black press. However, black newspapers noted that the committee had a much 
better working relationship with the newest of the armed services, the Air Force. Even before 
Truman issued Executive Order 9981, Secretary of the Air Force Stuart Symington had 
advocated complete integration of the fledgling service.282 Symington’s efforts, however, had 
been complicated by his rocky relationship with Secretary of Defense James Forrestal. 
Forrestal’s cautious and gradual approach to integration was very different from the kind of 
sweeping change Symington suggested.283 
 Truman’s executive order and the creation of the Fahy Committee created an opportunity 
for Symington to advance his plan despite Forrestal’s reluctance. At the committee’s second 
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meeting in January, the Air Force presented the plan for integration that Symington had 
presented to the Secretary of Defense.284 That plan was greeted with great enthusiasm by the 
Defender, which endorsed it even before the Fahy Committee could formulate its official 
response to the proposal: 
An auspicious beginning has been made in the new drive to broaden the 
democratic base of our armed services and we believe that the abolition of the 
double-standard of merits and rewards in the military establishment will surely 
follow, sooner than some of us at one time believed. . . . The President’s 
Committee may run up against stiff opposition from several quarters, including 
some elements in the military hierarchy itself, but we believe that the time is at 
hand when the government recognizes the importance of democratic action as 
well as democratic talk.285   
 
In truth, Symington’s plan was not nearly as audacious as the Defender made it sound. It was 
bolder than what Forrestal might have preferred, but the plan still fell short of what many civil 
rights activists, including those in the black press, had demanded. The plan banned racial and 
ethnic quotas and specified that all promotions and assignments would be based solely on merit. 
However, it also acknowledged that some all-black units would continue to exist, at least in the 
short term.286 
 While the Fahy Committee weighed the merits of Symington’s plan, the black press was 
intensely focused on the fate of the 332nd Fighter Wing, a black fighter air wing based at 
Lockbourne Air Base in Ohio. The press’ interest in this particular unit stemmed from its 
illustrious history: the 332nd was the successor unit to the 332nd Fighter Group, one of the units of  
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the Tuskegee Airmen. During the war it was commanded by Col. Benjamin Davis, Jr., son of the 
first black U.S. Army general and a highly respected leader in his own right.287  
 As the Air Force presented its plan first to Forrestal and then to the Fahy Committee, the 
black press focused on what it might mean for the men stationed at Lockbourne. The Afro-
American’s story on the Air Force plan led with rumors of the unit’s demise. Toward the end of 
the article the unnamed author claimed, per unnamed sources within the service, that “the plan 
was not worked out because of any altruism on the part of the Air Force but because of 
‘budgetary considerations.’”288 The Courier’s coverage followed a similar pattern, failing to note 
that although the 332nd might be organized out of existence, other all-black units were permitted 
to remain under Symington’s plan.289 The Defender’s own Charley Cherokee noted that there 
was disagreement among black officers at Lockbourne as to whether the Air Force’s plan would 
help or hinder their prospects for promotion.290 Their ambiguous feelings were mirrored in the 
black press. The exploits of Col. Davis and the 332nd had been a source of pride for black 
Americans during and after the war. Now newspapers that had trumpeted the achievements of 
the Tuskegee Airmen for years were confronted with an unintended consequence of their drive 
for integration: the disappearance of such storied all-black units as the 332nd.  
At least some civil rights activists were suspicious of the plan. The Afro reported that a 
group of Lockbourne pilots called the National Negro Military Service Committee had gone on 
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record as opposing the plan as a ploy by the Air Force to get rid of its black pilots.291 Afro 
columnist Charles Houston acknowledged the sacrifice that was required of these pilots and 
those who cheered their exploits but it was, he concluded, a necessary one. Better to struggle in 
an integrated world than “vegetate” in a segregated one, he wrote.292 Houston was one of the few 
writers in any of the papers to weigh the gains and losses of the plan so openly. Most of the other 
leading editorialists and columnists of the black press seemed content to sit on the fence a while 
longer. In the end, the Air Force’s proposal was accepted with minimal changes by the Defense 
Department after consultation with the Fahy Committee. The newspapers confirmed that the 
332nd was to be deactivated, but otherwise made little comment about the Air Force plan.293 The 
lack of coverage suggests that many black editors and journalists might have been unsure 
whether the goal of an integrated military was worth giving up units such as the 332nd.  
Exit James Forrestal, Enter Louis Johnson 
 Something neither the black press nor the Fahy Committee could have expected was the 
sudden resignation of Secretary of Defense Forrestal in March 1949. Forrestal had generally 
supported the committee and its goals, but his cautious approach had frustrated advocates for 
immediate change within the armed forces.294 The black press had also been dissatisfied with his 
reluctance to press the services more forcefully. His departure occasioned little comment from 
the major black newspapers. Forrestal was replaced by Louis Johnson, who had served as 
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Assistant Secretary of War under Franklin Roosevelt before World War II. Johnson’s 
appointment was treated with wariness by the Defender, which noted that his opinions on 
military integration were largely unknown: “Resignation of Secretary of Defense Forrestal and 
appointment of Louis Johnson hasn’t excited anybody. Johnson is uncommitted on racial 
attitudes. . . .”295 Columns and articles in the Afro were somewhat more enthusiastic, although 
exactly how Johnson would measure up to Forrestal remained unclear to everyone.296 
 However, Johnson soon proved to be a much more forceful proponent of integration than 
his predecessor. Not long after his appointment, he announced a deadline of May 1, 1949 for the 
armed services to present formally their plans for integration. Johnson’s announcement was 
motivated in part by a desire to upstage the Fahy Committee, gain the support of black leaders 
and consolidate his position within the Defense Department.297 But whatever the reasons for 
Johnson’s deadline, it was greeted rapturously by the Defender. “Defense Chief Cracks Down 
On Jim Crow,” read a page-one headline shortly after Johnson’s announcement.298 The attached 
story described Johnson’s proposal and acknowledged it was in part a reaction to the work of 
Sengstacke and the Fahy Committee: “Johnson’s directive. . . is said to have been issued in 
anticipation of forward-looking recommendations which are expected to be made by President 
Truman’s Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services headed 
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by Charles Fahy, and of which DEFENDER publisher John H. Sengstacke is one of the two 
appointed Negro members.”299 
If Sengstacke or his editors resented Johnson’s attempt to steal the limelight from the 
committee, it was not apparent in the Defender’s reporting or editorials. In an editorial entitled 
“Mr. Johnson Cracks the Whip,” the newspaper praised the Secretary of Defense for his tough-
mindedness: “The Defense chief is apparently allergic to red tape. . . . The sunlight of democracy 
is shining through this crack in the wall of Jim Crow.”300 The Defender also noted, however, that 
Johnson’s announcement alone would not bring about the immediate end of segregation, writing 
that “although the forthright directive of Secretary Johnson is a step forward, the brass hats in the 
military establishment, who have shown a remarkable resistance to integration, can be depended 
upon to exploit any loopholes which may be found in the new order. They are not going to give 
up their racial views without a struggle.”301 The Defender’s prediction that military leaders 
would continue to resist all serious efforts to integrate would soon be proven correct. But there 
would also be more victories for the advocates of desegregation. 
 The Courier, as usual, cloaked its approval for the plan in criticism of the Truman 
administration. Washington correspondent Lem Graves, Jr. described Johnson’s plan as “the first 
move which had the appearance of a genuine administration effort to make good on a civil rights 
promise since the Truman inaugural.”302 On the whole, however, Graves’ coverage of the plan 
was quite flattering to Johnson, whom Graves described as “hard-hitting.” Although the Courier 
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writer noted that Johnson’s move “severely undercut” the work of the Fahy Committee, which 
had expected to have several more months to prepare its formal report to the president, he also 
wrote that “general consensus among Washington observers is that Secretary Johnson’s move is 
a good one, if the words of the directive mean what they say.”303  
 Of the three major black newspapers, only the Afro-American refused to endorse 
unreservedly the Johnson plan. In an April 30 editorial, the Afro’s editors wrote that the directive 
differed little from the president’s executive order of the previous year.304 While acknowledging 
that the Secretary’s deadline might induce the services to move at a more rapid pace in their 
preparations for integration, the newspaper declared that it would withhold judgment until the 
services submitted their individual plans. Talk, after all, was cheap. Black troops and their 
supporters wanted action.  
 They soon got it in the form of Kenneth Royall’s resignation. The Secretary of the Army 
had been black newspapers’ primary antagonist in their campaign for military integration. While 
the other services had made at least halting, uneven efforts to integrate their ranks in the years 
after World War II, the Army under Royall had resisted all efforts to desegregate. Royall’s 
resistance to change was evident in his often-combative appearances before the Fahy Committee 
in early 1949. In a lengthy opening statement at his first appearance before the committee in 
March, he argued that although racial integration of the Army was desirable from a moral and 
administrative standpoint, there were too many reasons why it could not be achieved. To begin 
with, the Army was not a laboratory for sociological experiments. 
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SECRETARY ROYALL: Specifically the Army is not an instrument for social 
evolution. It is not the Army’s job either to favor or to impede social doctrines, no 
matter how progressive they may be—it is not for us to lead or to lag behind the 
civilian procession except to the extent that the national defense is affected.305 
 
Moreover, he said, black soldiers were not suited for many of the roles within the Army. 
SECRETARY ROYALL: However, there are other considerations. One of these 
is the differing average qualifications of the troops of the two races for 
performing specific duties. In the past—for reasons that are perhaps at least semi-
political—there has been a hesitancy to discuss this problem frankly. But such 
hesitancy is not in my opinion conducive to reaching that solution which is best 
for a sound national defense. The history of two wars has demonstrated that in 
general Negro troops have been less qualified than white troops for the 
performance of certain types of military service, for example service with the 
infantry or with other units requiring troops to. . . “close with the enemy.”306 
 
Finally, Royall argued that integration would ultimately undermine morale and discipline among 
white troops. 
SECRETARY ROYALL: We must remember that soldiers are not mere bodies 
that can be moved and handled as trucks and guns. They are individuals who 
came from civilian life and often return thereto—plan to return thereto. They are 
subject to all the emotions, prejudices, ideals, ambitions and inhibitions that 
encumber our civil population throughout the country. . . . A total abandonment 
of—or a substantial and sudden change in—the Army’s partial segregation policy 
would in my opinion adversely affect enlistments and reenlistment not only from 
the South but from many other parts of the country, probably making peacetime 
selective service again necessary.307 
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Royall presented a forceful case for maintaining segregation, but the committee members 
challenged him on several points. Sengstacke in particular attempted to get Royall to admit that 
the Army had taken no serious steps to comply with Truman’s executive order. 
MR. SENGSTACKE: In other words, there has been practically no action or 
follow-up in regard to [Executive Order 9981]? 
SECRETARY ROYALL: I don’t understand what you mean by that.  
MR. SENGSTACKE: I look at the order as an order to Secretaries to eliminate 
what I consider to be segregation and discrimination and give equality of 
opportunity within the armed services—an order from the President. I was 
wondering whether or not any action had been taken. 
SECRETARY ROYALL: We think we do that, and we did it before the 
President’s order was issued.308 
 
Royall’s protestations notwithstanding, the fact was that Army had neither complied with 
Executive Order 9981 nor Johnson’s deadline. Even though Royall had assented grudgingly to 
President Truman’s executive order, he never embraced the spirit behind it. Ultimately, the 
differences between the Commander-in-Chief and his Secretary of the Army became too 
profound to bridge, and Royall was forced to announce his retirement in April 1949.309 
Although Royall’s resignation removed a major obstacle to integration, it received sparse 
coverage in the major black newspapers. The Defender noted that Royall had refused to declare 
an end to racial segregation in his branch of service but also noted that an internal report 
described modest gains in the number of black officers in the reserves and regular Army.310 The 
Afro-American also reported on the “comparatively small” achievement.311 Yet the editorial 
boards of the black newspapers that had railed against Royall’s stubbornness did not comment on 
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his departure from the Defense Department. Although black editors could have taken the 
opportunity to boast at the expense of a defeated foe, they were still fighting many other battles. 
That spring, the black press was again compelled to address the issue of black Americans’ 
loyalty. This time, however, the controversy was sparked not by a politician but an actor. 
“Nuts to Mr. Robeson” 
 The occasion for this latest media frenzy was a statement made by the black actor Paul 
Robeson in Paris. By the 1940s Robeson was internationally renown for both his artistic 
accomplishments and his political activism. During his career he championed the cause of labor 
unions, the International Brigades of the Spanish Civil War, anti-colonist movements, as well as 
civil rights activists in his own country. Robeson’s willingness to speak out against oppression 
anywhere, and his association with Communists and other leftists dating back to the 1930s, had 
made him a flashpoint for controversy in both the mainstream press and black publications. 
Robeson’s April 1949 trip to France would engender even more discussion and argument in the 
media, and complicate the efforts of those who were attempting to win military integration 
through official channels.312 
 Robeson had travelled to Paris to attend the Congress of the Partisans of World Peace, an 
international organization devoted to global cooperation and disarmament. Alleged by the U.S. 
government to be a front organization for Soviet-aligned Communist parties, the Congress 
nonetheless attracted a number of distinguished delegates from around the world; W.E.B. Du 
Bois led the American delegation. At the conference, Robeson sang before the gathering and 
then made some brief remarks. According to an Associated Press dispatch, Robeson told the 
assembly: “We colonial people have contributed to the building of the United States and are 
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determined to share in its wealth. We denounce the policy of the United States government, 
which is similar to Hitler and Goebbels. . . . It is unthinkable that American Negroes would go to 
war on behalf of those who have oppressed us for generations against a country [the Soviet 
Union] which in one generation has raised our people to the full dignity of mankind. . . .”313  
In fact, Robeson had not spoken the words that the AP story ascribed to him.314 Yet the 
story was published across the world as fact, and Robeson found himself at the center of a 
maelstrom of criticism. That a man whom many in America considered the exemplar of black 
achievement would suggest that black Americans would not fight in a war with the Soviet 
Union—a war many at the time thought inevitable—was considered traitorous. Robeson 
attempted to set the record straight, with little success. The outcry was immediate and vicious.315 
 The Courier, which had needled Robeson and derided his activism for years, pounced on 
the AP report. “This was a pathetic statement,” read the newspaper’s editorial, “because Mr. 
Robeson, who belongs to more than a half hundred Communist-front organizations (while 
denying he is a Communist) cannot conceivably speak for American Negroes.”316 The writer 
went on to provide a truncated history of black participation in American military history from 
the Revolutionary War up to World War II before suggesting that Robeson himself was a coward 
for not serving in either of the World Wars. Even in the Spanish Civil War, he noted, Robeson 
had preferred to sing in the trenches rather than fight.317 The Afro-American’s response was more 
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restrained in its tone and less contemptuous of Robeson, but made the same point: Robeson 
misrepresented the beliefs of most black Americans.318 
The Defender’s account of the reaction among NAACP officials, black educators, and 
black clergy dripped with scorn for Robeson’s participation at the “so-called World Peace 
Congress.”319 Walter White, Channing Tobias, and Bishop William Jacob Walls of A.M.E. Zion 
all went on record to distance themselves from what Tobias described as “a striking example of 
disloyalty.”320 These fixtures of the black middle class again took pains to point out that Robeson 
did not speak for all black Americans and that black soldiers would certainly fight for America in 
any conflict with the Soviets. The Defender’s own editorial board did not pull any punches in its 
response to the Robeson flap. In an editorial headlined “Nuts to Mr. Robeson,” the newspaper 
criticized Robeson for playing into the hands of the Soviet Union: “The responsible Negro 
leadership and every one of our great national mass-membership organizations are anti-
Communist. They are all concerned primarily with one over-all objective and that is to make our 
democracy work. To assume that because we squawk about our grievances and raise hell about 
our second-class citizenship, that we are therefore anxious to embrace the thugs who boss the 
Kremlin is the height of folly.”321The “responsible Negro leadership” described in the editorial 
included not only organizations such as the NAACP but, by implication, the black press itself. 
These institutions had steered the movement for equal rights for decades, and they did not intend 
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to have their work jeopardized by the loose talk of a Communist-affiliated entertainer at a time 
when even an accusation of Communist sympathies could destroy careers or worse.  
The hyperbolic reaction in the black press to Robeson’s alleged statement was in some 
respects puzzling. For one thing, the vow that black soldiers would refuse to fight in a segregated 
military was nearly identical to the one A. Philip Randolph had made almost exactly one year 
earlier. Yet that statement, if not endorsed universally, had been treated in the black press with a 
considerable amount of sympathy. The indignation of black editors and columnists was also 
unusual because Robeson had made a similar statement before Congress in 1948, while testifying 
on a bill that would require all Communist and “Communist-front” organizations to register with 
the federal government. During his testimony, Robeson was asked if he would fight for America 
if the nation went to war with the Soviet Union. Robeson responded, “I would like to say that I 
would be on the American side to have peace. I would struggle for peace at all points. . . . If the 
American government would be a Fascist government, I would not support it.”322 The response 
of the black press to his testimony was muted. 
 Courier columnist Marjorie McKenzie came closest to identifying why the latest 
Robeson story produced such sound and fury: “I think the vitality of Paul’s remark lives on 
because it suggests, though it does not articulate, a deeper question. . . . He is saying, in effect, 
that he himself has come to some conclusions about the future of the Negro people in this 
country as things now stand. He must see the present political and economic context as an 
impossible vehicle for Negro aspirations. Else he would not advocate that Negroes should nor 
predict that they will behave in so drastic a fashion.”323 She continued: 
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If you believe, as Walter White does, that the democratic process has not been 
wrung dry of victories for minority people, then Paul’s talk is not just 
revolutionary; it is foolish. But before we can condemn or criticize Paul Robeson, 
we have to think straight about our fundamental philosophies. . . . The fact is that 
a lot of anti-Communist liberals are not happy about the way this Congress has 
fouled up the civil rights program. Its inaction creates a fertile ground of 
discontent and political disloyalty, whether overt or concealed. The Government 
[sic] ought to regard the exaggerated response to Paul’s statement as a storm 
signal.324 
 
McKenzie had identified a growing fault line among black Americans between those who had 
faith in the ability of American institutions to reform themselves and those who were convinced 
that such institutions could never be redeemed from within. The black press, along with the 
NAACP and other moderate civil rights organizations, were committed to working within the 
government to achieve integration.  
The words that an AP reporter had put in Robeson’s mouth had created new doubts about 
black Americans loyalties and possibly threatened the modest gains that had already been won. 
Black newspapers, having cast themselves in the role of the loyal opposition, had little choice but 
to denounce Robeson and continue to press the military and political establishment for real 
change. Yet the fault line McKenzie had described was not going to disappear. Indeed, in the 
years to come it would grow even larger, with significant consequences for the black press. 
“A Score For Our Side” 
 Even as the furor over Robeson occupied the black press for months, Sengstacke and the 
rest of the Fahy Committee continued to hold meetings. With the Air Force plan approved by the 
Secretary of Defense, the committee’s focus turned to the Army and Navy. Although the Navy 
had been theoretically in favor of full racial integration since the end of World War II, in practice 
black sailors remained a small and marginalized minority within the service. In the course of its 
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investigation, the Fahy Committee learned that black sailors comprised only about five percent 
of all active-duty naval personnel. Most of these men served in ancillary positions, such as 
stewards.325 The committee learned quickly that the Navy’s rhetoric and its practices were at 
odds. As Sengstacke put it during one meeting of the committee in April: 
MR. SENGSTACKE:. . . . It seems to me, as you say, nothing has been done, and 
since the Navy knows the general impression among Negroes is that they can only 
serve in the messman’s branch, I take it silence is exclusion in itself. That is, by 
doing nothing and knowing the reason they aren’t coming into the Navy is 
because of the past situation and nothing is being done about it. . . .That is one 
reason why you don’t have any progress in there, and it could be possibly that you 
aren’t interested to that extent, knowing all those facts and having those facts 
before you.326 
 
The Navy’s representatives attempted to defend the service’s policy on integration, but 
Sengstacke’s arrow had struck its mark.  
For years the Navy had espoused a policy of equality while making minimal efforts to 
achieve it. When Secretary Johnson announced his deadline for the services’ integration plans, 
the Navy simply submitted an outline of its current plans. Johnson, however, condemned the 
service for its “lack of any response” to his directive and demanded a new plan.327 Goaded to 
action by the Air Force’s plan, Johnson’s deadline, and the Fahy Committee’s own inquiries, the 
Navy found itself compelled to develop a serious proposal to integrate itself. Under the 
leadership of Acting Secretary of the Navy Dan A. Kimball, the service finally submitted a 
second, more comprehensive, plan for integration in late May. It included most of the measures 
that the Fahy Committee had been urging upon Kimball. These included a concerted effort to 
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attract more black recruits and officer candidates, a complete overhaul of the stewards’ branch, 
and the opening of more opportunities within the service for black sailors. The Marine Corps 
would also begin to integrate its training of recruits. That policy was ratified by Kimball’s 
successor, Francis P. Matthews, on June 23 and accepted by Johnson on July 7.328 
 Despite the significant changes included in the Navy’s second plan, the announcement of 
its approval met with only modest acclaim in the black press. The Defender’s Charley Cherokee 
devoted just two lines to it in his weekly column: “The navy [sic] release report is approved by 
the Defense Secretary Johnson and altho’ it contains little new it does include most of the things 
recommended by Lester Granger. . . . It’s a score for our side.”329 The Afro-American went a 
little further, describing the plan as a far-reaching step that would be applauded by “right-
thinking citizens the nation over.”330 However, the approval of the Navy plan was overshadowed 
by two other events. The first was the graduation of Ensign Wesley Brown from Annapolis, 
which received extensive coverage in all the major black newspapers.331 The second was the 
announcement, simultaneous with that of the Navy’s success, that the Secretary Johnson had 
swatted down the Army’s second plan for integration. Whatever excitement was generated by the 
Navy’s plan was tempered by the knowledge that the most difficult task still lay ahead. 
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 Everyone involved in the fight for military integration always knew that the Army was 
going to be the real obstacle to significant progress. There were various reasons why the Army 
was proving to be much more difficult to integrate than the other branches of the armed forces. 
One factor was simply the size of the organization. With far more members, and far more black 
members, than any other service, the Army would have much more difficulty integrating its 
ranks. The Army had also not made any serious preparations for integration before Truman 
issued his executive order. The closest the service had come to addressing the issue was a 1946 
study on the utilization of black troops authorized by the Secretary of War. Chaired by 
Lieutenant Alvan Gillem, Jr., the committee responsible for conducting the study spent just six 
weeks interviewing witnesses and analyzing documents before it delivered its final report. The 
conclusions of the Gillem Board, as the committee was known, ostensibly established a new 
racial policy for the postwar Army. In reality the Gillem Report suggested only modest changes 
in Army policy, such as shrinking the size of all-black units, and largely sidestepped the 
fundamental issue of segregation within the service.332 The Army refrained from embracing even 
these meager steps, meaning that in terms of racial integration the service had made almost no 
progress since the end of World War II. It was effectively starting at square one.333 
 Perhaps the biggest barrier to integrating the Army, however, was the institutional 
philosophy of the generals in charge. The Army’s officer corps had traditionally been dominated 
by white Southerners who often reflected the racial biases of their region. Even officers who 
agreed with the idea of integration thought it unlikely that it could ever be successfully achieved. 
The Army was too large and contained too many individuals with divergent racial attitudes, they 
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reasoned. The service could never maintain discipline on its bases if Northern blacks were 
barracked with Southern whites.334 All of these factors contributed the Army’s determination to 
resist any and all efforts to change.  
Like the Navy, the service had responded to Secretary Johnson’s deadline by submitting a 
description of its current policies. Unlike the Navy, the Army persisted in its defense of these 
policies, submitting a second plan that differed little from the first one. Johnson, acting on the 
recommendation of Fahy, once again shot it down.335 The black press ridiculed the Army for 
refusing to move forward even as the other services were making definite (if uneven) progress. A 
June 11 Defender article by Washington correspondent Venice Spraggs was headlined “Report 
New Navy Integration Plan Ready,” but most of the story focused on the Army’s ongoing failure 
to design an acceptable integration plan.336 In a longer June 18 article headlined “Gives Army 3rd 
Chance To End Jim Crow,” Spraggs noted that the Army was becoming increasingly isolated in 
its insistence on slowing down the pace of integration: “Seasoned observers argue that the Army 
hasn’t a leg to stand on in the face of the action to end segregation already taken by the Navy and 
the Air Force. For the second time within a month, the Defense Secretary rejected the Army’s 
equality proposal, stating that “it still fails to meet the basic intent” of President Truman’s 
Executive Order banning discrimination, which Mr. Truman himself stated envisioned the end of 
racial segregation in the armed services.”337 The Afro-American and the Courier also highlighted 
the continuing resistance of the Army, suggesting the service was acting in defiance not only of 
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Johnson but also the Fahy Committee and the President.338 The Army, the Afro’s editorial board 
opined, “must either put up or shut up.”339 
Stalemate 
 In fact, the Army leadership opted to dig in its heels. Although Royall was gone, his 
replacement, lawyer and fellow North Carolinian Gordon Gray, proved to be no more inclined to 
speed the process of integration. Segregation, he argued, was necessary to give black soldiers an 
opportunity to develop leadership skills without the “competition” from presumably superior 
white soldiers. To press forward too quickly with integration would damage the combat 
efficiency of the Army to a dangerous degree, Gray charged.340 Sengstacke and the rest of the 
Fahy Committee remained unconvinced. Much of the summer and early fall was taken up with 
proposals and counterproposals from each side, yet neither the Army nor the committee 
demonstrated a willingness to compromise.341  
 The Fahy Committee, however, was aided by growing public pressure on the Army. 
Although black newspapers such as the Courier and the Defender had been in the vanguard of 
seeking equality in the armed services, an increasing number of mainstream newspapers had 
joined the crusade. The New York Times, for example, accused the Army of defying the wishes 
of the Commander-in-Chief and engaging in a “private insurrection.” According the nation’s 
paper of record, the service was attempting to “preserve a pattern of bigotry which caricatures 
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the democratic cause in every corner of the world.”342 The black press, meanwhile, also 
continued to keep its eyes on the issue.343 Fahy was optimistic that the Army would eventually 
bow to the demands of Truman, Johnson, and the public and finally put forth a workable scheme. 
“It is the Committee’s expectation that it will be able within a few weeks to make a formal report 
to you on a complete list of changes in Army policy and practices,” he wrote in a letter to 
Truman.344 
With all eyes on the Army, Secretary Gray submitted a third proposal for desegregation 
to Johnson on September 30. This proposal opened all military occupational specialties to any 
qualified man, abolished racial quotas in Army schools, and ended racially segregated promotion 
systems and standards. However, it also retained racial quotas on enlistments and failed to open 
up assignments for black specialists. These last two items had been major sticking points in the 
ongoing negotiations between the Army and the Fahy Committee. Johnson realized that the 
prospect of getting the Army to agree to a plan acceptable to the committee was unlikely. 
Frustrated by what he viewed as a lack of urgency on the part of the Fahy Committee and acutely 
aware of the fact that his own professional reputation was now linked to the success of the 
Army’s plan, he opted to move forward.345 Without consulting the Fahy Committee or the 
president, Secretary Johnson approved the plan in late September.346 
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 The decision made the front pages of the Defender, the Courier, and the Afro-American, 
and all three papers were unanimous in their disdain. The Defender derided the proposal, 
outlining exactly how the approved plan failed to achieve any of the objectives that advocates of 
military integration had sought for so long. The Army policy, Venice Spraggs wrote, “not only 
fails to end racial segregation, but also maintains the 10 per cent racial quota established by the 
Gillem Board, which has been long and bitterly opposed. Essentially, the new policy represents 
no appreciable departure from the Gillem Board’s recommendation for the utilization of Negro 
manpower made in 1946. This would seem to indicate that the Army has made no noticeable 
gains in its racial philosophy during that three-year period.”347 The Courier and the Afro 
identified the Army as the main culprit, concluding quite correctly that the service had never 
taken Truman’s executive order or the suggestions of the Fahy Committee particularly 
seriously.348 The Afro also accused the Army of attempting to smuggle their latest plan past the 
eyes of the public in the hopes of avoiding exactly the kind of uproar that the black press had 
produced.349  
Curiously, Johnson himself was let off the hook by all of the newspapers, which focused 
their scorn on the Army. There was even some speculation in the Afro-American’s report that the 
Secretary of Defense, like the Fahy Committee, had not actually seen the proposal at all. James 
C. Evans, civilian adviser to Secretary Johnson, was quoted in an Afro article as saying that his 
office had never seen the plan, even though it should have been submitted for his approval. The 
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Afro’s story suggested that there were “implications” within the Pentagon that Johnson had never 
seen the plan and that one of his subordinates had approved it without the Secretary’s 
knowledge.350 Louis Lautier repeated the allegation one week later, as did Defender columnist 
Charley Cherokee the next month.351 
Johnson, of course, had seen the Army’s proposal, and had bypassed the Fahy Committee 
and the president in a futile effort to burnish his reputation. In doing so, Johnson had gambled 
that he would be able to dictate the nature and pace of the president’s desegregation plan. It 
proved to be a spectacularly poor decision. Angered by Johnson’s transparent attempt to 
undercut his authority, Charles Fahy went to Truman and told the president that neither he nor 
any of the other committee members could endorse Johnson’s decision. Truman responded by 
making a very public affirmation of the committee’s work. At a press conference on October 13, 
Truman described the Army’s latest proposal as merely a “progress report” and implied that a 
more substantial and far-reaching document was in the works. He also privately pressured 
Secretary Johnson to withdraw his support for the Army’s proposal.352 Johnson recognized that 
the Fahy Committee had the full support of the President, which he could not overcome. 
Moreover, the Secretary was increasingly occupied in a bureaucratic war with the senior 
uniformed military chiefs over a number of other issues. Johnson largely withdrew from the 
ongoing discussions with the Army, affirming the Fahy Committee’s dominance as the 
president’s instrument of military integration. 353 
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 The black press responded to Truman’s announcement not with praise for his desire for 
substantive change but derision for his inability to do more. They were not alone in their 
dissatisfaction with the increasingly beleaguered president. The Courier and the Afro-American 
reported that a number of groups were petitioning Truman to take more decisive action on the 
issue, including Americans for Democratic Action, the American Council on Human Rights, and 
A. Philip Randolph’s Committee Against Jim Crow in Military Service and Training.354 The Afro 
registered its own impatience with the president in an October 29 editorial: “As Commander-in-
Chief of the Armed Forces President Truman is in a position to have his will obeyed. He can fire 
as well as hire. We hope that he will tolerate no further delays now that there are ample 
precedents that democracy can be made to work where our fighting men are concerned.”355  
The Defender’s Charley Cherokee, who had followed the military integration process 
perhaps more closely than any other black reporter or columnist, contrasted the president’s bold 
words with the sluggish pace of change and wondered why Truman had not done more. “Well 
come on, Harry, what’s holding you?” he asked.356 The fact that the Defender, one of Truman’s 
most stalwart defenders in- or outside of the black press, had become more willing to criticize 
the president publicly was a reflection of black editors’ impatience with the Army’s continued 
obfuscations and Truman’s increasingly precarious political situation. In April, Mao-Tse-tung’s 
Communist army crossed the Yangtze River and completed its takeover of China. Then in 
September, the American intelligence services confirmed that the Soviet Union had detonated an 
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atomic bomb. Both of these events, coupled with the growing anti-Communist hysteria in 
Washington, lead to accusations that the president had weakened the nation’s security and 
threatened the United States’ dominance in global politics.357 Within a few months, these 
accusations would contribute to Truman’s decision to confront global Communism more 
directly. For now, however, the president was castigated by the black press as incompetent and 
weak. Even as the Defender and other newspapers called on him to expend more political capital 
in the fight for military integration, it was clear to any astute political observer that Truman was 
too weakened politically to do much more. He had sidelined Johnson, but now it was largely up 
to the Fahy Committee to wrangle a real plan for change out of the Army.  
Deception 
 The prospects for winning a workable plan did not appear demonstrably better than they 
had a few months earlier, however. Despite the rejection of the Army’s first two desegregation 
plans and Truman’s repudiation of its third, the service still remained extremely resistant to 
change. By now the black press frequently portrayed the Army as out of sync with its sister 
services, which had demonstrated a certain willingness to desegregate. Typical of such portrayls 
was the Afro-American’s editorial cartoon of October 15, which depicted an Army officer 
driving the wrong way down a one-way street labeled “One Way to Democracy” while a Navy 
officer and Air Force officer cruised toward progress. The growing public frustration with the 
nation’s largest uniformed service was personified by an onlooker labeled as “The Public,” 
shouting at the offender.358 The lengths to which certain elements within the Army would go to 
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maintain segregation became clear to the members of the Fahy Committee in late 1949, when 
they uncovered a scheme within the personnel and training divisions of the service. 
 In early October the Army sent a series of new regulations to its field commanders, 
including one that opened all military specialties to black soldiers. Many of the officers, 
oblivious to the bureaucratic wrangling taking place in Washington, took the orders at face value 
and began to assign black specialists for former all-white units. Officials at the personnel and 
training divisions were appalled, as they had not expected the new regulations to be put into 
practice. In response they issued an order that forbade the placement of black soldiers in white 
units, an order that not only violated Truman’s executive order but also existing Army policy. 
The illegal order was issued without the knowledge or approval of Secretary of the Army 
Gray.359 
 The Fahy Committee might not have learned of the deception had it not been for the 
foresight of Executive Secretary Kenworthy. Recognizing that certain officers might attempt to 
actively sabotage the work of the committee, he let it be known the committee’s office in the 
Pentagon was always left unlocked at night. Black personnel who worked in the building were 
thus able to provide the committee with information subtly and anonymously. It was by this 
method that a copy of the Army’s illegal order found its way to the committee. Kenworthy, who 
had a number of contacts in the media, took the story to the Washington Post.360 The newspaper 
ran with the story, and its editorial page took the opportunity to chastise the Army for such a 
flagrant attempt to thwart even the most modest advances toward integration.361 
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 The black newspapers were even less charitable. The Courier painted the Army’s actions 
as a “Revolt of the Generals,” comparable to the then-ongoing Revolt of the Admirals.362 An 
enraged Gordon Gray rescinded the illegal order and reiterated publicly his promise to the Fahy 
Committee that qualified black specialists would be assigned to certain white units.363The black 
press, although still unconvinced that Gray shared their commitment to integration, treated the 
announcement as a qualified victory.364 The Courier, with characteristic bombast, applauded 
itself for exposing the revolt, although credit for that more properly belonged to the Post.365 Still, 
the paper could be forgiven for engaging in a bit of self-congratulation. The campaign that the 
Courier and other black newspapers had waged for years was finally coming to fruition. By the 
end of the year, the Air Force had completely integrated, and the Navy was moving more quickly 
in the same direction.366 The bad publicity the Army received from both the black and 
mainstream press in the wake of its illegal regulations had weakened the hand of the 
segregationists within the service and nudged the Secretary of the Army toward total integration. 
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As the year ended, it seemed that at least a partial victory was within sight for the black press and 
its allies. 
Endgame 
 In the end, it was committee chairman Charles Fahy who delivered the coup de grâce to 
the Army’s campaign of resistance to integration. Exasperated by the foot-dragging and 
deception on the part of the Army, Fahy informed the White House in early December that the 
committee intended to issue a press release about its dispute with the service. The Truman 
administration, eager to avoid further negative publicity, proposed that instead the committee 
produce a document outlining what steps it believed the Army needed to take to comply with 
Truman’s order. Such a statement, with the imprimatur of approval from the White House, 
would leave the Army with little choice but to acquiesce. In addition, Fahy met personally with 
Secretary Gray and the Army Chief of Staff to emphasize the necessity of the committee’s 
recommendations.367 
The pressure proved to be too much for the Army to resist. In January 1950 the service 
issued a new directive regarding racial policy within its ranks. It stated that all soldiers would be 
assigned specialties regardless of their race and that it was effectively abandoning existing racial 
quotas.368 These were modest steps, but the Defender portrayed them as a great victory for both 
the Fahy Committee and all the advocates of racial integration. “Mix Units In U.S. Army” read 
the large headline above the story announcing the decision. “The strongest barriers to a fully 
integrated army were dissolved Monday by Department of the Army Secretary Gordon Gray,” 
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read the Defender’s article, “with an order implementing the policy set forth by President 
Truman’s Executive Order, which provided for equality of treatment and opportunity without 
regard to race, color, creed or national origin in the armed services.369 The news story was 
accompanied by a brief editorial that gave grudging credit to the Army for finally moving 
forward and also recognized the efforts of the Defender’s publisher to ensure that the policy 
would represent a real change: “Like we predicted here last week, Army took a plea in its racial 
segregation policy. While reported policy changes don’t let down flood gates to racial 
integration, Army mules are at least headed in the right direction. Fahy Committee at meeting 
last Saturday microscoped new assignment policy language with members Palmer and 
Sengstacke holding out for word changes. Final pronouncement may not be too bad.”370 
The Afro-American’s coverage was more skeptical of the prospects for real change; even 
as it called the Army’s announcement “a major step” toward integration, it questioned the 
service’s sincerity.371 The newspaper once again called attention to the Army’s sluggish pace in 
an editorial cartoon: the Army brass was depicted as a tortoise finally catching up to the hare of 
the 1946 Gillem Report, while an Air Force eagle watched from just past the “integration” finish 
line.372 The Courier editorial board, for its part, again trumpeted its own role in fighting military 
segregation, including the Double V campaign. The newspaper, however, also noted that “we 
would be the last to contend that this was a Negro victory in the sense that Negroes alone 
brought it about. Actually it was an interracial job, with white and black men of good-will 
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battling side by side for the just and decent thing.”373 Not all of the Courier’s writers shared this 
sanguine view, however. Columnist Horace Cayton described the Army’s latest announcement 
as a “gimmick” and raised the now-familiar question of why Truman and Johnson did not simply 
force integration through executive fiat.374 
In May 1950 the Fahy Committee released its final report, entitled Freedom to Serve. In 
it, the committee offered a refutation of the most commonly espoused rationales for segregation 
and affirmed its commitment to a multiracial society that offered the same opportunities to all 
Americans. Perhaps most importantly, the report included a blistering critique of the Army’s 
policy of racial segregation. The Army had long defended its policy on the grounds of military 
efficiency; the Fahy Committee’s report demonstrated that such a system was in fact wildly 
inefficient: the political imperatives of segregation had led the service to create duplicate 
structures for both black and white soldiers. 375 The practical effects of this unwieldy system 
would become apparent to the Army brass within a few short months. 
The black press responded to the report much as it had to the Army’s announcement a 
few months earlier. The Defender announced that it was “a job well done” and claimed that “the 
most stubborn brass hats have been put on notice and the new orders now in effect are bearing 
fruit in every branch of the military establishment.”376 The Afro-American, while acknowledging 
that the Navy and the Air Force had made significant progress since the Fahy Committee began 
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its work, pointed out that the Army still had a long way to go in guaranteeing equal treatment for 
its black soldiers.377 The Courier voiced concern that the committee’s report on military 
integration was more concerned with “the machinery set up for that purpose than goals 
attained.”378 It also expressed impatience with the slow pace of change within the Defense 
Department. 
In sum, the response of the leading black newspapers was decidedly mixed. The fact that 
one paper was optimistic (the Defender) while another skeptical (the Afro-American) and another 
both (the Courier) illustrated their opinion of the bureaucratic process through which integration 
was actually occurring. With its publisher serving a vital role in that bureaucracy, it was natural 
that the Defender would be far more hopeful about the possibility of successful change than 
outsiders such as the Afro and the Courier. All of these newspapers, however, shared a belief that 
change could only come through official channels. The idea of mass protest or civil disobedience 
as espoused by the likes of A. Philip Randolph and Paul Robeson was misguided at best or 
counterproductive at worst. For good or ill, the leaders of the black press remained convinced 
that the ultimate power to end segregation rested with those who possessed political power, men 
like Johnson and Truman. The black press believed that its best course of action was to call on 
the better angels of such individuals. Real change, however, would ultimately arrive not through 
the intercession of politicians or the efforts of the black press, but by the stark realities of 
combat. 
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Chapter Four: Now to War 
 By the time President Truman dismissed the Fahy Committee on July 6, 1950, the Navy 
and Air Force had made significant progress in desegregating. The Army, however, continued to 
lag behind. A year of protracted negotiations with the committee had produced certain 
agreements, such as the opening of all military specialties to all soldiers regardless of race and 
the end of racial quotas. The Army, though, had done little to actually fulfill these promises. In 
terms of racial segregation, little had changed. Yet it would be a mistake to conclude that the 
Fahy Committee had not accomplished its goals. By compelling the service to agree to an end to 
quotas, the committee had made it much more difficult for the Army to control the number of 
black enlistees. More importantly, the committee’s experiences with the Air Force and Navy had 
established that racial integration could succeed.379 
 The Army, however, was determined to resist change for as long as it could. Many senior 
officers still thought little of black soldiers’ intelligence and bravery. Once again, black troops 
would need to prove their worth on the battlefield. They would not have to wait long. On June 
25, 1950, North Korean troops poured across the 38th Parallel and into South Korea, taking the 
world by surprise. The Army, unprepared to mount a coordinated defense, was forced to thrust 
still-segregated black units into the heat of battle. Some of these units performed capably, others 
proved to be ill-prepared for combat. Black newspapers would follow all of their exploits 
closely, using their victories as proof of black military prowess and their failures as evidence of 
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how segregation damaged military efficiency. These publications recognized that their crusade 
for complete equality in the armed forces was at stake. If military segregation was truly to be a 
thing of the past, then the black press could not allow the segregationists use the war as a pretext 
to roll back the advances it had made. 
“Calling the Red Bluff” 
The invasion had surprised President Truman and his advisers. The chaos of the first few 
days prevented the White House and the Pentagon from obtaining a clear picture of what was 
happening. At first Truman authorized only naval and air support for the beleaguered South 
Korean troops, believing this would be sufficient to repel the North Korean advance. By June 30, 
however, it became apparent that South Korean forces were not up to the task. After consulting 
with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the president authorized General Douglas MacArthur, commander 
in chief of all American naval, air, and ground forces in the Far East, to use all resources at his 
command to defend South Korea. Truman opted not to ask Congress for a formal declaration of 
war and tried to downplay the significance of his decision by describing the conflict taking place 
in Korea as a “police action.”380 The mainstream press was not fooled, however; the next day’s 
New York Times appeared with the banner headline “US TROOPS LAND IN SOUTH 
KOREA.”381 
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The black press, for its part, was generally supportive of Truman’s actions. In a July 8 
editorial entitled “Calling the Red Bluff,” the Defender argued that Truman’s decision was “the 
only action possible under the circumstances.”382 Moreover, the editorial noted that “the Red-
inspired Koreans are clearly the aggressors. They started the shooting and there is every reason 
to believe that they acted upon the advice of Russia.”383 The Courier followed suit, proclaiming 
that the United States had acted responsibly (while delicately omitting any mention of Truman, 
who had of course made the decision to react militarily.)384 The Afro-American, always wary of 
the excesses of anti-Communist hysteria, made a remarkably coolheaded assessment of the 
situation: “Actually, Korea, 7,000 miles away, is awkward to defend and, on top of that, it is of 
questionable strategic value. . . . What makes matter worse is the fact that the South Koreans 
actually do not have their hearts in the struggle and consequently are of questionable value as 
allies. For this, the U.S. is partly to blame.”385 Even as it questioned the merits of American 
intervention, the Afro concluded in the same editorial that “we cannot fail in Korea.”386 Whatever 
the risks involved, the paper’s editorial board concluded, the Communist threat must be 
confronted. 
The nature of that threat, however, was poorly understood by a number of people, 
including the president, who tended to view global Communism as a monolithic entity controlled 
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by Moscow.387 That perspective was shared by many in traditional media as well as the black 
press. In another editorial in mid-July, the Defender again placed the blame for the war squarely 
on the Soviet Union and its allies: “Joe Stalin, who is the biggest dictator of our time, and his 
puppets know the value of the big lie. They also know how to throw a rock and hide their 
hands.”388 Although North Korea was indeed a client state of the Soviet Union at that time, the 
relationship between the two nations was considerably more complicated than the Defender’s 
portrayal suggested. Nonetheless, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin had given North Korea’s Kim Il-
Sung the green light to invade South Korea and had provided the NKPA with considerable 
amounts of weapons and other military equipment.389 Just as importantly, the Soviet Union had 
mounted a robust propaganda campaign on behalf of its North Korean ally. This campaign 
included frequent denunciations of the United States as a racist, imperial power.390 Intended to 
drive a wedge between white and nonwhite members of the United Nations coalition that had 
come together to oppose the North Koreans’ aggression, the Soviet propaganda might also have 
resonated with black Americans who were once again expected to fight for a country that 
continued to treat them as second-class citizens. 
The black press, however, remained resolute in its support of American intervention. 
“The Reds are trying to make the Asiatics believe that the United Nations defense of South 
Korea is ‘white imperialism,’” wrote one Defender editorialist. “This strategy seeks to destroy 
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whatever goodwill America may have among the darker peoples.”391 The Defender argued that 
the best way to counter this propaganda was with improved treatment of black Americans, 
particularly those in the military. In a page one editorial, the newspaper noted that “the Reds in 
North Korea are using racial propaganda as effectively as they are using Russian tanks, planes, 
and other weapons of war. . . . Russian propagandists have built up anti-American sentiment 
throughout Asia by exploiting the actions of white supremacists in the United States. The Red 
propaganda should be off-set by deeds as well as words. The assignment of a Negro general to 
the staff of the supreme commander of United Nations forces should be accompanied by 
complete integration in the military establishment which has been advocated by President 
Truman and his Committee on Equality in the Armed Forces.”392 Even as black newspapers 
called for change within the armed forces, however, they made it clear that black Americans 
would stand and fight in Korea no matter what. Walter White used one of his columns in the 
Defender to proclaim that whatever problems America had with regard to race relations, black 
Americans would still fight against “an aggressive totalitarianism.”393  
The Courier’s response was similarly vehement. Turning the Soviet argument on its 
head, the newspaper’s editorialists linked Communist aggression with the worst depredations of 
the slave trade in the last century. “In the interest of national survival,” read one Courier 
editorial, “the United States must oppose the new slavery of totalitarianism just as it fought the 
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old slave traffic and drowned the slave system in blood on its own soil.”394 The newspaper’s 
editorial board was joined by the Courier’s columnists, who were unanimous in their rejection of 
Communist propaganda and their confidence in the loyalty of black Americans. Marjorie 
McKenzie proclaimed that “almost nothing could give Negroes a greater sense of belonging to 
this nation than the right to die for it on a basis of equality and dignity,” while her fellow 
columnist Joseph Bibb made a similar point, arguing that Communism was not the solution to 
the persistent racism in America or elsewhere.395 
 The Afro-American continued to use more moderate language in its editorials even as its 
position on Communism and the war was similar to the Defender’s and the Courier’s.396 The 
newspaper’s editors also expressed an anxiety that the language of American troops in Korea 
could play into the hands of the Soviet propagandists:  
Already from the Korean battlefield has come a new derogatory word—“Gook,” 
something coined to indicate utter contempt for the North Korean enemy, not for 
the Russians who may be backing them, but for the little brown men alone. . . .  
America has gone to great extremes in an effort to prove that there is nothing 
racial about this present war. At present, this particular word is not being applied 
to South Korean forces. They are our allies. But one day, we fear, the South 
Koreans will wake up to the fact that their brothers to the north are being 
disparaged, and we do not think they will like it.397 
 
Despite the Afro’s concerns, the newspaper did not waver in its support of the war effort in 
Korea. Like the other major black newspapers, it affirmed its belief in the necessity of American 
military intervention and expressed confidence that black troops would again prove their loyalty 
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to their country. The next major controversy surrounding these troops, however, would center 
not on their loyalties but their competence.  
Holding the Line 
 While the black press was decrying Soviet propaganda, American troops and their allies 
were moving into South Korea in an effort to beat back the invasion. From an American 
perspective, the timing of the war was terrible. After World War II, the United States had 
withdrawn its occupation troops from the Korean peninsula in the belief that Western Europe 
would be the flashpoint for the next confrontation between the democratic West and the 
Communist East. Responsibility for the defense of the fledgling country was delegated to the 
poorly trained and ill-equipped soldiers of the Republic of Korea Army, or ROKs, as they were 
known. The American military presence in South Korea was reduced to an “advisory” group that 
comprised about 500 officers and enlisted men.398 
Meanwhile, President Truman and Secretary of Defense Johnson had embarked on a 
cost-cutting program in an attempt to curb defense spending. The end result of their efforts was a 
drastic reduction in American military effectiveness, particularly that of the Army. By June 
1950, the Army had a total strength of 591,000 men, far below its previously authorized strength 
of 677,000. The men that the Army did have were not particularly ready for combat, either. 
Many had joined in peacetime in the belief that another global conflict was unlikely in the 
nuclear age. Those who had been inducted into the service during the peacetime drafts of 1948-
1950 were often actively hostile to the Army. Readiness was another problem; the length of basic 
training had been cut after World War II. Johnson’s austerity program had also resulted in a 
shortage of up-to-date equipment; stockpiles of World War II-vintage vehicles and weapons 
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were deteriorating and little investment had been made in new technologies and equipment.399 
The most notorious example was the World War II-era bazooka issued to American troops in 
Korea; its rockets bounced harmlessly off the Russian-supplied tanks used by the North 
Koreans.400 
The dismal state of the American Army and the ROKs stood in stark contrast to the 
NKPA. The NKPA’s Soviet sponsors had been far more generous with military assistance than 
the United States had been with the ROKs. As a consequence, when the North Koreans began 
their invasion on June 25, they rolled easily over the South Korean forces. The first American 
units to engage the NKPA in battle in mid-July fared little better. By the end of the month, the 
North Koreans had pushed the Americans and South Koreans into the southeast corner of the 
peninsula, the so-called “Pusan Perimeter.”401 
 In the early days of the war, black newspapers tried to put a positive gloss on the 
disastrous performance of both white and black Army troops on the Korean peninsula. The 
participation of black troops in the first major military action since World War II was touted on 
the front pages of the Afro-American and the Defender as a particular point of pride.402 These 
stories were not always in line with the facts. One Defender story noted hopefully that “so far no 
Negroes have been identified among the Air Force and Army casualties which still are at a 
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minimum. The tide of the invasion is expected to change as soon as American military 
equipment is thrown into the fight.”403 
The Courier, meanwhile, emphasized the role of the fully integrated Air Force in the 
early bombing campaigns against the advancing North Koreans: “While Negro aviators fly with 
the Thirteenth Air Force, now lending support to forces in South Korea waged in battle against 
the advancing North Koreans, thousands of colored troops stand nearby awaiting the call to 
action.”404 This support, the newspaper noted, was not limited to the kinds of logistical 
operations to which black soldiers had been confined in the last war: “Flying speedy jets. . . 
serving with bomber crews. . . directing activity from the ground. . . Negro airmen are serving in 
many capacities with the Thirteenth Air Force.”405 Perhaps even more importantly, the Air Force 
had successfully integrated not only the rank and file, but also its officer corps. The Courier kept 
a careful count of the number of black officers assigned to Korea, and noted approvingly that at 
least one major was among them.406 The Air Force’s progressive racial attitudes were paying off, 
according to the Courier. “Negro youths,” the newspaper reported, “increasingly aware of the 
fact that racial barriers are being done away with particularly in the Air Forces with the Navy 
running close behind, are leading the way to the recruiting offices as the number of volunteers 
for service is stepping up since the outbreak of the Korean war.”407  
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Even as the Courier upheld the Air Force as a model of how integration could work, it 
continued to lament the Army’s reluctance to integrate its units or even give black soldiers an 
opportunity to prove themselves in battle. The newspaper frequently made the comparison 
explicit in its early stories. Whereas the Air Force “made no hesitation in using top Negro 
officers in responsible positions,” one reporter wrote, Army forces moving into Korea kept black 
troops away from the front lines.408 Racism, the Courier implied, was the only reason for the 
Army to keep black soldiers away from the battlefield at a time when American forces were 
desperately needed to repulse the North Korean invasion. The Army had no shortage of black 
troops who could be utilized at this time. 
Soon enough the Courier’s writers would get their wish. With American troops heavily 
outnumbered on the Korean peninsula, the Army had little choice but to throw its all-black units 
into action. Among the first American troops to confront the North Koreans were the members of 
the all-black 24th Infantry Regiment. Of the four traditionally all-black regiments in the Army, 
the 24th was the only one that still existed and was the largest all-black unit in the Korean 
theater.409 It owed its continued existence to Ned Almond, now MacArthur’s chief of staff, who 
used it to absorb the large number of black soldiers serving as occupation troops in Japan.410 
Given little to do by leaders who would have preferred to forget about them entirely, the 
members of the 24th grew indolent. When the war began many of these troops were in 
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substandard physical condition. Even more importantly, their units lacked the heavy armor and 
weaponry that had not been needed in Japan but were essential for major combat operations.411 
Although white units suffered from similar problems and performed just as poorly, the 
troops of the “deuce-four” became the focal point of a long-running controversy regarding the 
fighting ability of black soldiers. What often went unnoticed was that the poor performance of 
black troops was largely due to the Army’s policy of segregation. Whereas officers and enlisted 
men could be transferred in and out of white units to weed out incompetents and replace them 
with skilled troops, only blacks could replace the black troops of the 24th. With few black trained 
non-commissioned officers and weapons specialists available either in the Far East or in the 
United States, the 24th found itself saddled with a large number of dispirited and poorly trained 
troops.412  
Victory 
Despite the Twenty-fourth’s problems, the unit would provide the Army with its first 
decisive victory in the conflict. In late July 1950 the 24th seized control of the strategic town of 
Yechon, driving out the NKPA troops that occupied it.413 With little other good news for 
Americans arriving from Korea, the Twenty-fourth’s victory made headlines in both the 
mainstream media and the black press. Several days after the battle, the Defender ran a photo 
collage of front pages from mainstream newspapers such as the Charlotte Observer, the Chicago 
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Daily News, and the Richmond-Times Dispatch. The headlines could have come from the 
Defender: “Negro Troops Capture Key City,” “Negroes Gain Korea Victory,” “Negro Troops 
Win 16-Hour Battle.”414 The Defender’s own story struck a similarly celebratory tone. The 
article described how “crack Negro infantrymen” had occupied the strategic city after “a fierce 
and bloody 16-hour battle.”415  
After Yechon, the Defender could now use the most recent fighting to prove that black 
servicemen could fight just as well as whites. Indeed, in the days and weeks after the battle, the 
Defender would note that just as “our boys” had repelled the North Koreans at Yechon, they 
continued to push back Communist attacks.416 While emphasizing the successes of black units, 
the newspaper’s articles also highlighted the actions of individual black officers or enlisted men. 
The Defender frequently reported on awards and citations presented to black troops, ranging 
from the Army’s Distinguished Service Cross (recommended to a lieutenant who repelled a 
North Korean attack) to the Combat Infantry Badge (awarded to 154 black soldiers for service in 
Korea, all of whom the Defender listed individually.)417 The newspaper highlighted not only the 
victories of black troops, but also their sacrifices. In an obituary for a slain black corporal, 
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Defender correspondent L. Alex Wilson described how the soldier was killed by enemy fire 
when he attempted to rescue several wounded comrades.418 
The Courier’s coverage followed a similar pattern, emphasizing both the 24th Infantry 
Regiment’s accomplishment and the sacrifices the unit’s troops had made: “Brown-skinned 
doughboys became spattered with blood. Some of it was their own. But most of it was that of 
slant-eyed North Korean Reds who found themselves in hand-to-hand combat facing America’s 
oldest and most battle-tested and proved Negro infantry outfit.”419 The achievements of the 24th 
at Yechon served as an inspiration not only to black Americans on the homefront, but also to 
other black soldiers in Korea, the newspaper reported.420 The performance of the troops of the 
24th, the Courier’s reported, was proof that they were capable of serving as equals alongside 
their white counterparts. It was also evidence that for all their grievances against American 
segregation, black troops were still willing to fight and die for their country: “The GI sees that 
this much talked about democracy is workable. . . and worth protecting, even at the cost of one’s 
life. . . . Recognizing this, and appreciating the life he has lived in Japan, the Tan GI is still ready 
to go, recognizing the fact that he is an American, moving forward again to take his place among 
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other Americans. He realizes that in facing an uncertain future that America must win. All  
else. . . his gripes, his pleasures. . . becomes unimportant.”421 Here the fortunes of black 
Americans were clearly linked to the success of the American mission in Korea. By fighting for 
democracy abroad, black troops could finally win it at home.  
This subtle echo of the Courier’s earlier wartime campaign became explicit in the next 
week’s edition of the newspaper, which reported that “a revival of The Pittsburgh Courier’s 
World War II ‘Double V’ program is being urged by strong voices in the nation’s capital.”422 
Among those voices was A. Philip Randolph, who had evidently reconsidered his earlier views 
on serving in a segregated military. Randolph’s change of heart was occasioned by a political 
calculation that blacks had more to gain from fighting in Korea than opposing the war. Now that 
the United States was in a shooting war with Communists, black Americans whose loyalties had 
already been in question could not risk any association with the enemy. As Randolph told the 
Courier: “While our boys are fighting and dying to establish a beachhead in Korea for liberty 
and peace, let no man or woman of America fall to so vile and so low an estate as to lend his 
support to the sordid and unmoral [sic] business of propaganda guerilla warfare here at home, 
from which our Russian Communist enemies may reap benefit and advantage.”423 Randolph was 
now firmly in line with the black publishers and editors who had always embraced military 
service as a path to true equality. While the soldiers of the 24th were fighting Communism 
abroad, black leaders inside and outside of the black press were coming together to affirm their 
opposition to Communism at home. 
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 The Afro-American was also part of this united front, and its coverage of Yechon and its 
aftermath closely mirrored that of the Defender and the Courier. The newspaper boasted of the 
Twenty-fourth’s victory, highlighting the speed and skill with which the unit defeated its 
opponents.424 “We can be pardonably proud,” read one editorial, “of the part our troops have 
played in bringing about the change.”425 The Afro also noted that the Twenty-fourth’s success 
provided a convincing rebuttal to the Communist propaganda that portrayed the conflict as a war 
between white imperialists and the nonwhite denizens of East Asia.426 In an exclusive interview 
with the Afro, the South Korean consul general made the same point: “This is not a race war. It is 
a war for liberty from oppression. Colored soldiers of America, who are fighting so gallantly, 
furnish a powerful proof that the love of freedom is not racial—but human.”427  
 Despite the victory at Yechon, American forces were still on the defensive, and units 
such as the 24th Infantry Regiment continued to take heavy casualties. The Afro-American 
emphasized the hardship experienced by the troops of the 24th. Headlines such as “Situation Very 
Grave in Korean Fighting” and “Tan Lads in 14 Days of Continuous Battle” reminded readers of 
the danger and difficulties faced by black soldiers.428 The battlefield could be dangerous for 
reporters as well; Albert Hinton, an associate editor at the Norfolk Journal and Guide and a 
correspondent for the National Negro Press Association whose articles appeared in the Afro, was 
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killed in a plane crash off the coast of Japan.429 James Hicks, the Afro’s most prolific 
correspondent in Korea, only narrowly missed being on the same fatal flight as Hinton. Despite 
the tragedy, Hicks kept up a steady stream of articles about the 24th Infantry Regiment and other 
black units in Korea.430 Although some of his articles featured the accomplishments of black 
troops, much of the news was increasingly grim. “24th in Tatters, Hicks Says Casualties 
Staggering!!” read one August headline.431 The Afro, along with every other major black 
newspaper, had urged blacks to give their full support to the war effort in the belief that the 
success of black troops would be the most effective strategy for achieving racial equality in the 
military. Yet it now appeared that the success of black troops at Yechon had been a fluke. As the 
Pusan Perimeter threatened to collapse entirely and the U.S. Army was on the verge of being 
thrown into the Sea of Japan, the black press decided to change tacks. Now black newspapers 
would argue that military integration was necessary not because black troops fought well, but 
because segregation made them fight poorly. 
 “The Only Solution” 
As North Korean troops continued to ride roughshod over black and white troops alike, 
black reporters and editors drew attention to a fact the Army was slowly beginning to recognize: 
segregation made for an inefficient fighting force. In an August 26 Defender editorial, an 
anonymous writer argued that “everybody goes in this fight and the color line is in the way. The 
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time has come to cut out the comedy errors and make use of every man according to his skills at 
home as well as in Korea.”432 A few weeks later another editorial claimed that “the business of 
maintaining lily-white units on the one hand and Jim Crow units on the other is becoming 
impractical if not impossible.”433  
As bad news continued to trickle out of Korea, the Defender increasingly made strategic 
and pragmatic arguments for the integration of the Army. In an article about integrated sailors 
aboard a Navy aircraft carrier, Alex Wilson noted that, “if the interracial policy will work—and 
it is doing that—aboard the close quarters of a Navy ship during war-time, then Jim Crow in any 
other branch of the armed service is just so much dead weight. It is thwarting an united America 
and impairing the efficiency of our forces against the enemy.”434 Much as it had during the Fahy 
Committee’s deliberations, the Defender used the examples of the Navy and Air Force to 
demonstrate that there was no practical reason for the Army to continue to resist complete 
integration. The integration of the two smaller branches, Wilson argued, had been accomplished 
without generating racial animosity among either the officers or the enlisted men. It was the 
bigoted attitudes of the Army leadership, the Defender contended, that were the real roadblock to 
integration. In formerly all-white units where black replacements had begun to appear, there was 
remarkably little racial tension, at least in the Defender’s coverage. The newspaper ran numerous 
stories about black and white officers and enlisted men working together without apparent 
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animosity. The tone of these stories was summed up in the headline of one of them: “Integration 
Welcomed By Combat Infantry.”435  
The Defender also ran numerous stories about formerly prejudiced white soldiers who 
were impressed by the performance of black troops. Typical of this type of story was a front page 
article from the October 7, 1950 edition of the newspaper. In it the Defender correspondent 
related the tale of Sgt. 1st Class Jodie Garrett of Mississippi, a white man. Imprisoned by the 
North Koreans, Sgt. Garrett reconsidered his views on race after he and his fellow prisoners of 
war were liberated by an all-black unit: “The Southern sergeant said, “We are all Americans. I 
shall never forget that. I saw one Negro sergeant stand up there with his machine gun and shoot 
30 Reds. It was not just being freed by colored people though. A man does a lot of thinking in 
this war about race prejudice.”436 These “conversion” articles made frequent appearances in the 
newspaper throughout the first few months of the war, as the Defender continued to emphasize 
not only the competence of black soldiers, but also their ability to work alongside white soldiers, 
particularly Southerners.437 In doing so, the newspaper chipped away at another long-held 
assumption of the Army leadership—that racial tension would prevent black and white soldiers 
from working together. 
 While the Defender railed against the inefficiency of segregated Army units, the Courier 
emphasized the hardships experienced by black GIs and the psychic toll of unceasing combat. 
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The attitude of many black soldiers was summed up in one headline: “‘Let’s Get This Mess Over 
and Go Home.’”438 With fewer victories for the Courier to trumpet, the focus of its coverage in 
early fall focused on the sacrifices made by black soldiers. Black troops were described as “mud-
soaked and weary after weeks of constant Red attacks.”439 Under pressure from “ceaseless Red 
thrusts,” many of these units were forced to withdraw.440 But even as units such as the 24th 
suffered heavy casualties, the Courier maintained that the troops’ willingness to fight remained 
unwavering. In a dispatch filed from the main Army hospital in Tokyo, correspondent Frank 
Whisonant asserted that wounded black soldiers were eager to return to the battlefield: “Mute 
evidence that the Negro soldier has given all that was expected of him is the number of wounded 
lying in the Tokyo General Hospital. . . . The Negro soldier, however, has taught the North 
Koreans to treat him with respect on the field of battle.”441 
 Ironically, the defeats inflicted upon units such as the 24th were actually speeding the 
process of integration. As white and black soldiers alike were killed, wounded, or otherwise 
incapacitated, it was vital that replacement troops were rushed to the battlefield as quickly as 
possible. However, matching white replacements to white units and black replacements to black 
units proved to be extremely difficult under wartime conditions. Faced with no alternative, the 
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Pentagon began to quietly integrate some of the formerly segregated units in Korea, including 
the 24th. 442 The pace of change, however, was slow. 
 Once the Courier’s correspondents discovered this, they proclaimed it a harbinger of the 
inevitability of complete integration. According to the Courier’s articles, white and black 
soldiers alike recognized the logic of complete integration. One such article contained an 
interview with a white officer, who declared that integration was “‘the only solution’ to the 
Army’s biggest personnel puzzle.”443 When word arrived that the Army had sent three white 
riflemen as replacements to the 24th Infantry Regiment, the Courier again noted that “the 
problem of replacements has become a serious one for the Twenty-fourth is now well below half 
its normal strength.”444 Complete integration now appeared inevitable, but the Army was still not 
moving quickly enough for the Courier’s editorialists. The newspaper continued to criticize the 
halting and haphazard nature of the desegregation process.  
Its editors were particularly incensed by the news that South Koreans were serving 
alongside white American soldiers. This development galled the Courier’s editorialists because 
they considered race relations between Koreans and whites even worse than those between 
blacks and whites. One editorial noted that “the South Koreans have won integration into the 
United States Army before black Americans. . . . Americans don’t like Koreans and Koreans 
don’t like Americans.”445 Nonetheless, the presence of the South Koreans was proof enough for 
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the Courier’s writers that there was no longer any acceptable justification for segregated units. In 
an editorial headlined “Abolish ‘Negro’ Units,” one writer proclaimed that “if there was any 
sound reason for continuing this segregation among those defending their common country and 
flag, it vanished with the reports from Korea that South Koreans were being integrated into white 
American units. . . . The only thing a South Korean has in common with a white American is 
their common struggle against the Communist-directed and –supplied North Koreans, whereas 
white and colored American lads have everything in common except color.”446 Like the 
Defender, the Courier insisted that integration must come because its logic was now irrefutable. 
“A new day for minorities has dawned in America,” wrote columnist Joseph Bibb.447 “Wherever 
race prejudice arises and racial friction crops out, colored Americans may well point to 
Korea.”448 
 While the Defender or the Courier stressed the irrationality of a segregated military, the 
Afro-American continued to emphasize the achievements of black troops even as there were 
fewer achievements to report. In an effort to locate a silver lining in otherwise depressing reports 
from the front lines, the Afro highlighted such events as the rescue of a stranded platoon and the 
escape of a wounded lieutenant through enemy lines.449 The newspaper also lauded the 
destruction of Yechon by black combat engineers. After the 24th Infantry Regiment captured the 
town, they were ordered to withdraw and leave it to the Communists. Without a trace of irony, 
the Afro praised the work of the Twenty-fourth’s engineers who demolished the town their 
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colleagues had fought so hard to capture.450The Afro was upfront about its reasons for continuing 
to praise the beleaguered troops of the 24th and other black units. “Ordinarily we do not call 
particular attention to the color of an individual about whom we publish news,” read a September 
9 editorial.451 It continued: 
But there are special circumstances in the Korean crisis which make it important 
for the whole world to know that Americans with dark skin are helping put down 
Communist aggression in Korea. The Communists are trying to take over Asia 
and win control of the colored peoples by portraying the United Nations effort in 
Korea as a case of whites fighting colored peoples. This is a propaganda 
technique the Communists have used with considerable success for many years 
. . . . They do not know that colored Americans fight for free institutions and the 
rule of law as gallantly and willingly as white Americans. So a Communist 
propaganda weapon was refuted in making known the role of the 24th Infantry on 
the East Korean front and the fact that colored men are fighting in other combat 
groups in Korea.452  
 
The Afro continued to extol black troops throughout the early fall, even as these troops continued 
to suffer terribly.453 Good news, however, was on the way, and black newspapers such as the 
Afro would no longer have to look so hard to find causes for celebration. 
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 Reversal of Fortune 
 United Nations forces, after an initially dismal performance on the Korean peninsula, 
were slowly regaining the initiative against their foe. American bombers flew dozens of sorties 
each day, destroying crucial North Korean military and industrial targets. Meanwhile, American 
and allied reinforcements continued to stream into South Korea. The North Koreans now found 
themselves outmanned and without the logistical and technological advantages of the UN 
forces.454 Meanwhile, MacArthur launched an amphibious invasion behind North Korean lines 
that he had planned for months. Code-named Operation Chromite, the invasion involved a joint 
Army-Marines-ROK force attacking the heavily defended port of Inchon. On September 15, 
1950, a flotilla of Navy ships landed men and armor on the seawalls at Inchon, catching the 
North Koreans by surprise. MacArthur’s forces achieved their immediate objectives and by 
September 19 had established a secure lodgment. The success at Inchon allowed MacArthur’s 
forces to recapture the South Korean capital of Seoul by the end of September. Shortly 
thereafter, American forces led a breakout from the Pusan Perimeter, trapping a large number of 
enemy troops and driving the remaining NKPA forces back into North Korea.455  
 Black soldiers played a major role in these operations. The 24th Infantry Regiment, still 
the focus of the black press’ coverage of the war, participated in Eighth Army’s breakout from 
Pusan and the pursuit of North Korean troops across the border.456 Black newspapers, presented 
with the first unambiguously positive development since the fall of Yechon, used the opportunity 
to again trumpet the fighting skills of the 24th. This time, however, they were able to point to 
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some of the recently mixed Army units as further evidence of integration’s merits. Defender 
correspondent Alex Wilson noted that integrated elements of the 25th Infantry Division (the 
Twenty-fourth’s parent division) had participated in some of the heaviest fighting.457 The 
newspaper’s editorial board, meanwhile, used the opportunity to continue to push for a black 
general in the armed forces. Such an appointment was desirable not for “political or sociological 
reasons,” read the editorial, but because “Jim Crow breeds inefficiency.”458 The Defender’s 
coverage of the drive into North Korea backed up this argument, as the newspaper’s articles 
demonstrated that both all-black and newly mixed units could perform just as well as all-white 
units.459 The Courier and the Afro also gave considerable space to both all-black and partially 
integrated units participating in the offensive.460  
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 It seemed as though the black press was about to achieve the kind of double victory it had 
been unable to in World War II: victory over the North Korean enemy and, at long last, the 
integration of the Army. Military success seemed a foregone conclusion to black newspapers. 
Events were transpiring too fast for journalists to keep up with them. “As this is written,” read an 
October 7 Defender editorial, “our boys are mopping Korea [sic] and the end of this Communist 
inspired war seems to be in sight.”461 On the same day, Courier editor P.L. Prattis noted, “The 
Korean War seems about over as this is written.”462 Meanwhile, the success of the units the 
Army had mixed on an ad-hoc basis seemed to point the way to further integration; Army leaders 
could no longer point to racial tensions as a reason for keeping units racially segregated. “A 
more democratic spirit is sweeping the armed forces,” the Defender editorial board 
pronounced.463 Total integration was inevitable, wrote a Defender columnist.464 From the 
battlefront, Afro-American correspondent James Hicks reported that “At this writing, integration 
of colored and white soldiers on the front line is already under way here.”465 There were positive 
developments in Washington as well; the Afro reported that the new Secretary of the Army, 
Frank Pace, was considering a new directive to speed up the process of integration throughout 
the service.466  
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The optimism of the black press proved to be premature, however. Two separate 
developments threatened both the success of the American military in Korea and the integration 
of the Army. The first was the American decision to pursue the retreating NKPA past the 38th 
Parallel and into North Korea. On October 7, American forces crossed the border; on October 19 
American and South Korean soldiers entered the North Korean capital of Pyongyang; by October 
26 the Americans had reached the Yalu River, on the border between North Korea and China.467 
The presence of a large, hostile army on China’s doorstep persuaded Mao Tse-tung to send 
Chinese soldiers into Korea. In October 1950, hundreds of thousands of men from the Chinese 
People’s Volunteer Army moved across China’s southern border and into North Korea to 
confront the UN force.468 The arrival of the Chinese radically altered the course of the war, and 
would have profound consequences for the black soldiers who thought the fighting was almost 
over. 
 Chinese troops began moving into North Korea in mid-October, but their skill at 
camouflage and the errors of American military intelligence allowed them to penetrate hundreds 
of miles into the country before the UN military leadership realized what was happening. The 
entrance of an enormous, well-trained enemy force came as a shock to American troops, who 
first encountered the Chinese in late October.469 The dispiriting effect of the Chinese offensive 
on American morale was made clear in the Defender’s stories. “The effect on the troops was like 
dashing a pail of ice-cold water on a bridegroom who has just walked away from the altar,” 
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wrote Wilson in one of his more colorful articles.470 As American units wilted under increasingly 
deadly Chinese attacks, tales of successful attacks against the Communists became less common. 
Instead, the Defender described how black units “stemmed the surging tide of Chinese Reds,” 
making it possible for other units to escape.471 The newspaper also highlighted stories of black 
soldiers who rescued their comrades from danger, as in the case of a corporal who crawled into a 
ravine to pull wounded soldiers to safety, or black soldiers who served in logistical or support 
units.472 The Defender also placed the blame for the recent setbacks squarely on the shoulders of 
the military’s top officials: “There must be something radically wrong with our intelligence 
services if the reports from the war fronts can be believed. Our information on what the enemy is 
doing from the very beginning of the Korean incident to the present has been frightfully muddled 
and incomplete. We seem to be continually caught by surprise in one spot or another.”473 The 
implicit message in the Defender’s editorial was clear. The white leadership had failed the men 
in the field, white and black, who were doing their best to battle an implacable enemy. 
The Afro-American missed the story of the Chinese invasion altogether, as James Hicks 
had returned to the United States. By the time the newspaper was able to get dispatches from 
NNPA correspondent Milton Smith in early December, the situation had become dire. “The 24th 
Infantry Regiment of the 24th Division [sic] is suffering heavy losses; absorbing punishment 
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from the advancing Chinese Reds and the vicious weather,” Smith reported.474 The next week’s 
issue of the Afro proclaimed “We’ve Been Licked.”475 In it, Smith painted a grim picture of 
American troops hurriedly evacuating the city of Pyongyang as the Chinese pressed closer: “The 
faces of these wounded soldiers are faces one will never forget. Colored and white, they were 
covered with grime from the miserable, fecal earth of Korea. There are faces of deep lines and 
eyes that are dazed. The wounds are bandaged with bright white cotton, which blobs of blood 
have stained not red but a dirty-looking brown. I shall never forget the stumbling, pain-wracked 
men—colored and white who dumbbly [sic] followed their leaders up or down the 
gangplanks.”476As the black press had earlier in the war, the Afro sought a silver lining in the bad 
news emerging from the battlefield. Among the chaos of the retreat south, Smith found that the 
horrors of combat had bonded white and black soldiers together in blood. “I have seen dark-
skinned wounded men helping broken-up white men;” he wrote, “and I have seen white ones 
helping the colored GI’s who have been torn by steel fragments.”477  
One particular example of interracial camaraderie made the headlines in every major 
black newspaper, although it was a bittersweet one. Jesse Brown, the first black Navy aviator 
whose exploits the black press had trumpeted, was shot down near the Chosin Reservoir on 
December 4. Other pilots circling over his crash site could see that Brown was still alive, but the 
fuselage of his jet was engulfed in flames. Lt. Thomas Hudner, a white pilot, crash-landed his 
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own jet near Brown’s and attempted to free him from the wreckage.478 Hudner’s valiant effort to 
save his fellow pilot, although unsuccessful, was held up by black newspapers as evidence that 
the racial prejudices that held sway in America were irrelevant in Korea.479  
The Courier, like the Afro, had sent its Korea correspondent elsewhere during the 
Chinese invasion and so missed the story. Unlike the Afro, however, the Courier did not rush to 
catch up with story; readers without any other source of news would have been unaware of the 
scale of the disaster facing American troops in Korea. The Courier’s reporting on the Chinese 
offensive during the last months of the year was limited to a six-paragraph story on page 13 of its 
December 16 issue.480 Instead, the Courier was devoting its front pages to another story from 
Korea it had been following since late summer. It involved the fate of the entire 24th Infantry 
Regiment.  
“Looking for a Scapegoat” 
The 24th had scored a major victory at Yechon, and in the weeks following there were 
many instances of individual heroism that the black press seized upon. Private First Class 
William Thompson became the first American soldier to earn the Medal of Honor in Korea when 
he gave his life defending his fellow soldiers from advancing North Koreans. Sergeant Cornelius 
H. Charlton would earn the same award in 1951 when he led three assaults on an enemy-held 
ridgeline despite being mortally wounded.481 Yet even before the Chinese offensive of October 
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the unit as whole had fallen into disrepute among American soldiers on the peninsula. By the end 
of August, the unit had earned a reputation for breaking under fire, or “bugging out.” Major 
General William B. Kean, commander of the regiment’s parent division, concluded that the 24th 
was “untrustworthy and incapable of carrying out missions expected of an Infantry Regiment.”482 
He even recommended that the unit be deactivated on the grounds that it jeopardized the war 
effort.483  
Courier correspondent Frank Whisonant was among the first black journalists to pick up 
the story of the Twenty-fourth’s dismal reputation among Army officers and enlisted men. “It all 
began,” Whisonant wrote, “when several people here in the war area told their friends that they 
had heard that the Twenty-fourth’s men were cowards and were afraid to fight, that they had a 
history of running away from the battlefront.”484 To Whisonant, these accusations were evidence 
not of the poor performance of black troops, but the incompetence of their white officers. As he 
saw it, “the biggest trouble with the Twenty-fourth is that officers have made their promotions 
already, and not wanting to fight a war anyway, lay their discontentment on Negro troops.”485 To 
be sure, many white officers had no qualms about expressing their racism openly. Whisonant 
interviewed a white chaplain who freely told the reporter that he considered black soldiers 
inferior to their white counterparts: “When asked if his feelings were in accordance with the 
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Bible, the Colonel admitted they were not, but stated they were his own and that he intended to 
keep them.”486 
 Despite the negative rumors surrounding the 24th, the Courier was still able to find white 
commanders who still supported the unit. The newspaper publicized statements by senior 
officers who announced that they were aware of no evidence to support the accusations against 
the unit.487 But the Courier also recognized that many officers within the military were eager to 
place the blame for the Americans’ setbacks on the battlefield solely on all-black units: “Rumors 
have it that the Eighth Army is looking for a ‘scapegoat’ to put the blame on for the enemy 
breakthrough of Sept. 1.”488 Certainly, the 24th had experienced several disastrous defeats. But 
the Courier argued—correctly—that the unit’s performance was no worse than that of all-white 
units. Moreover, the newspaper argued, the 24th had suffered from limited supplies and flawed 
leadership: “At the same time the combat efficiency of the once crack twenty-fourth Infantry 
Regiment has been reduced by about 45 or 50 per cent within the last three weeks due to the 
questionable tactics of the Twenty-fourth Division heads.”489 This, the article concluded, had 
seriously undermined the morale of the unit. Meanwhile, the regiment’s purported tendency to 
break under enemy fire had become common knowledge among both white and black troops 
serving in Korea. A popular song began called “The Bugout Boogie” began making the rounds 
of other American units. Described as “the official song of the 24th Infantry,” its lyrics went: 
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“When them Chinese mortars begins to thud/the old Deuce-four begin to bug.”490 Frustrated by 
the negative reputation of the 24th and other all-black units, the Courier continued to emphasize 
the sacrifices made by black soldiers. There was no shortage of these. As a Courier editorial put 
it: “While Negroes in the States are gearing themselves to give all they have for the benefit of 
Americans of all classes and colors fighting in Korea, the news from that battlefront about the 
Twenty-fourth Infantry Regiment is distinctly disquieting. . . . There is not a single American 
unit in Korea which has not run, whether they called it a retreat or not.”491 Despite the rumors 
surrounding the unit, however, the Courier reported that the soldiers of the 24th remained 
resolute in their desire to finish the fight.492  
“The Latest GI Smear” 
 As allegations of cowardice continued to dog the 24th Infantry Regiment, one of the 
unit’s junior officers was about to become the focal point for the ongoing debate about black 
soldiers’ ability to fight. Leon Gilbert was a first lieutenant in the 24th who had been tried and 
convicted of insubordination and cowardice when he refused to retake a location overrun by 
North Korean troops. An Army court martial convicted him and sentenced him to death.493 The 
Courier quickly turned Gilbert into the public face of the maligned regiment. It published 
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numerous interviews with his relatives and promoted efforts by activists around the country to 
obtain a presidential pardon.494  
 The newspaper’s involvement with the Gilbert case went beyond merely publicizing it, 
however. The Courier had known of Gilbert’s conviction in early September but, according to 
the newspaper, military officials had ordered its Korea correspondents not to publish it.495 
Unable to act publicly, the newspaper maneuvered behind the scenes to obtain Gilbert’s release. 
After the military lifted the embargo on the story, the Courier described its efforts: “We had the 
story. We could not print it at the time. But we had already put our extensive machinery in 
motion to help Lieutenant Gilbert — if we could. The Courier appealed to the White House!”496 
The newspaper had now taken its advocacy for racial equality in the military to a new level.
 For more than a month, the Courier kept the Gilbert case on its front pages, publishing 
numerous articles and editorials arguing that the military had made the lieutenant and the entire 
24th Infantry Regiment scapegoats for the poor performance of the entire Army.497 The 
newspaper’s efforts on behalf of Gilbert, coupled with those of civil rights organizations and 
sympathetic politicians, finally forced President Truman to intervene in late November and 
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reduce the lieutenant’s sentence to twenty years in prison.498 But there was little time for the 
Courier to celebrate even this small victory. In the weeks after the Gilbert case, the Army began 
mass courts-martial against dozens of other members of the 24th for supposed acts of 
cowardice.499 The Courier followed these cases closely, again arguing that black soldiers were 
being made to pay for the shortcomings of the entire U.S. Army. In an editorial entitled, “The 
Latest GI Smear,” the newspaper noted that “Aside from the notorious case of Lieutenant 
Gilbert, it is reported that dozens of Negro soldiers of the Twenty-fourth Infantry Combat Team 
have been arrested and court-martialed for “misconduct before the enemy” and sentenced to long 
terms. It is very significant that there is only a sprinkling of white soldiers so accused, convicted 
and imprisoned, although the record of the Negro soldiers has been better than that of the 
whites.”500 Throughout the rest of the year, the newspaper continued to devote much of its 
coverage to the plight of the 24th. When the NAACP announced that its chief legal counsel, 
Thurgood Marshall, would be traveling to Korea to investigate, the story dominated the 
Courier’s front page.501  
 The Afro-American and the Defender were slower than the Courier to grab the story of 
the 24th and Lieutenant Gilbert. Although the Afro did highlight the case of Gilbert and called for 
his life to be spared, the newspaper devoted relatively little coverage to the rumors surrounding 
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the other members of the 24th Infantry Regiment.502 Correspondent James Hicks mentioned the 
unit’s negative reputation only briefly in an open letter to President Truman recommending the 
regiment for a Presidential Unit Citation.503 The mass court-martials that began late in 1950 
generated some additional coverage, but the Afro never took up the plight of the 24th as an 
editorial crusade in the manner that the Courier did.504 The Defender also gave considerable 
space to the Gilbert case without touching on the larger issue of the Twenty-fourth’s battle-
readiness.505 The newspaper did cover Marshall’s planned trip, and the reason for it. One 
editorial described the courts-martial of the black soldiers as an effort “designed to discredit the 
heroic performance of Negro soldiers in Korea.”506 Both Marshall and the Defender latched onto 
the fact that there was an obvious inconsistency in the courts-martial. Twice as many blacks as 
whites were brought up on charges even though fewer than one soldier in six was black.507 The 
paper again noted that although some black units might have performed poorly in the early days 
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of the war, they were hardly alone. “‘It should not be forgotten,’ [Marshall] continued, ‘that 
throughout the early phases of the war, American troops, white as well as Negro, were retreating 
precipitously before the onslaught of the North Koreans.’”508 
  As the year drew to a close, the black press had little to celebrate. American forces were 
in full retreat from the Chinese onslaught and although white and black troops continued to 
intermingle on the battlefield, the pall hanging over the 24th Infantry Regiment seemed to 
threaten the prospect of black soldiers ever being treated as equals. “If anyone tells you that 
segregation and discrimination have ended in the Army, tell them they are lying and you can 
prove it,” James Hicks proclaimed after returning from Korea.509 Yet black newspapers 
continued to commend the men of the 24th and other black soldiers.510 “Victory abroad, then 
victory at home,” had been the mantra of the Double V campaign in the last war. The black press 
had embraced this idea again for this new conflict, either explicitly (as the Courier did) or 
implicitly (as did the Afro and the Defender.) But what if there was no victory abroad? If black 
newspapers’ campaign for military equality was predicated on the ability of black soldiers to 
vanquish their opponents, what happened when these soldiers were unable to achieve this goal? 
If these questions occurred to black journalists and editors, they found no expression on the 
pages of their newspapers. Complete integration, they reasoned, could only be bought, either 
with victories or with blood. 
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Chapter Five: A Pyrrhic Victory? 
 As 1951 dawned, the war continued to go poorly for the Americans. As historian Clay 
Blair wrote, “To this point the war had not been well fought. Most of the large mistakes had been 
MacArthur’s. . . . As a result, some 60,000 American soldiers and Marines and probably five 
times that number of ROK soldiers were dead, wounded, or missing.”511 There would be little 
respite for those troops who had survived the initial Chinese assault, either: On New Year’s Eve 
1950, Chinese forces launched another massive offensive across the 38th Parallel into South 
Korea. In the bitter cold of the Korean winter, UN forces evacuated the South Korean capital of 
Seoul and withdrew to the south.512 It was another ignominious defeat for the already profoundly 
demoralized American troops. 
For the black press, and its allies in the quest for military integration, there was more bad 
news. The reputation of the 24th Infantry Regiment had reached its nadir as dozens of its troops 
were brought before courts-martial for various offenses, including desertion.513 Many white 
officers continued to openly question the value of black soldiers.514 The idea of an integrated 
Army, it seemed, was literally on trial. In response, black newspapers turned the tables: they put 
segregation on trial. Laying out the evidence in numerous articles, editorials, and columns, the 
Defender, the Courier, and the Afro-American methodically and forcefully demolished the myths 
                                                 
511 Blair, 554. 
 
512 Blair, 592-602; Steuck, 129. 
 
513
 Bowers, Hammond, and MacGarrigle, 185-188. 
 
514
 Nalty, 257-258; Stillman, 50-52 
163 
 
and prejudices that underlay Jim Crow. But despite the logical and moral force of their 
arguments, they failed to persuade Army officials to abide by the spirit of President Truman’s 
executive order and completely integrate. In the end, events far beyond the control of black 
editors and publishers would deliver the victory for which black newspapers had fought so long. 
“A Club To Beat Our Brains Out” 
Early in 1951, the major black newspapers followed a two-part strategy in their campaign 
against the ongoing segregation in the Army: they vigorously defended the accused soldiers of 
the 24th Infantry Regiment against charges of cowardice and desertion while continuing to 
highlight the accomplishments of other black troops. Thus the front page of the January 6 edition 
of the Courier included one article urging the Pentagon to award the Medal of Honor to two 
black officers and another article reporting on Thurgood Marshall’s impending visit to Japan to 
investigate the case of the accused soldiers of the 24th.515 Courier Columnist Horace Cayton 
wrote that Marshall’s investigation was necessary because “what we have read gives us a queer 
feeling that is not on the up and up.”516 Nonetheless, he wrote, all he and the Twenty-fourth’s 
defenders desired was an unbiased examination of the available evidence.517 Cayton’s claim was 
echoed by the Defender, which noted that black soldiers were asking only for fair treatment.518 
Another Courier columnist, J.A. Rogers, also backed Marshall’s trip while noting that despite 
ongoing injustices, black troops remained loyal. “The Negro’s dogged faith in continuing to fight 
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for this country in the face of his treatment sometimes looks like a miracle to me,” Rogers 
wrote.519 “And I hope he will continue. Constancy will one day be rewarded and retribution will 
as surely overtake the conscienceless and the unjust.” 520 
Marshall himself, however, was considerably less sanguine than Rogers that faithfulness 
alone would win black soldiers their equality. When Marshall arrived in Korea in February, he 
learned that the military’s double standard for white and black soldiers was even worse than he 
previously thought. After conducting interviews and making a careful review of the available 
court-martial records, Marshall learned that not only were black soldiers far more likely to face 
court-martial than white soldiers, but black officers rarely sat as members of courts-martial and 
black defendants often received harsher penalties than whites convicted of the same crimes. 
Marshall was particularly appalled by the case of a black enlisted man who had been tried, 
convicted, and sentenced to life in 42 minutes. In his final report to the NAACP Marshall wrote, 
“Even in Mississippi a Negro will get a trial longer than 42 minutes, if he is fortunate enough to 
be brought to trial.”521  
The discrepancies in the treatment of black and white defendants, Marshall concluded, 
were the result of a culture of racial discrimination that permeated not only the front lines but all 
of Far East Command.522 Marshall reported his findings in a February 15 memorandum to 
MacArthur. Far East Command conducted an investigation of its own in response to Marshall’s 
report, but the investigators concluded that Marshall’s accusations were baseless. Although 
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several of the convictions had been set aside and many of the sentences had been reduced after a 
review by higher authorities, Far East Command said it found no evidence of bias.523 MacArthur 
and his staff had allowed Marshall to come to Japan and South Korea to conduct his inquiry, but 
they were far less willing to admit any fault on the part of the Army leadership.524  
The black press followed Marshall’s visit and investigation with great interest. All of the 
major black newspapers detailed every stage of his trip, from his visit to Far East Command 
Headquarters in Tokyo, to his arrival in Korea, to his return to America.525 The Courier and the 
Defender also endorsed his conclusion that many of the court-martials of the Twenty-fourth’s 
infantrymen were racially motivated. (The Afro-American, though it had devoted many pages to 
Marshall’s investigation, offered no editorial opinion on its conclusion.) The Courier 
congratulated Marshall on a job well done while endorsing the legal strategy that he and the 
NAACP had employed to begin to dismantle the infrastructure of segregation (and that would 
reach its acme three years later in Brown v. Board of Education.)526 The Defender’s editorial 
board lauded Marshall’s efforts, but it also used the opportunity to hurl a rhetorical hand grenade 
at the Army. “Racial armies in our democracy are utterly asinine and the wily Communists have 
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exploited this racial nonsense to their own advantage,” the Defender’s editorialist wrote.527 “The 
Army should stop giving such aid and comfort to our enemies. Why give our adversaries a club 
to beat our brains out?”528  
For the Defender, Marshall’s report was another piece of evidence in the newspaper’s 
ongoing case against military segregation. Even as Marshall was gathering evidence, the 
Defender continued to blast the Army for its unjust and illogical policy. In a January 13 editorial, 
the Defender stated that “the American people as a whole should know the facts. Our boys are a 
credit to themselves and America.”529 As for poor reputation of the 24th Infantry Regiment 
among other soldiers, the newspaper again claimed that the unit’s problems stemmed directly 
from segregation. As the newspaper explained it, if the unit had been integrated, “the regiment 
would have had its proper share, according to supply and availability, of automatic weapons, 
which it didn’t have at one time; that the morale of the Negro fighters would have been even 
higher, if they were not a Jim Crow outfit; and that the outfit would not have had to await the 
arrival of colored troops for replacement.”530  
Although the Defender was perhaps the most vehement and persistent opponent of Jim 
Crow in the Army, its sentiments were most definitely shared by the Courier and the Afro-
American. Both newspapers continued to publish articles about any kind of successes achieved 
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by black soldiers in Korea, no matter how modest.531 The Courier also continued to emphasize 
the idea of “democracy abroad and democracy at home,” though the paper’s plans for an official 
sequel to the Double V campaign never came to fruition. “We need everything we can get to win 
this war,” advised columnist Benjamin Mays.532 The Courier’s editorial board, meanwhile, railed 
against the idea that “fighting anti-Negro segregation and discrimination is somehow 
disloyal.”533 
Yet while many black soldiers continued to distinguish themselves on the battlefield and 
the black press continued to extol the ethical and practical benefits of complete integration, a 
tone of fatalism crept into the newspapers’ coverage during the winter and early spring of 1951. 
The Chinese offensive had ended all hopes of an early victory, and Marshall’s investigation 
suggested that serious obstacles would have to be surmounted before complete integration could 
become a reality. Even the progress that had been made since the beginning of the conflict was 
not guaranteed to last, as Alex Wilson acknowledged in a Defender article headlined, “Question: 
Can We Hold Interracial Gains In Army When Shooting Over?”534 The Courier once again 
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chastised Truman for not doing more to shove the Army in the right direction, asking “Why, 
then, does the Commander-in-Chief allow the Army to flout his will?”535  
The Army Starts To Listen 
Even as the outcome of both the war and integration appeared to be in doubt, important 
changes in Korea and Washington were underway. As Thurgood Marshall’s investigation of the 
court-martialed troops of the 24th Infantry Regiment dominated the headlines of black 
newspapers, another, arguably more important, inquiry was taking place in Korea. Spurred by 
the complaints of the commander of the 25th Infantry Division, General William Kean, Eighth 
Army had begun a study of the general’s recommendation that the 24th be disbanded.536 Among 
other things, the Eighth Army investigators studied the opinions of three black reporters: Alex 
Wilson of the Defender, Frank Whisonant of the Courier, and James Hicks of the Afro-
American. All three correspondents acknowledged that there were problems within the 24th, but 
the Eighth Army report noted that the journalists ascribed these to “lack of leadership, esprit-de-
corps, and close relationship between officers and men; discrimination against negro [sic] 
officers; and poor quality of replacements. Their opinions were that complete integration was the 
solution, and Mr. Hicks stated that 75 percent of the men in the regiment favored such action.”537 
The report ultimately concluded that although integration was the most practical solution to most 
of the unit’s problems, it was not administratively feasible at present. Nonetheless, the Eighth 
Army report demonstrated that not only was the Army leadership increasingly aware that true 
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integration could solve many of its problems, but Army officials were also relying on the black 
press to gauge the attitudes of its own troops.538 
The Army was also increasingly concerned about the ability of the black press to sway 
the opinions of its readers back home. Black newspapers had blamed the Twenty-fourth’s bad 
reputation in part on the poor performance of its white commanders and indeed, the unit’s first 
two commanders had done little to distinguish themselves since arriving in Korea. The first, 
Colonel Horton White, had never commanded troops in combat and considered himself too old 
for the job.539 He had been relieved of command after the Twenty-fourth’s disastrous 
performance during the battle for the Pusan Perimeter in early August 1950. His replacement, 
Colonel Arthur “Art” Champeny, was widely reviled by his men as a bigot and by his fellow 
officers as incompetent.540 His racist attitudes had not escaped the attention of black 
correspondents, who criticized his leadership in a number of their dispatches.541 Champeny did 
not last long as the Twenty-fourth’s CO, however. On September 6, he was wounded by a sniper 
and evacuated.542 He was replaced by a 36-year old lieutenant colonel named John Corley. 
General Kean gave him a battlefield promotion to full colonel and named him commander of the 
24th. Corley was now the youngest regimental commander in Korea.543 
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Corley’s first week as the Twenty-fourth’s commander began inauspiciously when he got 
into an argument with a black lieutenant and threatened the man with his gun. The incident took 
place in sight of Alex Wilson of the Defender and Frank Whisonant of the Courier, who both 
wrote articles critical of the colonel.544 Eventually, however, Corley proved himself to be a 
competent leader who won the affection of both his men and the black press. When the Saturday 
Evening Post published an unflattering account of the 24th Infantry’s ignominious performance 
during the retreat south in late 1950, Whisonant turned to Corley to rebut the allegations.545 
Wilson also came to respect Corley, describing his replacement of Champeny: “Thus vigorous, 
liberal able youth replaced what the fellows called ‘granddaddy rocking chair military 
leadership.’”546 Coverage of the colonel in the Afro and the Courier was similarly favorable.547 
Unfortunately for Corley, he was not as popular with Brigadier General J. Sladen 
Bradley, who replaced Bill Kean as commander of the 25th Infantry Division in mid-February.548 
A disagreement over the regiment’s defensive positions escalated into a heated argument 
between the two men, and ended with Bradley relieving Corley.549 Corley’s departure presented 
a public relations problem for Bradley and his superiors. As William Bowers, William 
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Hammond, and George MacGarrigle wrote in their history of the 24th Infantry Regiment in 
Korea, 
[Corley] was revered by the men of the 24th, almost all of whom stood in awe of 
him. That he should have been disciplined could only have harmed their 
confidence in the division’s command. At the same time black newspaper 
reporters who covered the 24th Infantry also thought highly of the colonel. They 
would have inevitably scrutinized the reasons for his relief and might well have 
sided with him in print. Although it is difficult to say how the black community 
would have responded, some sort of outcry might have developed. The effect 
would inevitably highlight the Army’s policy of segregation and the service’s 
continued intolerance for the black soldier.550 
 
In the end, the reasons for Corley’s departure were hushed up and the black press took little 
notice.551 The incident, however, illustrated that many officers were increasingly aware that the 
Army’s racial policies were increasingly a liability, and that the service could not afford to 
antagonize the black press. 
On the Home Front 
 Although the debate over military segregation was focused primarily on Army units in 
Korea, the black press was also fighting a rearguard action against segregationists at home who 
were attempting to roll back the modest gains that civil rights advocates had already made. 
Foremost among their domestic opponents was Rep. Arthur Winstead, a Dixiecrat from 
Mississippi. In March Winstead had inserted an amendment into a universal military training 
bill, which was once again under consideration by Congress. The Winstead Amendment would 
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have permitted American servicemen to opt out of racially integrated units. The amendment 
prompted a fierce counterattack by the NAACP, the black press, and their allies in Congress.552 
 The Afro-American urged its readers to contact their congressmen to register their 
disapproval.553 The newspaper also heaped scorn on the Dixiecrats and Republicans on the 
House Armed Services Committee who had voted for the amendment. An editorial cartoon 
published Easter week showed Uncle Sam turning away from a black man hunched over while 
Jim Crow sat on his back. The caption read, “Why Hast Thou Forsaken Me?”554 The Courier and 
the Defender also made ardent pleas on their editorial pages for the defeat of the Winstead 
Amendment.555 After intense lobbying from the NAACP, the full House voted to strip the 
Winstead Amendment out of the bill.556 Although the black press celebrated the victory, it also 
found itself enmeshed in an internecine struggle between the NAACP and two black 
Congressmen.  
Once again, the debate centered on what strategy would best serve the goal of total 
integration in the armed forces. Afro political columnist Louis Lautier summed up the 
controversy in his April 7 column: 
The NAACP wants Rep. Adam Clayton Powell (Dem., N.Y.) to lead the fight to 
strike the Winstead amendment out of the military manpower (draft and universal 
military training bill). . . . Of his own volition, the Rev. Mr. Powell told the House 
that he would not offer during the fighting in Korea any anti-segregation 
amendment to any armed services bill. He can deny that statement until he gets 
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blue in the face, but that is what the Congressional Record said he said—and he 
had a chance to edit his remarks in any way he saw fit before they were put into 
print. . . . Why the NAACP shuns Representative Bill Dawson just doesn’t make 
sense. He’s one of the most influential men in the House. When he takes a 
position on any issue, it’s a signal to the entire Democratic delegation from 
Illinois of how to vote. Besides, there are a lotta Southerners who’ll vote with 
Dawson, but won’t vote with Powell.557 
 
Powell’s statement that he would not press for full integration during wartime echoed W.E.B. Du 
Bois’ notorious “Close Ranks” editorial of World War I, which Du Bois himself later repudiated. 
It was perhaps for that reason that Powell later attempted to distance himself from it.558 
 Despite Powell’s backtracking and his avowed commitment to the defeat of the Winstead 
Amendment, all of the major black newspapers gave credit for the victory to Rep. Dawson, who 
won over his colleagues with what the Defender described as “dramatic eloquence, sincerity and 
unassailable logic.”559 Dawson received similar encomiums in the Courier and Afro.560 Bitter 
experience had taught black newspapers that they could not set aside the cause of equality during 
wartime. They were attracted to allies like Dawson, who would press for change even as he 
committed himself to the United States’ military aims in Korea.  
Ridgway Arrives, MacArthur Fades Away 
  Dawson was a useful ally for the black press to have, but he was still only one 
congressman among many. The black editors who were pushing for military integration were 
about to receive a far more powerful one, though they did not yet know it. Lt. Gen. Matthew 
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Ridgway had arrived in Korea in December 1950 to replace Eighth Army commander Walton 
“Johnnie” Walker, who had been killed in a jeep accident. Ridgway arrived just as Eighth Army 
was at its lowest point, battered by the Chinese offensive and suffering from poor morale and 
leadership. Ridgway immediately undertook a series of drastic changes designed to reverse 
Eighth Army’s fortunes. He sacked officers he deemed insufficiently aggressive and replaced 
them with men he believed were focused on attack rather than defense. Under Ridgway’s 
leadership, the Chinese offensive was finally halted in late January and morale began to 
improve.561 
 Among Ridgway’s many problems as Eighth Army commander was the issue of what to 
do with still-segregated units, most notably the 24th Infantry Regiment. Although de facto 
integration had begun in the 24th and other units, the Army still maintained an official policy of 
racial segregation. This was a source of great frustration to Ridgway, whose command was in 
constant need of replacement troops even as black infantrymen idled away in Japan because 
many white units refused to accept them.562 MacArthur, however, was the only man in Far East 
Command who could force the issue, and he had shown little interest in doing so. In the 
meanwhile, Ridgway would have to make do with racially segregated units. Having stemmed the 
Chinese tide, Ridgway ordered a series of counterattacks beginning in late January. While other 
units participated these assaults, the 24th Infantry Regiment was given time to rest. By early 
February it was nearly back to full strength for the first time in months.563 Along with the rest of 
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Eighth Army, the 24th fought its way north, aiding in the recapture of Seoul and advancing to the 
38th Parallel by the end of March.564  
 Ridgway’s transformation of Eighth Army from a demoralized and battered unit into an 
aggressive and accomplished fighting force made the general an international celebrity. Featured 
on the cover of Time magazine, Ridgway also found himself the toast of Washington as military 
and civilian officials publically voiced their approval of his leadership.565 The black press, 
however, had little to say about Eighth Army’s leader. Ridgway’s replacement of Walton Walker 
had occasioned no comment from the major black newspapers, and even the successful outcome 
of Eighth Army’s spring offensive generated no coverage in their pages. Despite the accolades 
he received elsewhere, Ridgway was initially a non-entity to the black press.  
Ridgway’s star was definitely rising, even if the black press chose to ignore it. 
MacArthur’s fortunes, on the other hand, were headed in the opposite direction. Although the 
general was still highly popular with the public, his relationship with President Truman had 
reached its breaking point. Truman had never trusted MacArthur, whose military genius was 
inextricably linked with his mercurial personality. MacArthur had taken the war to the Chinese 
border despite the warnings of officials in Washington. Even more galling to Truman was the 
general’s repeated insubordination. In early April, MacArthur replied to a letter sent by 
Republican House Minority Leader Joe Martin. MacArthur’s response, which Martin read on the 
floor of the House, directly criticized the president’s policy of limiting the war in Korea to avoid 
a direct confrontation with China. MacArthur, Truman decided, was attempting to thwart the 
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constitutional principle of civilian control of the military.566 On April 11, Truman relieved 
MacArthur of his command, replacing him with Ridgway.567 
 The president’s decision created a firestorm of controversy. “Seldom has a more 
unpopular man fired a more popular one,” wrote Time magazine, one of MacArthur’s most 
ardent supporters.568 Truman’s foes in Congress called for his impeachment.569 The reaction of 
the black press was mixed. The Defender quoted Thurgood Marshall’s assessment of the general, 
in which the civil rights attorney blamed MacArthur for the atmosphere of racial prejudice in Far 
East Command that led to the courts-martial of so many soldiers of the 24th Infantry Regiment.570 
The newspaper’s editorial board wrote, “We do not believe that the President who is, according 
to the Constitution, commander-in-chief of the armed forces can be pushed around and ignored 
by an Army general and still maintain the respect due the presidential office.”571 
 The Afro-American also supported Truman’s action, but the paper’s editors voiced 
greater concern about MacArthur’s racial attitudes than his insubordination. “MacArthur Backer 
of JC, Segregation Allowed Under His Command,” was the headline on the April 21 issue of the 
Afro.572 Former Korea correspondent James Hicks wrote that, “just about any colored person you 
talk to in the Far East will tell you. . . that General MacArthur has always permitted racial 
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discrimination to exist in his command.”573 The Afro’s editorial board chimed in with an editorial 
bluntly titled, “We Shed No Tears.”574 Only political correspondent Louis Lautier offered any 
defense of the general, contending that a “loophole” in Truman’s executive order prevented the 
general from fully integrating all the units of Far East Command.575 
The Courier’s editors, although they had little love for Truman, were not particularly 
fond of MacArthur, either. Before the war, Courier managing editor P.L. Prattis derided the 
general as an “emperor” obsessed with the absolute power he wielded as the Supreme 
Commander of Allied Powers in Japan.576 During the conflict, columnist Horace Cayton had 
voiced his concern that MacArthur would “get us into a large scale war with all of China and her 
allies.”577 Nonetheless, the newspaper’s editorial board could not quite bring itself to endorse 
Truman’s decision; instead it demanded that the president fire any other Army officer who was 
obstructing the integration of the service.578 In June MacArthur gave a series of lengthy 
interviews to the Courier. In them, he defended his record on segregation: “‘I have one criticism 
of Negro troops,’ [MacArthur] said sternly. His face relaxed: ‘They didn’t send me enough of 
them!’”579 The problems, he argued, were caused by his superiors in the Pentagon who sent him 
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racially segregated units. The Courier’s editorial board accepted MacArthur’s self-serving 
version of events without question, blasting “irresponsible, pro-Administration and Left-wing 
Negro editors and commentators” for “accusing the deposed commander as prejudiced against 
colored people.”580 
 While black editors and columnists debated whether MacArthur was friend or foe of 
integration, his replacement remained something of an enigma to them. “We do not know the 
racial attitudes of General Matthew B. Ridgway,” wrote the Defender’s editorialists, “but we 
hope that he will act with more dispatch than MacArthur did in abolishing the lingering Jim 
Crow practices which continue to cripple our fighting forces.”581 The Afro-American’s Korea 
correspondent Bradford Laws wrote a rather glowing profile of Ridgway in early May, noting 
that the “tough commander” spoke with “sincerity and straight-forwardness.”582 There was no 
mention in Laws’ story, however, about Ridgway’s intentions vis-à-vis the ongoing issue of 
segregation. Ridgway’s plans for black units in Korea were still mystery, although not for much 
longer. 
Good News Or Bad? 
Soon after Ridgway was installed as MacArthur’s replacement he asked the Department 
of Defense for permission to integrate all military units under his command.583 Ridgway’s 
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request was backed by a number of important civilian and military officials, including new 
Secretary of Defense George Marshall and Eighth Army’s new commander, General James Van 
Fleet. There were also a number of officers who continued to oppose integration, including Ned 
Almond.584 Ridgway and his allies, however, had a powerful tool at their disposal. In March 
1951 the Army had quietly contracted researchers at Johns Hopkins University to conduct a 
study of the efficacy of complete integration within the service. Known as Project Clear, the 
study comprised a wide range of surveys and interviews with black and white soldiers in 
America, Korea, and Japan.585 In July the researchers issued a preliminary report indicating that 
the integration of select units was an unqualified success and advising the Army to proceed with 
complete desegregation. The Department of Defense granted Ridgway’s request, and on July 26 
the Army announced that its all-black units stationed in the Far East, including the 24th Infantry 
Regiment, would be dissolved and that complete integration of all forces in Japan and Korea 
would be completed in six months.586 
 All of these developments had taken place out of sight of the media. Ridgway’s views 
were not well known outside of the Army, and the existence of Project Clear had been classified 
as secret.587 The Army’s announcement, therefore, came as a surprise to black newspapers. 
Perhaps this accounts for the Defender’s initially understated reaction to the news. The 
newspaper devoted just four sentences to the announcement in its July 28 edition: 
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Recommendations by top U.S. Army officers in Korea has led policy making 
brass in Washington to bring racial segregation in the army closer to an end by 
disbanding the only remaining all-Negro regiment, the 24th. It was revealed here 
last week that Negro troops of the 24th Infantry Regiment will be integrated into 
other divisions now in Korea. The 24th is famous for its battle exploits in the 
Korean conflict and in numerous other engagements. Its greatest victory in Korea 
came during the early stages of the war when the outfit captured Yechon for the 
first major victory secured by allied forces.588  
 
A somewhat more substantive article appeared in the next week’s edition, which noted that 
Ridgway’s order was “without precedent.”589 According to the article, the decision had been 
made “not necessarily on the grounds of a moral belief in racial equality, but simply on the 
grounds of making each man an efficient battle soldier.”590 
 On Aug. 11 the Defender’s editorialists finally made their feelings about Ridgway’s plan 
known in an opinion piece headlined, “General Ridgway Steps Forward.” In it, they wrote: “The 
beginning of the end of segregation in the armed forces of the United States is at hand. The 
experimenting with mixed units is over and the verdict of the battlefield has been heard. 
Segregation has been shown to be impractical, inefficient, ineffective and injurious in building a 
modern fighting force today. Jim Crowism simply will not work.” 591 In other words, the military 
had finally accepted the argument the Defender had advanced since the darkest days of the war: 
segregation made for a woefully inefficient fighting force. 
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 The Courier’s first story about the Army’s announcement was also brief; just four 
paragraphs.592 As the newspaper followed the story for the next few weeks, its coverage evinced 
a more ambiguous opinion of the news than the Defender’s triumphalism. Although Ridgway’s 
decision meant complete integration was probably not far off, it also meant the end of the storied 
24th Infantry Regiment. Hence the almost elegiac tone of the Courier’s brief article: “A piece of 
good news, which also may be classed as bad news (depends upon which way you look at it) 
came out of the nation’s capital here last week. . . . On one hand the integration of Negroes and 
whites in the armed forces is what Negroes throughout the country have been clamoring for. But 
it’s a case of either having your cake or eating it, for with integration comes to end [sic] of a 
colorful all-Negro unit which was responsible for many of the daring sagas that repose on the 
pages of America’s military history.”593 The newspaper’s editorialists voiced these sentiments in 
their editorial of August 4, writing that although the Courier had campaigned for this change 
since the 1930s, they could not help but observe it “with a twinge of regret.”594 
The Courier editors’ mixed feelings about the demise of the 24th, however, were in 
competition with their relentless instinct for self-promotion. In an article headlined “Courier 
Articles Influenced Army,” the newspaper argued that its recent investigation of integration at 
military facilities and its interview with MacArthur had contributed to the Pentagon’s decision to 
accede to Ridgway’s request: “Quite a furor was created in the Pentagon in May when the 
Courier quoted General MacArthur as saying that ‘Jim Crow units were created in Washington,’ 
and it was up to Washington to integrate them. Also, it is known that Army officials have been 
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carefully studying the Courier’s current series of articles on conditions in American Army 
camps.”595 Although Jim Crow units were “created in Washington,” MacArthur unquestionably 
had the power to desegregate them once they arrived in the Far East, a fact the Defender had 
noted.596 As for the Courier’s claims that the Army had studied the newspaper’s investigation of 
Army bases, these were attributed only to anonymous “high Pentagon officials.”597  
 Like their counterparts at the Defender and the Courier, the Afro-American editors were 
happy to see Jim Crow kicked out of Far East Command, even at the cost of the 24th Infantry 
Regiment. “For years,” they wrote, “we have been pointing out how contradictory was 
America’s ideological position in fighting two world wars for democracy with armed forces 
undemocratically divided on the superficial accident of color.”598 Yet the Afro’s coverage also 
questioned what Ridgway’s order would mean for black soldiers stationed stateside, or in 
commands outside of the Far East. Afro correspondent Ralph Matthews interviewed troops in 
Korea, who wondered if they would be permitted to stay with newly integrated units when they 
returned to bases in the South.599  
 It was a valid question. As the Afro noted, the demands of military inefficiency and not 
moral arguments had finally brought about the collapse of segregation in the Far East.600 
Although the Defender and the Courier seemed sure that racial barriers throughout the military 
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would soon come tumbling down, base commanders in Europe and the United States were not 
faced with the kinds of pressures that had killed Jim Crow in Korea. Even as the Afro heralded 
integration abroad, former Korea correspondent James Hicks was conducting an investigation of 
living conditions for black troops on military installations in America, similar to the one the 
Courier launched a few months earlier. Like the Courier investigation, Hicks’ inquiry discovered 
that despite President Truman’s executive order, the recommendation of the Fahy Committee, 
and Ridgway’s desegregation of Far East Command, racial segregation was still a fact of life on 
a number of bases at home.  
 Although Hicks found that some facilities such as New Jersey’s Fort Dix had 
successfully and completely integrated their troops, other Army, Navy, and Air Force bases 
remained mired in the past.601 Not all of these bases were located south of the Mason-Dixon 
Line, either. Hicks reported that Massachusetts’ Camp Edwards was “worse than Dixie” while 
Virginia’s Camp Pickett had successfully integrated most of the units located there.602 At the 
same time Hicks was examining the state of integration on military bases at home, the Afro’s 
Ollie Stewart was making his second tour of U.S. military bases in Europe. He too, found 
evidence of ongoing segregation and heightened racial tensions at the bases he visited.603 The 
problem, both Hicks and Stewart concluded, was that the level of integration at each base 
depended entirely on its commanding officer. Whatever the official policy of the White House or 
the Department of Defense, the prejudices of individual officers still held sway at many bases. 
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Despite the proclamations of the president and senior military officers, racial segregation was 
still very much a reality at these bases.  
New Battles 
 Black newspapers’ increased focus on civil rights at home came in part because by the 
summer of 1951 the conflict in Korea had settled into an uneasy stalemate. The Chinese had 
launched another major offensive in the spring, but although it resulted in many casualties on 
both sides it failed to win any significant benefits for the Communists. The two sides continued 
to fight just above the 38th Parallel, where the front line had come to rest and stubbornly refused 
to move. There would be no more significant shifts of territory, only a series of costly and 
ultimately futile battles. Neither the Americans nor the Chinese possessed the resources or 
political will to knock their opponent out of the war.604 It became clear to the American troops in 
Korea that there would be no grand victory as there had been in World War II; the phrase “die 
for a tie” soon became a popular refrain among them.605 
 Even as the fighting continued, peace talks had begun in July 1951 at Kaesong and were 
later moved to Panmunjom. Negotiations proceeded slowly, complicated by the fierce enmity 
between the two Koreas and the malign influence of Soviet leader Joseph Stalin. Stalin was 
pleased to find his two major rivals locked in a costly struggle with one another, and privately 
counseled the Chinese to take a hard line in the negotiations. 606 With the peace talks proceeding 
slowly and little military action to report, Korea gradually faded from the pages of black 
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newspapers. Even the dissolution of the 24th Infantry Regiment in early October attracted only 
minimal attention from the black press. Afro war correspondent Ralph Matthews was the only 
black journalist in Korea to observe the unit’s deactivation. The news earned just four paragraphs 
in the October 13 edition of the Afro.607 Back home, the Defender’s Alex Wilson interviewed an 
officer who served with the 24th, who hoped that the Army’s project of integration would “save 
the lives of many men who go to Korea.”608 The Courier, which had covered the travails of the 
24th Infantry Regiment so closely just a few months earlier, made no note of its demise. By 
December 1951 , the Afro’s Matthews was the only accredited black journalist still in Korea.609 
He covered the gradual and occasionally tense integration of Army units on the front line before 
returning to the United States at the end of the month.610 Black editors and journalists were 
moving on to different battlefields in the war for civil rights. 
 As 1952 dawned, coverage of Korea in the black press had all but disappeared. The 
Courier had shifted its focus away from the Far East to U.S. military installations in Europe. In 
March, its “expert on military affairs” Collins George began yet another series of investigative 
reports examining the state of integration at European military facilities, much as the Afro’s Ollie 
Stewart had done just a few months earlier. George’s first few articles found that the Army 
continued to lag behind the Air Force in integration, but by mid-April the Army’s European 
Command assured him that integration was now official EUCOM policy and complete 
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integration would proceed immediately.611 George’s report was confirmed by the Defender the 
next month, which added that its sources within the Pentagon claimed that all European facilities 
would be integrated within two years.612 Just as the newspaper had predicted, the desegregation 
of Far East Command appeared to have triggered a slow but inexorable change throughout the 
Army.  
 Although this news might have heartened the editors and reporters who had been nudging 
the Army in this direction for years, the fight for an integrated military no longer dominated the 
front pages of the major black newspapers as it had for the past four years. There were two 
factors contributing to this change. First, the stalemate in Korea gave black newspapers little 
occasion to continue to report on the state of integration there. Second, 1952 was an election year 
and the black press had a vested interest in its outcome. Military integration was an important 
issue to black newspapers, but it was not the only one. The newspapers had taken up a number of 
causes that required federal action, including the passage of a federal fair employment law, anti-
lynching legislation, and the guarantee of voting rights for Southern blacks. The next president 
would have the power to either advance or frustrate their agenda. 
 President Truman, who had proven to be a valuable ally in the fight for civil rights, had 
taken himself out of the running. Highly unpopular with the American public, not least because 
of the seemingly endless turmoil in Korea, Truman decided he would not accept his party’s 
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nomination for another term as president. Announcing his decision in a speech in late March, the 
president said, “I do not feel it is my duty to spend another four years in the White House.”613 
The Defender’s editorialists voiced their appreciation for the president’s achievements, writing 
that, “Mr. Truman has become the symbol of everything the diehard white supremacists hate 
most. Their opposition to him is, in our view, the finest tribute that can be paid Mr. Truman.”614 
The Afro-American declared that he would “go down in history as one of the greatest champions 
of civil rights who has ever sat in the White House.”615 The Courier’s editorial board ventured 
no opinion about Truman’s decision, though before the president’s announcement it admitted 
that, “The president has kept alive the inflammatory issue of civil rights as has no chief executive 
in history. For that we must all be deeply grateful.”616 
 As the newspapers discussed Truman’s legacy, they also began to speculate who would 
gain each party’s nomination. Conventional wisdom had settled on Illinois Governor Adlai 
Stevenson as the Democratic nominee despite Stevenson’s protestations that he would prefer to 
run for re-election as governor.617 The Defender approved of Stevenson, who had earned a 
reputation as a liberal governor and a reliable supporter of civil rights. “The Democrats could 
hardly do better,” the Defender opined.618 The Courier, however, considered Stevenson a 
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political lightweight who was unlikely to best anyone the Republicans pitted against him.619 The 
speculation surrounding the Democrats’ choice, however, was overshadowed by the prospect 
that Dwight Eisenhower would be the Republicans’ choice. Just as in 1948, both parties had 
sought to persuade the still highly popular general to run on their tickets. This time, however, the 
general proved more receptive to the Republicans’ pitch and allowed himself to be placed on the 
ballot for the New Hampshire primary. After winning the primary in March 1952, Eisenhower 
officially declared his candidacy for the Republican nomination.620 
 Eisenhower’s candidacy was a concern for many in the black press, who had neither 
forgiven nor forgotten the general’s remarks about the abilities of black soldiers just a few years 
earlier.621 Commenting on the general’s prospects, the Defender’s editorial board concluded that, 
“The biggest handicap against Ike lies in his testimony on Army segregation in a 1948 
Congressional hearing.” 622 The Afro urged Eisenhower to clarify his current opinion on racial 
segregation in general and military segregation in particular if he wanted any support from black 
voters. Responding to reports in the mainstream press that Eisenhower would be “militant” in his 
protection of racial minorities, Afro editor Cliff Mackay noted that “certainly Ike, neither by 
word or deed, has thus far shown any of that militancy.”623 The newspaper’s editorial cartoonist 
poked fun at Eisenhower’s reluctance to clarify his opinions on racial matters by depicting him 
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as a giant, stone-faced sphinx.624 The Courier also urged the general to explain himself, 
publishing articles about Ike’s views on racial segregation for several weeks.625  
 Instead, Eisenhower shied away from the civil rights issue throughout the campaign. 
When pressed, the general expressed support for civil rights in the abstract but refused to commit 
himself to any particular program to guarantee them.626 Despite the Defender’s earlier prediction, 
the issue of military segregation did not damage Eisenhower’s candidacy to any great degree and 
even the black newspapers moved on to other issues. The Defender and the Afro were soon more 
concerned with Eisenhower’s opposition to the Fair Employment Practices Commission.627 (The 
Courier, ever the iconoclast, endorsed Eisenhower as the best candidate because twenty years of 
Democratic control had failed to deliver equal rights to all Americans.)628 Eisenhower won the 
Republican nomination in July and cruised to victory over Stevenson in the general election in 
November.629 Although the controversy over Eisenhower’s 1948 comments about black soldiers 
had not dissipated entirely—it would return as an issue in his 1956 reelection campaign—it had 
been eclipsed by other matters, most notably the still-unfinished war in Korea. 
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Cease-fire 
Although there had been no major military developments along the frontlines in Korea 
since spring 1951 and the war had long since ceased to command the front pages of black 
newspapers, the war had played a major role in the presidential campaign. Peace negotiations 
continued to drag on in Panmunjon even as American troops and their allies continued to fight. 
One of the campaign’s most memorable moments occurred in October when Eisenhower 
announced that if he were elected, he would go to Korea to seek an end to the conflict. 630 In 
November the president-elect did just that, meeting with Far East commander Mark Clark (who 
had replaced Matt Ridgway in May) and James Van Fleet. Although his generals discussed 
strategies for ratcheting up the pressure on the Chinese, Eisenhower was uninterested. He wanted 
to end the fighting sooner rather than later.631 
The war that had given the black press the opportunity to make their case for the viability 
of an integrated military was coming to an end. Yet its passing generated little commentary from 
the major black newspapers. The lack of interest was perhaps understandable; black Americans 
were as tired of the fighting as everyone else. Thus when on July 27, 1953, the United States and 
North Korea signed an armistice that signaled an end to all hostilities on the Korean peninsula, 
the black press paid relatively little attention. This muted reaction may have also owed 
something to the inconclusive nature of the conflict’s conclusion: no peace treaty between North 
Korea and South Korea was ever signed. Just as the war had never been declared officially, it 
never ended officially.632  
                                                 
630
 Ibid., 569. 
 
631
 Halberstam, 626. 
 
632
191 
 
News of the armistice did not appear in the Defender’s August 1 issue. Instead, domestic 
news dominated the front page: the nomination of a black man for Manhattan borough president, 
the resignation of a New Orleans union leader, the appointment of a black clergyman as an 
alternate United Nations delegate.633 The only news from Korea was a three-paragraph report 
that a private from Alabama had been killed in action.634 The Courier had no news of the cease-
fire on its front page, either. Only the Afro-American put the news on the front page of its August 
1 issue, proclaiming that, “for the first time in recent history colored and white Americans lived, 
fought, and sometimes died side by side—not in isolated instances but in a general pattern that 
had the support of top American officers and policy makers.”635 The next week’s issue of the 
Defender did include a front-page feature story on the end of the war. In it, Alex Wilson summed 
up how the conflict had advanced the cause of civil rights: “The tragic Korean conflict stands 
today as another milestone in the forward march of the Negro and other minorities toward 
complete integration in the democratic way of life. That highly significant milestone is the 
integration of the American Negro in the United States Army. This costly achievement was not 
born altogether of plan but of necessity.”636 
Complete integration was not yet a reality; the last all-black Army unit would not be 
deactivated until November 1954.637 Nonetheless, the fact remained that the Army that had gone 
to war in the summer of 1950 had been radically transformed in just three years. With the end of 
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segregation in the largest branch of the armed forces, and the one historically most hostile to 
racial integration, the black press had realized one of its oldest and most important goals. Its own 
role in achieving that goal, however, was ambiguous. As Alex Wilson recognized, it was the 
Chinese who had forced the Army to finally end a policy that was damaging its own 
effectiveness. If the military situation in Korea had not been so dire, the leaders of the black 
press might have recognized that their strategy of loyal opposition was bearing diminished 
returns. As it was, they remained committed to a policy of limited accommodation with the 
political and military establishment, unwilling to commit themselves to the more radical ideas of 
men such as A. Philip Randolph.  
But change was in the air. Younger black activists had already fired the first salvos in the 
battle for civil rights. In 1951, black students in Farmville, Virginia staged a strike to protest the 
poor condition of their segregated school. In June 1953, one week before the end of the war, 
black residents of Baton Rouge launched a boycott of the city’s segregated buses.638 A 
philosophy of direct action was replacing the gradualist, accommodationist strategy that had 
guided black leaders of the earlier generation. That change was not reflected in black 
newspapers’ coverage of the war. Rather than acknowledge that the Korean conflict was fought 
in a different domestic context than World War II, the newspapers covered the new war in the 
same way they covered the last one. Yet black editors were at least somewhat aware that the 
ground beneath their feet was shifting. When the Army finally announced its plans for 
desegregation, for example, the Courier responded with a mixture of joy and regret. Although 
segregated units such as the 24th Infantry Regiment were an enduring reminder of institutional 
racism, they were also a source of racial pride to the older generation of civil rights activists. 
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Younger activists, however, had little interest in dwelling on the past. The civil rights 
movement was fast approaching a critical juncture. Some chose to the follow the path of 
nonviolent resistance espoused by Martin Luther King, Jr. Others adopted a more forceful 
strategy, as epitomized in the early teachings of Malcolm X. Both of these philosophies, 
however, emphasized direct, organized action. This represented a sharp break from the ideas of 
accommodation and collaboration that the Defender, the Courier, and the Afro-American 
endorsed. Had the newspapers chosen to use the Korean War to editorialize more forcefully for 
equal rights within the military, they might have found a new generation of readers willing to 
follow them into the next decade. But in deciding to fight an old war, the black press failed to 
realize that the battlefield had already moved.
  
 
 
Chapter Six: Winning the Battle, Losing the War 
In its November 6, 1954 edition the Pittsburgh Courier paid homage to Benjamin O. 
Davis, Jr., the famed Air Force officer who commanded the Tuskegee Airmen during World War 
II. One week earlier President Eisenhower had promoted Davis to the rank of brigadier general, 
making him the first black general in the Air Force. The Courier’s editorialist noted that whereas 
it had taken Davis’ father, Benjamin O. Davis, Sr., more than thirty years to achieve the 
equivalent rank in the Army, the younger Davis had earned his star in just eighteen.639 Moreover, 
Davis, Jr. now occupied the highest echelons of a completely integrated service. The difference 
in the two men’s experiences, the anonymous writer concluded, provided a stark illustration of 
how drastically the condition of black servicemen and women had changed. 
Most of these changes had come with a speed and magnitude that surprised even those 
who had fought so long for them. When the Courier began its campaign for military integration 
in the 1930s, the editorial continued, “complete integration of races in the armed services was 
regarded as extremely remote even by incurable optimists, and only in the last five years has it 
become a reality. This rapid development in the betterment of racial relations in an institution 
generally regarded as class-ridden and tradition-bound, and in so short a space of time, is almost 
miraculous, and yet it is typical in a culture accustomed to revolutionary changes of all sorts.”640 
Black newspapers such as the Courier had played a vital role in this change, as they had 
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provided a focal point for opposition to the military’s policies of racial segregation and kept 
public pressure on military and political officials who resisted efforts to end it. The end of 
segregation in the military, however, was only the beginning of a decade of changes that would 
ultimately overwhelm the black press.  
 The failure of black editors and publishers to anticipate these changes is in some ways 
understandable. The civil rights movement of the late 1950s and early 1960s was sui generis. 
Comparing this period with the Reconstruction-era effort to win civil rights for black Americans, 
the historian C. Vann Woodward concluded that the twentieth-century experience was “deeper, 
surer, less contrived, more spontaneous.”641 He continued: “More than a black revolt against 
whites, it was in part a generational rebellion, an uprising of youth against the older generation, 
against the parental “uncle Toms” and their inhibitions. It even took the NAACP and CORE 
(Congress of Racial Equality) by surprise. Negroes were in charge of their own movement, and 
youth was in the vanguard.”642 The most influential leaders of the black press—John Sengstacke, 
P.L Prattis, William Nunn, and Carl Murphy—belonged to this “parental” generation. They had 
played a vital role in expanding the economic, educational, and political opportunities for black 
Americans. Among their accomplishments was the gradual but inexorable expansion of 
opportunities for black military personnel, culminating in the eradication of segregation 
throughout the military.  
This achievement, among others, had emboldened a new generation, who would 
ultimately reject the methods of their parents and instead launch a massive campaign of direct, 
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nonviolent action to win full equality. The symbolic culmination of this strategy was the 1963 
March on Washington, in which a quarter of a million people marched to the Lincoln Memorial 
to hear Martin Luther King, Jr.’s appeal to the nation’s conscience. That march was the 
brainchild of A. Philip Randolph, whose earlier threats of a massive act of civil disobedience in 
protest of military segregation had been dismissed by the black press as counterproductive.643 
Without fully realizing what they were doing, black newspapers had helped sire the generation 
that would supplant them as the leaders of the newly radicalized civil rights movement.  
Answering the Research Questions 
 The purpose of this study was to document how the black press pressed for military 
integration before and during the Korean War, analyze how this campaign adhered to or departed 
from theoretical models of the alternative press, and understand how this campaign was 
connected to the larger civil rights movement of the mid-twentieth century. Black newspapers 
utilized every tool at their disposal to achieve their goal and their methods were both overt 
(editorials urging integration) and subtle (news coverage valorizing black soldiers). The research 
questions that drove this study were designed to use the issue of racial integration in the armed 
forces as a vehicle to explore the ideas that motivated the most influential voices in the black 
press at a critical time in the history of civil rights. 
 The black press pursued a two-pronged strategy in its pursuit of military integration. 
First, black newspapers sought to convince the white-dominated political and military power 
structure of black Americans’ loyalty and competence. Second, the black press attempted to 
dismantle the infrastructure of segregation by highlighting its inherent injustice and 
demonstrating the illogical behavior it engendered. These two efforts came into conflict with the 
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eruption of the Korean War, when black newspapers were confronted with the stark choice of 
whether to support another war for democracy that would be waged with a profoundly 
undemocratic military, or to hold fast to their demands for equal treatment and open themselves 
up to charges of disloyalty. In the end, the black press opted to support the war while hoping it 
would provide black servicemen with an opportunity to finally earn their civil rights. 
In their efforts to prove their loyalty, all of the black newspapers analyzed in this study 
presented a united front against what was commonly perceived as the menace of global 
Communism. In defining themselves as opposed to the machinations of the Soviet Union and its 
client states, black newspapers sought to tamp down concerns among white Americans about the 
allegiance of blacks. These concerns were fueled by the Soviet Union’s worldwide propaganda 
campaign, which sought to appeal to racial minorities and other marginalized groups in the West, 
as well as an atmosphere of virulent anti-Communism at home in the United States. The 
depredations of McCarthyism had proven dangerous to individuals and institutions far more 
powerful than the black press. Black editors and publishers could not afford even the suggestion 
that their publications were allied in any way with Moscow’s agenda.  
The three major black newspapers toed the anti-Communism line with varying levels of 
enthusiasm. The Courier was far and away the most committed to its program of anti-
Communism, while the Afro frequently voiced caution about the dangers of McCarthyism. The 
Defender was reliably anti-Communist, although not as vociferous as the Courier. Nonetheless, 
all of these newspapers made clear that they—and their audiences—could be relied upon to 
oppose the expansion of global Communism. Their commitment to this principle left them with 
little choice but to support the United States’ involvement in the Korean conflict. Even after the 
spring of 1951, when the war settled into stalemate and it became apparent that total victory was 
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no longer a feasible option, the major black newspapers continued to support the goal of 
containing the spread of Communism in east Asia. Although the black press might criticize the 
tactics of the nation’s political and military leaders, they did not take issue with the overarching 
strategy of checking Moscow’s influence around the globe. 
In addition to demonstrating the fealty of black Americans, black newspapers were also 
compelled to prove that black troops were the equal of their white counterparts on the battlefield. 
Once war broke out on the Korean peninsula and thousands of black troops were rushed from 
occupation duty in Japan to the front lines, black newspapers were presented with an opportunity 
to again highlight the martial prowess of these soldiers. The 24th Infantry Regiment’s seizure of 
Yechon, and the heroics of Medal of Honor winners Cornelius H. Charlton and William 
Thompson were highlighted by the black press to rebut racist notions about the intelligence and 
skill of black soldiers. These stories were also covered closely by the black press because many 
mainstream media organizations tended to ignore or downplay the achievements of blacks in 
both military and civilian life. 
The positive portrayal of these troops in the black press also touched on social 
constructions of black masculinity. Historically, the construction of black men in American 
society centered on the idea of the black male as an unthinking “beast.”644 This concept, which 
provided the justification for the use of black men as chattel in antebellum America, emphasized 
the physical strength of the black male while devaluing his intelligence. The institution of 
slavery also contributed to the idea of the black “Sambo,” a docile servant lacking initiative or 
                                                 
644
 Thomas F. Gossett, Race: The History of an Idea in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); 
Stephen Jay Gould, The Mismeasure of Man (New York: Norton, 1996); Peter Hoch, White Hero, Black Beast 
(London: Pluto Press, 1979); Ashley Montague, Man’s Most Dangerous Myth: The Fallacy of Race (Walnut Creek, 
CA: AltaMira Press, 1997).  
 
199 
 
desires outside of his appointed role.645 Paradoxically, black men were also considered to be 
physically and sexually uncontrollable.646 By the mid-20th century, some scholars began to re-
evaluate the legacy of slavery and its effects on interpersonal roles within the black community. 
These scholars concluded that the history of enslavement and oppression had shifted the black 
family system from a patriarchal model to a matriarchal one.647 This research led to subsequent 
studies that defined the modern black male as psychologically and interpersonally impotent.648 
Black newspapers were therefore pushing back against a number of critical and 
sometimes contradictory depictions of black manhood. These ideas of black masculinity also 
informed black newspapers’ campaign for an integrated military. The armed forces were one of 
the few arenas in which a black man could prove not only his fighting ability—as physical 
aggression had long been linked with black men—but also his intelligence and reasoning skills. 
When the fighting began in Korea, black newspapers took care to emphasize not just the fighting 
ability of black troops but their intelligence and leadership skills. The black press focused 
considerable attention on the still relatively small number of black officers, such as the Navy’s 
Lt. Jesse Brown, for just this reason. As officers, these men provided a rebuke to the construction 
of the black man as lacking either intelligence or ambition. 
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When the Army announced its plans to desegregate Far East Command, which signaled 
the beginning of the end for racial segregation in the U.S. armed forces, the black press reacted 
with a mixture of joy and remorse. The happiness of the journalists who had waged a decades-
long campaign to end Jim Crow was of course understandable. But it was tempered with a sense 
of loss that accompanied the dissolution of units such as the 24th Infantry Regiment and their 
storied history. The ambiguous feelings evinced by these journalists in their coverage of the 
news suggests that they were unsure about what the end of legal segregation would mean for 
black service members, as well as all black Americans. Such uncertainty would be one reason 
black journalists were reluctant to embrace a more revolutionary agenda as the modern civil 
rights movement gained momentum.  
As mentioned earlier, black newspapers’ strategy of supporting the war effort while 
emphasizing black accomplishment in the armed forces was in all significant aspects identical to 
the Double V campaign launched by the Courier and followed by all of the major black 
newspapers during World War II. In describing the result of the Double V campaign of World 
War II, historian Lee Finkle wrote: 
After waiting more than a decade without any sign of white gratitude for their 
wartime loyalty, blacks took to the streets and organized direct action, mass civil 
disobedience movements to demand their rights. Segregation laws were violated 
and discrimination patterns ignored. The advances blacks made during the 1960s 
came by the very actions that the black press opposed and worked to avoid during 
World War II. It was resistance rather than rhetoric, action by the masses, not 
pleas by the leaders that forced concessions from a reluctant white society. . . . 
There were, indeed, stirrings among the black people. Anger and resentment often 
led to open conflict and widespread racial violence. On the other hand, black 
leadership—including the press which was considered the most radical—was 
definitely anti-revolutionary.649 
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As this study has illustrated, the black press was presented with another opportunity to change its 
strategy during the Korean War. Instead it chose to abide by its gradualist philosophy. The most 
obvious example of this strategy was the Courier’s abortive effort to launch a second Double V 
campaign during the Korean conflict, but all of the newspapers adhered to this approach even if 
they did not describe it as such. By 1950, however, many black Americans were no longer 
willing to sublimate their own demands for social justice to the nation’s war effort. In fact, what 
Woodward described as a black “awakening” was fueled in large part by black Americans’ 
experience during World War II, when the contradiction of fighting for democracy with a 
profoundly undemocratic military became too obvious to ignore. The Double V campaign, the 
black press’ attempt to reconcile this contradiction, had failed to earn black citizens any 
significant concessions from the white-dominated political and legal structures. Despite their 
sacrifices, blacks remained second-class citizens. Given this experience during World War II, it 
was unlikely that another Double V would win much support from blacks during the Korean 
War.  
Yet black newspapers continued to focus their efforts on reforming racist institutions 
from within. This strategy was not limited to the struggle for an integrated military; these 
newspapers advocated similar campaigns for other causes, most notably public education for 
black children. The Afro-American, Defender, and Courier were all vocal supporters of the 
NAACP’s efforts to integrate the nation’s schools through legal action.650 There was certainly 
reason to believe that such a strategy could succeed; by 1950 civil rights advocates had already 
won a number of important legal victories. These included the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
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Morgan v. Virginia, which outlawed racial segregation in interstate transportation, and its ruling 
in Sipuel v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Oklahoma, which forbade colleges from denying 
admission on the basis of race.651 
Despite these achievements, however, black Americans were making only fitful progress 
toward true equality by the early 1950s. Victories in the court room did not translate into tangible 
results for most black Americans, especially those living in the South. On the contrary, many 
Southern states reacted to these rulings with voter suppression, racial violence, and campaigns of 
“massive resistance” designed to frustrate and terrorize their own black citizens.652 This reaction 
paralleled the Army’s reaction to Harry Truman’s executive order, the findings of the Fahy 
Committee, and other official rulings directing the military to integrate. Rather than comply with 
these directives, the Army chose to maintain its tradition of racial segregation, making only 
minor changes to its policies regarding black soldiers. True equality arrived only when the 
conflict in Korea laid bare the logistical problems of segregation and the Army found itself with 
no choice but to integrate. In this respect, the North Korean People’s Army and the Chinese 
People’s Volunteer Army did more to end military segregation than the black press could ever 
do.  
The ways the black press covered the fight for military integration revealed how these 
black newspapers saw their role within the black community as well as the larger society. 
According to media scholar Lauren Kessler’s taxonomy of dissident publications, alternative 
media serve two major functions: internal communication aimed at members of a particular 
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minority and external communication aimed at members of the majority group.653 Alternative 
media fulfill the internal communication function in several different ways, including 
community-building, providing a forum for intragroup debate, and defining the group’s own 
identity.654 They serve as external communicators by highlighting issues generally ignored by the 
mainstream media and attempting to convince non-group members to support their cause.655 
 In general, the Defender, Courier, and Afro-American emphasized the internal 
communication function but also utilized the external communication function. Although the 
black press kept the issue of military integration on their front pages throughout the late 1940s 
and early 1950s, black newspapers were hardly alone in covering the controversy. The 1948 
Congressional hearings on universal military training, A. Philip Randolph’s threatened civil 
disobedience campaign, and the Army’s troubles with segregated units during the early fighting 
in Korea were all highlighted by the mainstream media as well as the black press.656 Black 
newspapers therefore had little need to highlight an issue that was already dominating headlines 
across the country. Neither did these black newspapers demonstrate a particular interest in 
appealing to allies outside the black community as they pressed for equality in the armed forces. 
Although editorials in these newspapers were sometimes directed toward President Truman or 
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other white leaders, they more often spoke to the aspirations and problems of their 
predominantly black readers.  
Courier columnist Horace Cayton, in a November 1950 article, described what he 
considered the purpose of the black press: 
The function of the Negro press (or for that matter the press of any minority 
group) is to inform Negroes about what is happening in the world that is of 
special concern to them. It is to report the special injustices which Negroes have 
to endure in America. It is to bolster up their courage by telling of Negroes who 
have surmounted almost insurmountable difficulties. It is to direct and guide 
Negroes in their fight for a greater share of democracy.657 
 
Cayton’s vision of the black press accurately describes how his paper and its major competitors 
conducted their campaign to end Jim Crow in the military. When Cayton referred to how the 
black press reported on black Americans who “surmounted almost insurmountable difficulties” 
and how it acted to “direct and guide Negroes in their fight for a greater share of democracy,” he 
illustrated how the black press emphasized its role as an internal communicator during this 
campaign. 
But although most of the newspapers’ editorial content was targeted explicitly at black 
Americans, black journalists were also aware that their publications reached a wider audience. 
The newspapers’ robust avowals of patriotism and denunciations of Communism during the 
Korean War provided not only guidance for their readers, but reassurance to a white power 
structure that had longstanding concerns about the loyalties of blacks during wartime. In this 
way, the Afro-American, Defender, and Courier sent subtly different messages to different 
audiences.  
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 Throughout this process, the three major black newspapers focused on shaping the self-
image of black Americans, specifically black males, and directing the course of organized action 
to achieve the goal of an integrated military. As discussed above, the black press emphasized the 
accomplishments of black officers to counter images of black men as variously unintelligent, 
uncontrollable, cowardly, and weak. Perhaps even more importantly, black newspapers used 
their pages as a vehicle to for social change within the military. Yet in the view of black 
publishers and editors, such change could only arrive through accommodation with the white-
dominated political and military establishment. Men such as Sengstanke and Prattis and Murphy 
did not hesitate to use their publications as a bullhorn for their agenda, applauding their allies 
and vilifying their opponents. In that respect, their newspapers fit the model of many alternative 
or dissident media. But they were not yet prepared to embrace social action as a feasible method 
of societal change, and in that respect they remained as antirevolutionary as they had nearly a 
decade earlier.  
  Their determination to stay the course was not the only factor in the marginalization of 
the black press in the late 1950s and 1960s, or even the most important one. As Patrick 
Washburn wrote, black newspapers  
[B]ecame a victim of the shining prize for which they had sought so hard and 
long: integration. As the civil rights movement revved up and then roared onward 
over the years with an increasing, throbbing intensity, sometimes resulting in 
destruction, violence, and even death, integration spread out to gradually 
encompass far more than public schools, and one of those integrating out of 
necessity was the white press. It began hiring away some of the best young black 
journalistic talent in order to cover the black communities, particularly when there 
were riots, and suddenly black papers did not have a virtual monopoly on black 
news. This, in turn, led to blacks starting to buy white papers rather than black 
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ones, and as circulation dropped, it became apparent that the black paper might be 
in a death spiral that few of them would survive.658  
 
Washburn went on to note, however, that although the link between integration and the decline 
of the black press has been widely noted, the downturn was in fact more complicated. Black 
newspapers, unsure of how to react to the changing times and mores, adopted different editorial 
strategies. Some continued to agitate for change while others modeled themselves after 
mainstream, white-owned publications in an effort to regain their lost audience.659  
 The decline of the black press and the success of the black protest movement of the 1950s 
and 1960s have to a certain degree eclipsed the accomplishments of black newspapers during the 
struggle for military integration. Although these papers opted to pursue a fundamentally 
conservative strategy in their efforts to end Jim Crow in the armed forces, the black press 
nonetheless played a vital role in that process. In the case of the largest newspapers, these 
publications served as one of the few institutions that could mobilize black opinion on a national 
scale. Just as they had done during World War II, black newspapers urged their readers to take 
up arms and prove the worth of the black fighting man. The white political and military elite 
might not have been impressed with the performance of these black soldiers, sailors, airmen, and 
marines, but their accomplishments were a source of racial pride for black Americans whose 
avenues for personal achievement were still severely constrained. The Afro-American, Defender, 
and the Courier highlighted the victories and sacrifices of these troops when few mainstream 
publications would, and in the process affirmed the equality of black Americans who could fight 
and die as well as any white man. 
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 As the historian Adriane Lentz-Smith wrote in her study of black Americans during and 
after World War I, “the generation of black Americans that came of age during World War I 
entered World War II knowing the pitfalls of purported wars for democracy and knowing, as 
well, their strength.”660 Similarly, the black press viewed the Korean War as an opportunity to 
finally force the federal government and the military to make good on the promises of the last 
two wars. This war, however, took place in a time of unparalleled fear of Communism, when 
insufficient patriotism was tantamount to disloyalty to some Americans. In such a heated 
environment, black newspapers had to calibrate their demands carefully. An overly militant 
stance could have been costly. The largest black newspapers, after all, had a lot to lose. From the 
perspective of a half-century later, it might seem as though the black press opted to err on the 
side of caution. But in fact, these newspapers continued to do what they had done for decades: 
fight for the rights of their readers.  
Implications for Future Research 
 As stated earlier, most histories of the black press have ignored how black newspapers 
covered the Korean War and the role it played in ending racial segregation in the military. 
Similarly, general histories of black Americans in the military have not devoted much attention 
to the importance of black newspapers in pushing for the right to fight. This study has 
demonstrated that three of the largest black newspapers remained committed to the goal of an 
integrated military even after the disappointments of black troops’ experience during World War 
II, even as their strategy began to distance them from more militant leaders in the nascent civil 
rights movement. Although the Defender, Courier, and Afro-American were among the most 
influential black newspapers at the time, there were many other, smaller black newspapers 
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waging similar campaigns against discrimination in all its forms. An analysis of these 
newspapers and how their coverage adhered to or differed from the patterns discussed here 
would provide a starting point for a larger and more comprehensive inquiry. One aspect that 
should be examined is the role of economics. The three newspapers studied were among the most 
financially successful black-operated businesses in America at this time due to the advertising 
windfall they reaped from the World War II-era excess profits tax. Smaller publications with 
fewer or different kinds of advertisers may have been subject to different economic pressures 
that in turn could have affected the militancy of their editorial pages. A study of this topic could 
reveal how black newspapers either resisted or capitulated to such concerns.  
 A study of other black newspapers may also illuminate what, if any, role regional 
differences might have played in how these publications approached the issue of military 
segregation. Although the Defender, Courier, and Afro focused much of their coverage on their 
respective cities, the newspapers examined in this study were the national editions targeted for a 
nationwide audience of black Americans. More regionally focused publications may have chosen 
to highlight issues more pressing to their local audience than military segregation. Alternatively, 
publications located near military facilities with large numbers of black troops may have covered 
the issue with more depth than other newspapers. By examining smaller publications, researchers 
could determine if the crusade for an integrated military was limited to newspapers in major 
urban centers or was a truly nationwide phenomenon. 
 Another avenue of inquiry is the reaction of black troops themselves to the coverage of 
their struggles in the black press. Although black newspapers frequently published letters to the 
editor from black servicemen in Korea during the conflict, the vast majority of these letters were 
requests for correspondence from home. There is little in the published letters to suggest how 
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these men viewed the crusade black newspapers had launched on their behalf. Some of these 
veterans are still living, although their numbers grow smaller each day. Oral histories and 
memoirs could also be useful in discovering the reaction of black soldiers during this crucial 
period in American military history. By adding these  voices to the existing scholarship on the 
black press, researchers could determine how effective black servicemen thought such editorial 
campaigns were in ending segregation. 
 The black press, including the three newspapers analyzed in this study, still exists today. 
It is much smaller and ideologically heterogeneous than it was during its heyday in the middle of 
the 20th century.661 Black publications still wrestle with the question of who is their audience and 
how best to serve them. In addition, they must contend with the same new technologies and 
expanded news opportunities that have bedeviled much larger mainstream newspapers. Yet black 
newspapers and magazines continue to exist in part because the goals of the civil rights 
movement did not end with the integration of the military or Brown v. Board of Education. As 
Roland Wolseley wrote, “a black press of some sort always will be available in the U.S.A. unless 
fully integrated means the complete eradication of the black experience, culture, temperament, 
and personality.”662 And so, the fight goes on. 
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